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CHAIRMAN ALISTER McALISTER: This is the Finance and 
Insurance committee of the Assembly conducting an interim 
study on real property financing and various problems in 
connection therewith. 
our first scheduled testimony today will come from 
various persons associated with the California Savings and 
Loan League. 
MR. BERNARD J. MIKELL: Mr. Chairman, my name is 
Bernard J. Mikell, Jr., and I represent the california Savings 
and Loan League. I would like to simply introduce Mr. McKenna 
and Dr. Pratt and make a few comments about their credentials 
and then let them take over. 
Mr. McKenna received his education at Providence College 
and his J. D. at Yale University. He is presently in practice 
in Los Angeles with the firm of McKenna and Fitting. Among 
his many qualifications he was Deputy Administrator under the 
HHFA, the predecessor of HUD under the Roosevelt Administration 
and was number two man in the Eisenhower administration. He 
has also been General Counsel for the Committee on Government 
Operations of the u. s. House of Representatives and was 
Litigation Counsel for the Federal Horne Loan Bank Board and 
and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. He 
also worked with the government of Brazil in setting up their 
housing structure, housing finance structure, and he is 
presently counsel for the California Savings and Loan League. 
Dr. Richard Pratt is presently Professor of Finance 
at the University of Utah. He is a Public Interest Director 
on the Federal Horne Loan Bank in Seattle. In 1970, he was 
appointed by the Federal Horne Loan Bank Board in Washington 
to represent the public interest. He is a member of the 
National Advisory Commission of the Federal Horne Loan Mortgage 
corporation and he was a consultant to the Federal Horne Loan 
Bank Board on the Hunt Commission which was the commission 
which was to study and make recommendations on restructuring 
the United States horne financing system and he has also been 
a consultant to the Agency for International Development on 
Housing Problems in Developing countries. 
MR. WILLIAM MCKENNA: Mr. chairman and members of the 
committee, or. Pratt has prepared a basic reference paper which 
I hope has been distributed to the members and which is avail-
able here. I will talk in general terms from the point of view 
of housing and, hopefully, Dr. Pratt will get more specific and 
talk in detail as to the particular provisions which are 
contained within the notice of the committee, that is, specifically 
charges and interest rates, and fees called premiums or pre-






wanted to talk first from the viewpoint of housing because 
really all of these instruments, no matter how much we 
clarify them and no matter how much we reduce the charges to 
borrowers or the interest rates, it all serves no purpose 
unless they get some money and this is really our problem 
here today. This is what we are struggling with, how do we 
get the money on the most economical basis possible, on the 
most practical basis possible or the basis which serves the 
needs of the people of the State of california who are selling 
houses, buying houses, who need shelter. That really is 
where I would like to address myself because that is the 
overall problem. Unless we accomplish that, we have 
accomplished nothing by changing the terms of instruments 
that do not produce money. 
I have seen and ·I have been told there have been 
continuous references here to the comparative situation in 
New York State and the state of California. We really, in 
the housing picture, have had to confront that situation since 
the close of the Second World War. Always it was New York 
that had the marvelous low interest rates, the prohibitions 
against exorbitant provisions in the loan instruments. We, in 
California, in all of that period up until the recent years 
were a capital-short state. New York had money coming out of 
its ears but New York's money carne here, it built our houses, 
we satisfied the needs of our people. We built housing for 
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them and in New York the shortage of housing got worse and 
worse and people lived in more and more dilapidated structures. 
They could not put money in housing, so all of these beauti-
ful instruments and these beautiful statutes that they devised 
only hurt the people of New York. We got the money from 
New York here in california and we built the housing here 
and that is the situation really that I would like to see 
reconstructed so that we get the money here, that we have 
the money to get the real estate business going again, that 
we can start the construction business going again, that we 
put the people to work who really need the work on construc-
tion, on house- building for their livelihood, that we give 
the real estate agents a lively real estate market, that has 
to be our objective and the argument over these provisions 
of the trust deeds must be subordinate to the major thrust, 
our major preface. And, of course, today particularly we 
have a very distressing situation. Hopefully, the last thirty 
days it seems that it is ameliorating some but it has been 
very bad. The cash flow available for housing in the thrift 
institutions of the State of California in September was about 
3% of what it was in January. It had dropped 97% from January 
to September. This is the situation we have to confront. The 
savings--or the cash flow available for housing through the 
financial intermediaries in the State of California in 




off on mortgage loans alone. The rest of it went to the 
meeting of the negative deposit flow. This is the situation. 
We have to construct. We must get money flowing into the 
housing picture again and we must get it on a basis which 
serves the needs of the people, not a lO~fo interest rate. You 
cannot really finance homes for the ordinary person over a 30-
year period at a 10~ rate. we have got to get it down and 
that is our basic effort. This is what we are struggling with 
now and I would like to put the emphasis on starting the 
money flow again into housing so that we really have a 
viable housing business--real estate busin~ss and home con-
struction, but we start with a background that all of the 
commodities in the world for which everybody can compete, its 
money. The sharpest people in the world want money. The 
biggest corporations in the world want money. The Arabs 
want it for their oil, the European countries want it to buy 
oil and we are competing with them. That is our job. We 
compete with everybody in the world except, perhaps, some 
nuns and nice people like that that have sense to remove them-
selves from this competition but even the number of them is 
reduced. Almost everybody wants money and we have gotto get 
it for housing and that is the problem and we cannot really 
take our minds away from it. 
Now, how does that relate to what we are talking about 
here? Well, I believe that we were talking--you had some 
talks yesterday by way of example on the late charge provisions. 
What harm does it do if we let somebody stay a month or two 
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late in his payments. Well, back in the '30s when we first 
started in the direct reduction loan, the long-term amortized 
loan,one of the first requirements of the federal government, 
in addition to direct reduction on its loan payments, was 
that there be an opportunity to prepay the loan but then at 
that time the federal government mandated a very onerous 
provision for late charges. Today, it is a little different. 
We do not really, I hope, need quite the provisions that the 
federal government required in earlier years and which 
still permits but let me give you an example of what happens 
when one person fails'to pay, make his loan payment on time 
and remember now it is not always the unsophisticated working 
man who fails to make his payment. Very often it is the 
calculating borrower, the professional borrower, the man who 
sees some other use for his money and if in terms of a one 
late payment on a substantial loan, that loan is rendered 
unsalable for a year to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora-
tion. If it is a $40,000 loan that means $40,000 is removed 
from the flow of funds available for housing in the state 
of California because one borrower failed to make his payment. 
Now, I say it is likely to be the sophisticated borrower who 
does not make his payment. The reason is that normally if it 
is a working man, an ordinary person, if he telephones the 
institution and says "I cannot make it." Then there is no pay-
ment, no late payment charge. The late payment is not imposed 
when somebody has a real reason for not being able to make it. 
It is normally the person who has a calculated reason for 







by him is that the entire unpaid principal balance of that 
loan is rendered unsalable to a New York purchaser, an out-of-
state purchaser and those funds do not came into the housing 
flow of the State of California and this is a basic problem 
in what we talked about--the impact of failing to make a 
payment on a loan. If, in fact, we are going to keep the 
cost of financing of homes to the people of California at 70% 
of the prime rate because the average yield in the portfolio 
of the thrift institutions in this state is 7.6% and the prime 
is still above 10% and if we are talking about keeping the 
mortgage rate in the State of california substantially under 
the rate for triple A bonds by AT&T or the big borrowers of the 
county, then really we must give to the people whose job it 
is to get this money the means of getting it and when you put. 
it in that way they are no more able to get this money than 
they are able to show to the people who are the potential 
sources of the money that they have paper that merits the 
purchase or that they can pay what they have to pay to attract 
the deposit and this means in direct relationship to the 
yield on the portfolio and to the degree that loan payments 
are late or prepayment charges, whatever it is. When we start 
talking in terms of such things as the due-on-sale clause, 
let us again reflect on what the impact of that is. We have 
constructed since 1933 a basic 30-year mortgage instrument, 
what we call a direct reduction loan instrument with, so far 
as the federal system is concerned, no subsequent payment any 
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l arger than any earlier payment. This is the requirement and 
this is the result of the reforms of the hundred days of the 
Roosevelt administration. The direct reduction, amortized 
loan payment with no subsequent payment greater than any 
previous payment. 
Put yourself in the position of a young family which 
wants to buy a horne. That family is ab l e to budget the maxi-
mum that is ever going to be required for the ownership of 
that horne during the period that it occupies the horne. This 
is the important thing. You are able to plan from the start 
on what it is going to cost you, X taxes, we cannot cover taxes, 
we cannot cover insurance but for the interest on the loan, 
for the reduction of principal of the monthly payment on the 
loan, by federal regulation, no subsequent payment can be 
greater over that 30-year period than any earlier payment so 
that the young family is able to say 11 This is all it is ever 
going to cost this family to occupy this horne." Now, we change 
it a bit, we say, "We are going to extend that. Not only are 
you going to be able to occupy this horne with no subsequent 
payment greater than any earlier payment but you are going to 
be able to sell that loan to the next purchaser." Immediately 
instead of having a loan with an average life of 8 or 10 years, 
the full contract period of 30 years becomes a possibility or 
something in between. Accordingly, the nitial interest rate to 
that borrower must go up to reflect not just what the inflation 





lender. It means that the initial cost of the loan to that 
horne borrower must be very substantially greater than it would 
be if all you were giving him is a loan for the period that 
he occupies the house. Maybe you want to do that but the cost 
is going to be much higher and, in fact, what you are doing is 
not saving the horne owner of California any money, what you are 
doing is transferring the cost from the present owner of that 
home to the subsequent borrower. You are putting the burden 
on the subsequent borrower into the housing market or the 
fellow who wants to sell his horne because you make the mortgage 
instrument, you fix the mortgage instrument at that flat rate 
and somebody who comes in has to pay more to balance it out 
because there is no fat there. The average yield in the 
thrift institutions of the state is 7.6% or thereabouts·, the 
margin for all of its overhead, all of its reserve allocations 
is not much more than 1%. There is no fat there. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Why should somebody just because 
they borrowed money in 1960 pay less interest over a 30-year 
loan than I, if I borrowed money in 1969? 
MR. McKENNA: I think your point is well taken, Mr. 
Chairman. But if we go back again to the history of it, that 
is the only place we find the answer. In 1933, the federal 
government had to buy all of the mortgages in the country and 
it had to buy it because these were short-term loans which 
suddenly matured and there was the obligation of repaying them. 
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From that, we went to the opposite extreme, which was (belt 
fades out) that in fact no sub {belt once again fails to 
record) raise the interest rate in response to the market so 
there is a limit there on how much that can be done with it . 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: over a period of time and with many 
loans, of course, ultimately you are going to be reducing the 
rate too, with a variable rate? 
MR. McKENNA: If, in fact, the federal government has 
fiscal responsibility but I do not think any of us would be 
willing to bet his own money on that right now. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: There are those of us, over the 
past generation or so we have seen inflation, but historically 
there has been no more inflation than deflation and you may 
well see a time when interest rates go down again. 
MR. MCKENNA: I think also if we were on the variable 
interest rate system there would be much greater public 
pressure to resist inflation, so I think you are right. If 
we had a variable interest rate mortgage, we would, in fact, 
eliminate many of these problems and we do not need prepayment 
charges and we do not need a due-on-sale clause if, in fact, 
we have a variable rate mortgage. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BOB CLINE: Let me ask you relative to this 
latter point that you make concerning variable interest rates. 







principal payment along with the variable interest rate, in 
other words, the principal payment moving inversely to the 
interest? 
MR. McKENNA: Yes, I think that is all the federal 
associations could do now, Mr. Cline, but the problem is that 
the principal payment, the principal reduction is such a tiny 
amount of the initial monthly payment that there is not much 
to reduce there but I agree with the principle of it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: Let us say you had a variable 
interest rate loan and the interest rate went up and the total 
payment remained constant. Is it your answer to my question, 
that the total payment would remain constant and the amount of 
the reduction of the principal will decline? 
MR. McKENNA: Well, yes, but the problem would be 
this, if we have a 30-year maximum it may be that the princi-
pal reduction becomes a negative fact of trying to crowd it 
into a fixed monthly payment. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: So, in other words, what you are 
saying is you want total leeway then to vary the total amount 
of the payment. 
MR. McKENNA: Well, obviously we would all like to keep 
that payment at a level amount. This is important to a young 
family. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: Do you envision with a variable interest 
rate loan, the increasing of total payment as interest rates 
rise? 
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MR. McKENNA: In some instances, yes, if we are going to 
have a true variable interest rate loan. I think we should 
resist it and minimize it but we may have to do it if we are 
going to keep to a 30-year maximum, have the present loan-to-
value ratios, and have the surge of interest rates that we have 
seen from time-to-time in the last few years. I do not like 
it but I think it will have to be. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: So, you are saying it will go beyond 
the 30 years? 
MR. McKENNA: I should think your original loan should 
not be made for more than 30 years but that if we have a choice 
of increasing the monthly payment or extending the loan beyond 
30 years, we should be allowed to extend it beyond thirty 
years rather than to increase the monthly payments. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: You think politically that is salable 
on a national level? 
MR. McKENNA: Not at the moment. This is a very emotional 
issue in washington. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: I would say not in the foreseeable 
future. 
MR. McKENNA: Well, but the net result is that we are 
excluding new entrance to the housing market by the present 
structure and we have to face that. A lot of the problem is 
due to the cost of constructing the home and the surge in real 




terms of 10 and 11% interest rates you do preclude a very 
hefty percentage of the respective horne owners from owning a 
horne and you have got to get that rate down. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: National l y, what percentage of the 
savings and loan lending goes into single family dwellings 
as opposed to non-single family dwellings? 
MR. McKENNA: I would only hazard a guess. I think 
the tax requirement, for tax eligibility is 7~~ but I am not 
certain of that. It certainly is more than two-thirds. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: My final question--concerning the 
due-on-sale clause--there have been a number of borrowers who 
in order to attempt to pass on to a subsequent buyer the loan, 
rather than have the payment due, enter into a land contract 
and then the homeowner then maintains the obligation as his 
and the new owner pays to the original borrower the amount to 
cover the principal and interest. I understand that the industry 
has not legally challenged this and I wonder what plans you 
have in that regard to challenge the legality of a land sale 
contract? 
MR. McKENNA: This really is not so much a practice now 
as an anticipated practice. The State Supreme Court about a 
month ago in the Lassen Savings case said that the due-on 
clause could not be exercised by a lender when the transfer 
was a transfer by a land sale contract rather than by a conveyance. 
Now, I think in my own mind this is a difference in words only. 
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That is what the supreme court held, so we anticipate and I 
think everybody anticipates that there will be a greater use 
of both sales contracts and of subordinate financing, of 
secondary financing if, in fact, the bare inference from the 
opinion is this would also so hold when there is heavy secondary 
financing. Now, this leads to the probability that in order 
to preserve the existing low-yield loan there will be wrap-around 
seconds at much higher rates and seconds normally have 
balloon payments before too long so I think really that this 
is going to send us in the direction of unsound financing, 
but all of that remains to be seen yet. I think this opinion 
is largely being analyzed from the viewpoint of its impact 
on all financing, Mr. Cline. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Thank you. You may proceed. 
MR. MCKENNA: Returning to the variable interest rate 
loan, under the laws of california the state-chartered lenders, 
in contrast with the federal, can also have short-term roll-
over notes, something in the nature of a 3 or 5 year loan with 
a balloon payment at the end which also will permit the lender 
at the end of that period or some other lender to refinance at 
the then current interest rate. These are developments that 
I think we are going to have because of the surge of infla-
tion, the uncertainty of interest rates and also because of 
the erosion of the provisions which make the long-term fixed 






CHAIRMAN McALISTER: You are saying that if you cannot 
have a due-on-sale clause and so in effect take advantage 
of the opportunity to loan money out at the higher interest 
rate being developed over a period of years that then you would 
have a series of short-term loans that would continually be 
becoming due over a period of several years so that you would 
continually refurbish your portfolio. 
MR. McKENNA: This is a real possibility. There is no 
way around the necessity of paying current rates for your 
money--current short-term rates for your money. Otherwise, 
we have the s±tuation we have had in the summer and early 
fall of this year and still have which is a very unpleasant 
situation, so we must be able to pay a higher rate for our 
savings in order to have an adequate flow of funds into housing. 
If we have an average yield in our portfolio as it is now of 
about 7.6%, new loans have to be outrageously high in order 
to have any perceptible influence on the average~ to lift 
the average. On the other hand, if the average yield on the 
portfolio went with the money market then new lending could 
be at a dramatically lesser rate. This is the.problem we have 
and the ways of achieving a solution are the variable interest 
rate loan, the short term roll-over loan and in the past, to a 
lesser degree, a due-on-sale clause which meant that instead 
of having a 30-year contract life to the loan, we would have 
a shorter actual life of perhaps eight years so that in 
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every eight year period we would have rolled over our 
portfolio. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Are not these other methods like 
the short term loan and the variable interest rate actually 
more equitable than the catch-as-catch-can system that is 
developed under the due-on-sale and prepayment penalties 
and this type of thing? I mean, this is kind of helter-skelter: 
if you sell,then there is a new loan issued to the new buyer 
and so you get higher interest rates but somebody else keeps 
their horne for 30 years, 40 years, and this does not happen 
and these other systems that you are talking about or at 
least if accepted over a period of time would apply to nearly 
everybody. 
MR. McKENNA: I think I agree with your proposition, 
but let me point this out, that the borrower now, or hopefully 
will have an option. If he likes the variable interest rate 
loan then he could pick that. If he prefers the short-term 
roll-over note, he could pick that. Now, we should also like 
to give him the form of loan that we have been using the past 
quarter century as an option, but this is not going to be a 
viable option, if we take away the provisions for a due-on-sale, 
the prepayment charges and these factors except with an 
exorbitant interest rate. I can understand a young family 
wanting to be able to budget for the time it occupies that 







CHAIRMAN McALISTER: With a person who chose that 
option of knowing exactly what he was going to pay over a 
period of time you would want the due-on-sale clause but if 
a person had a variable interest rate or a short-term loan 
then you would not want ••• 
MR. McKENNA: That would be my personal feeling. I 
would not justify a due-on-sale clause with a variable interest 
rate loan or a short-term roll-over note. I think what we have 
talked about is the essence of the problem. There is a need 
for what we call the nonoptional lender. Basically, in this 
state a savings and loan association cannot put its money 
anyplace, except to provide shelter for the average person. 
The reason for this is because you must develop these skills 
in the competitive money market among people who cannot use 
them except to get money to the homeowner. They are competing 
and our people are competing with the financial giants of 
the world and with everybody who wants money. Since the 
average homeowner cannot do this, we develop these skills 
and we develop the resources in the financial intermediary 
money market--the nonoptional lender, the savings and loan 
association--and say, "Develop your skills, get competitive, 
but the product of your skills, the money that you get flowing 
must go only to home lending." This is the only way that we 
can make the horne financing market competitive with the Arabs, 
with the countries of Europe or with General Motors. We must 
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do it this way for these people and these experts in the 
savings and loan structure, whose expertise must be limited, 
in order to give them a chance of winning in this battle for 
money and to have them develop competitive instruments. They 
must have the means of competing with the others who want 
money. When we limit them to a 30-year loan with a fixed 
interest rate and no due-on-sale clause, the task is impos-
sible. We will not get the money, and that is why I use 
New York as an example. When I was Deputy Administrator in 
•s4 it was perfectly clear to me that New York had all of 
these beautiful protective devices for borrowers and they 
were not building houses, nor sheltering their people. We, 
in California, were. We were getting the money from New York 
and we were putting it into california home construction. This 
is what I would like to see start again, and this is the 
overpowering need. We should not talk in terms of these 
isolated provisions of trust deeds, but how do you put roofs 
over the people of the State. Hopefully, Dr. Pratt can help 
us relate these two. 
DR. RICHARD T. PRATT: Let me say initially that it is 
a great pleasure to speak to this group. California has long 
had the national reputation of being the leader in both 
providing housing and housing finance and I think that you 
have a record that you can truly be proud of. I hope that 
the deliberations that your group will undertake will restore 






In following up on what Bill has had to say, I thought 
we might get into some of the aspects of the mortgage loan 
and its viability as an economic instrument. I would, of 
course, like you to interrupt at any time, some of the points 
will be fairly technical, but I think they will lay a solid 
groundwork on how each of the aspects of the instrument works. 
If we take a look at the mortgage loan, which Bill has mentioned, 
we are really seeing sort of two difficulties that are facing 
us at this time. First is the overriding economic problem of 
borrowing short and lending long which I intend to address 
myself to in a few moments. Second is the current interest 
rate in the mortgage instrument, itself, and the various 
provisions of it, such as late charges, the prepayment charge, 
and so on. 
First, I would like to say that these two things are 
very much interrelated. I think Bill has laid the groundwork. 
The mortgage is a financial instrument. It must compete with 
other financial instruments and it is a very large part of 
America's capital markets. The new funds raised through mort-
gage lending may be as much as three or four times the total 
new corporate borrowing in any year. This is the country's 
biggest capital market. We need to make every effort to 
insure that the instrument operating in that capital market 
is as efficient as possible. I think we need to be certain 
that no state isolates itself from this national market. I 
will give you figures which show the growing importance and 
dependence of california on other states in this system. 
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Something which I think needs to be clearly established 
is the fact that our mortgage lending system has operated 
with great efficiency. If we look at the last ten years 
and look at the record of savings and loan associations 
their net profit is something like 70 cents a year per $100 
of mortgage loan. This is total compensation for facing 
massive interest rate risks. Anyone of us looking at what 
has happened to the economy in the past few years have to 
say that a person who undertakes to borrow short and lend 
for thirty years in these markets is really taking a rather 
substantial market position. He receives about 70 cents a 
year for every $100 of mortgages that he serves. The total 
cost of obtaining funds, servicing loans, attracting funds 
through savings accounts, lending, providing a return to the 
owners of savings and loan associations or providing for 
reserves in the case of mutual institutions amounts to no 
more than 2% per year of the mortgage balances outstanding. 
Another important point is this secondary mortgage 
market. The state of california and the western United States, 
in general, depend very heavily on this market. Let me 
explain briefly, what it is. This is the origination of 
mortgage loans by an ~riginal lender, a savings and loan, a 
mortgage banker or others, and the sale of these loans on 
either local or national markets. The figures are really 








western United states, of the estimated 3.8 million single-family 
loans in this part of the country, approximately 1.4 million 
or about 36% of the total have been supplied by funds outside 
of this geographic region. More than 1/3 of the mortgage 
credit for single-family lending is coming from outside the 
region. 
What is the importance of these facts? Purchasers in 
this secondary market, whether they be federal agencies or 
other private financial institutions accept certain provisions 
in the mortgage. They anticipate being able to depend upon 
certain aspects of the contract. If this contract is modified 
or made less competitive as a financial instrument, it 
becomes an unattractive investment for lenders, for federal 
agencies, or perhaps precludes their purchasing of California 
mortgages, 36% of such funds coming from outside the area. 
Any action which would impair the salability of California's 
mortgages is simply denying mortgage credit to the home buyers 
of california. It is likely that this is going to be a more 
and more important source of funds. At the present time, 
what new mortgage lending there is, is coming mainly from 
federal agencies operating through the secondary market. This 
would be the Fanny Mae and the Ginny Mae programs, and the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation's purchase of mort-
gages. Thus, this secondary market and the fact that we have 
a national instrument are factors which should be kept in mind 
as we discuss the mortgage. 
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I would like to reinforce a point Bill made. Legal 
prohibition that precludes something like the due-on-sale 
clause or a late charge, in fact, reduce the lender's option. 
They reduce the borrower's option. Many of these provisions 
assess the cost where they occur. Should a person who is 
punctual in his mortgage payments have to pay the burden or 
"carry on his back" the person who is not punctual and is 
inept in making his payments? Quite often these clauses 
assess direct user charges, as we do away with these clauses, 
these charges must be lumped into the interest rate. We 
are not charging individuals for a cost which they do not 
incur upon the system and for which they are not responsible. 
It seems a less equitable system than that which we presently 
have. 
Let me refer now to the operational setting of a 
savings and loan association, and establish a base of effi-
ciency of operation. one of the real functions, I think, 
that mortgage lenders and savings and loan associations 
especially perform is this process of intermediation or 
assembly funds and dispersing them in the mortgage market. 
They do this essentially by borrowing short and lending long. 
The sources of funds for these associations are few. The 
first is the passbook savings, which is, of course~ withdrawable 
immediately and is subject to interest rate pressures of all 
types. An interest rate must be paid which will obtain those 







somewhat longer, is still relatively of short duration--
normally under 4 years. The certificate of deposit advances 
from the Federal Horne Loan Bank and have an average dura-
tion of up to five years. However, the average maturity 
of these across the country is presently eight months. 
On the other side, the mortgage lender offers loans 
for an average of 25 to 27 years. Now, we have talked about 
and will continue to talk about some options for this type of 
lending, such as the variable interest rate for the short-
term note. A very valuable service that the savings and 
loan association is performing is its financial expertise. 
It can go to the typical homeowner and say, "Look, there is 
financial risk in the market. Interest rates have changed. 
We are willing to bear that risk, keep it from you, and 
provide you with a loan where you can count on the payment 
being a certain amount as long as you have tenure in this 
house. You will know what portion of your monthly payment is 
for principal and interest." 
The price which the savings and loan has charged has 
been a very modest fee based on the figures, which I just 
gave you, to assume this interest rate risk. If we wish to 
shift it to the borrower, we have to ask the question: 
Is this really a very good thing to do, if he is able as the 
professional manager to bear that risk? As bng as the long-
term fixed interest rate mortgage has the appropriate tools 
associated with it, it allows such long-term fixed rate 
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lending. Look what happens, though, when we artifically 
extend the maturity of those loans or do such things as 
eliminate the due-on-sale. If we look at the 1965 portfolio 
of the Eleventh Federal Horne Loan Bank District, which 
covers California, Nevada and Airzona, they were earning an 
average of $6.37 per year per $100 of mortgages held. Of 
course, this figure continues as long as any portion of that 
portfolio is on the books, thus we see that the figures from 
1965 to 1973 for the portfolio held in 1965 remain at $6o37. 
The second line shows what has happened to the average cost of 
funds for these associations. When they made the loans 
in 1965, which is our benchmark year, the average cost of 
funds, plus their 1.2% operating costs amounted to $5.93. By 
1973, this figure had risen to $6.93. While there was a 
dollar increase, there is no increased return on the portfolio. 
The cost or the profitability of holding that mortgage goes 
from a positive 44%, 44 cents per $100 in 1965 to a minus 
56 cents in 1973. 
ASSEMBLYMAN JOHN KNOX: May I ask a question. Is 
it correct that as the payments come in they are re-lending 
the money at the higher rate? 
DR. PRATT: That is correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Thus, is it not correct to point out 







DR. PRATT: Yes. It is the volume and active market 
with these instruments which have allowed the savings and 
loan association to remain in business and make a profit. You 
are pointing out the importance of the due-on-sale clause. 
A substantial source of funds is the early repayment of the 
loan. This source is the result of the due-on-sale clause. 
It is this "rolling 11 of the portfolio, which has allowed 
California associ.ations to continue to operate. But the 
opposite side of the picture shows that as we slow down this 
ability, we force the mortgages to stay on the books and this 
becomes untenable. It just becomes untenable. No matter 
what your volume is, if you lose a little bit on each loan, 
you do not make it up. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: I am not certain I understand how 
this roll-over loan works. In other words, somebody would take 
a loan for five years or same other time period and the 
institution would agree, in advance to re-lend the money at the 
market rate? 
DR. PRATT: I intend to discuss this. 
The point is that since World War II these interest 
rates have continually moved upward on each loan. As it 
stays on the books it has become an unprofitable entity. Thus, 
it is a fact that these loans are paid off and partly paid 
off as a result of the due-on-sale clause or other aspects 
of the contract and the clause has maintained the viability of 
the instrument. For instance, let me refer back to the 
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secondary market for just a moment. on the average, when 
secondary market transactions are made, it is assumed that 
the mortgage will have a 12-year life. This obviously assumes 
some early pay-offs. If you eliminate the due-on-sale clause 
or if you do things to discourage such pay-offs, the 12-year 
life is not going to exist. 
I do not think we need to say much about the interest 
rate. There has been freedom of contract as to the level of 
this interest rate. Evidence shows that states which have 
restricti ve usury laws do not have mortgage lending. There 
was an excel l ent article in the St. Louis Federal Reserve 
Review in the last couple of months which you might find 
useful, if you are interested. 
There are two types of closing costs and origination 
fees. 
First are those which represent the hard costs to the 
lender of putting a loan on the books. It seems appropriate 
that these be charged at the time that the loan is closed. 
They are costs associated with the origination of the mort-
gage loan. It seems to be a better time and place to charge 
them rather than spreading them over the life of the loan. 
Second are those associated with origination fees and 
discount points. This is the market freedom. Even though there 
are loan disclosure requirements, such as the actual loan 
interest percentage rate, both the lender and borrower do 
have options. For some borrowers, the lender may prefer a 





others, the opposite may be true. This is a matter which 
can now be negotiated between the borrower and the lender. 
We also get into same difficulties in the secondary 
market if there is interference with the origination of fees. 
As you know, HUD has set arbitrary levels at which FHA loans 
should be made. When these arbit·rary levels are not the same 
as the market, the price of the mortgage changes in the 
secondary market. We have seen FHA mortgages carrying as much 
as 8 points of discount at various times to make them viable 
in this national secondary market. I would think that no 
state would want to consider any sort of legislation which 
might at some time preclude the marketing of their mortgages 
in such a market. 
Prepayment charge& Why do prepayment charges exist 
and what role do they fill? 
Let us look back at this interest rate risk for just 
a moment, if we might. When interest rates are rising the 
mortgage lender has no right to call the loan, nor has he the 
right normally to accelerate the interest rate on the loan. 
He must live with that portfolio. When interest rates fall, 
the borrower has every right to prepay and to re-finance at 
the lower interest rate, which would be to his advantage. 
For example, a 25-year, $10,000 loan has a 9% 
interest rate. If the loan is paid off at the end of year 5 
and if a prepayment charge is used, following the federal 
formula, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board has said that pre-
payment charges may not exceed 6 months' interest on the amount 
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prepaid, less 20% of the original balance of the loan. 
Thus, we have a loan balance at the end of year 5 of $9,327. 
We have a prepayment charge of $330, based on the formula, 
which I mentioned. If the borrower prepays at that time, the 
loan has cost him 9.53%. In other words, that is the effect 
of the prepayment charge. How low would rates have to be 
before he would be better off, that is, have a lower monthly 
payment, if he re-financed? Rates would only have to drop from 
9% to 8.66% to make it advantageous for him to pay off the 
previous loan, pay the prepayment charge and negotiate a new 
loan. So, on the rising interest rate side where a borrower 
in 1965 may have gotten a loan at 6 3/4% and today rates 
are 10~, nearly a 400 basis point increase, the lender has 
had no recourse whatsoever. He has to live with this and 
has been willing to do so. If interest rates were to fall 
we can see from this fairly typical example that they need 
fall only 34 basis points before the borrower would find it 
advantageous to re-finance. So this is a modest, a very modest, 
sharing of the interest rate risk. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: Have you built into this re-financing 
rate new origination fees? 
DR. PRATT: The 8.66% would have to be the effective 
rate, which would be a combination of the contract rate and 
the new origination fees. For instance, if the new contract 
rate were 8~, you could have about one point or a little 
more and it would make it the 8.66, so the 8.66 is an effective 





CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Dr. Pratt . When interest rates 
are rising, the borrower does not really have any incentive 
to sell or re-finance. Why have prepayment charges under 
those circumstances? 
DR. PRATT: In that case, we would probably say that 
the prepayment charge was a matter of negotiation between 
borrower and lender at the time that it was originated, and 
if both parties freely understand its operation, I would see 
no reason to preclude it. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Of course, things like that are 
never freely negotiated. Isn't that a bit of a legalistic 
myth to say that any of this is freely negotiated? 
DR. PRATT: I think that there are two aspects. The 
negotiation of individual borrowers of single family house may 
be limited, however, acting as a system I think the negotiation 
works rather thoroughly. You may have noticed in the paper 
yesterday that mortgage interest rates have already dropped 
in some instances. The system has been amazingly sensitive to 
competition. I think we would have to conclude that given 
the fact that economic changes have been rapid, readjustments 
have been made rather rapidly and rates have come down at 
the first sign of decrease in demand or any increase in supply 
of funds. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: No, it does not and you can only 
get so much blood out of a turnip. 
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DR. PRATT: I think from a pure economic rationale 
your point has some validity. 
MR. McKENNA: If, in fact, the increase in interest 
rates were such as we experienced from perhaps the end of the 
Korean war or until 1965, then there was a need for the 
prepayment clause because the interest rate rise was so modest 
that the loss of income during the replacement of the loan 
may have cost the institutions that much. But we are talking 
today in a totally different ball park and when we have this 
surging interest rate then obviously from an economic point of 
view the prepayment is not needed by the lender and there 
is not much economic justification for it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: I do not know why you fellows do 
not use the historic argument on prepayment. It dates back 
from the early English lenders. Now, of course, we have a 
more mecuric situation, but nevertheless I think that it 
at least has some validity. However, on a rising market, I 
see no justification for it at all. 
MR. McKENNA: Well, it certainly is not a rapidly rising 
market. I might go back a bit into the history of it. The 
Bank Board in 1934-35 for the first time required that 
mortgage loans must have a prepayment privilege, which pro-
vided that the borrower must have the right to prepay. At 
that time, the Bank Board put in exactly the same formula 
which is present today. Maybe they should be reconsidering 







buying a bond from a major corporation and it wants to 
call that bond, it has to pay a premium, which is a prepayment 
charge on that is a competitive instrument. Now they are the 
borrower, the big corporation, if there is a public market 
for that bond can go and buy it at the current rate in the 
public market. I really cannot say that if we are going 
to have this continuing surge of interest rates that we should 
have the present prepayment charges in there. I think that 
probably the Bank Board will consider a national change if we 
are going to have a repetition of this. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: Is it customary within the industry 
now to eliminate a prepayment penalty when the refinancing is 
done with the same institution? 
MR. MIKELL: In California, yes, that is true. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: That applies to federal and state 
institutions? 
DR. PRATT: Yes, as a matter of tradition it would be 
true for essentially all lenders. You will find wide varia-
tions in the way individual lenders apply this. Many lenders, 
in fact, would be very careful and very unlikely to charge 
a prepayment penalty in a period of rising interest rates, but 
it o~viously does vary a good deal from institution to institution. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: I think that this is a point that 
is a little troubling to some of us. There seems to be 
marked inconsistency at least between institutions and perhaps 
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as between different borrowers. We had a lady here yester-
day who told us her sad story about having to pay a prepay-
ment penalty although she understood the same institution 
waived the penalty for other people. I think it was the 
same institution that was going to carry the loan for the 
next purchaser and, of course, I do not know all of the 
facts on that, but the reported inconsistency as to the 
troubling thing. 
DR. PRATT: Yes, I have tried to establish sort of an 
economic basis for it as a sharing of the interest rate risk. 
I think that is a very valid use of this. Certainly, I am 
sure this committee will have mweigh other circumstances 
associated with it. 
The next section that we might take a look at is the 
late charges. I think the only comment that I would care to 
make at this time is that the late charge really serves two 
economic functions. One, the late charge should clearly 
cover the cost imposed by the individual who makes his pay-
ment late. I would like to reinforce that some of those 
costs may not be evident. The point that Bill made earlier 
that a history of late payments jeopardizes the sale of this 
mortgage in secondary markets should not be overlooked. That 
is an extremely important point and it may mean that $30,000 
or $40,000 or whatever of mortgage credit is simply not 
available because this instrument became ineligible for the 






fact that payments are late, delays the cash flow to a 
lending institution and that, by itself, reduces the amount 
of funds which might be available. Along with these direct 
costs it certainly is in the borrower's interest to be 
punctual in his payments. I believe that the late charge 
should reflect in increment to encourage him to be punctual. 
This is something which certainly is in his long-run interest. 
I do not think any of us would argue that we would like to 
see a situation which encouraged delinquency. 
The impounding of tax and insurance funds is essen-
tially not required in california any more, so I will not 
comment on that. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: But on the late charge matter, has 
the industry done any studies or d~ they have any statistics 
which might show us what their costs are because apparently 
that is going to be the test in california now, it would 
be good for us to know what the costs are of processing, 
including the loss to you, of a late payment. 
DR. PRATT: I did not make a study for this presentation. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: That is what the Supreme court of 
the State has said and either it is going to be finally 
decided through further litigation or the Legislature is 
going to have to establish by legislative fiat what those 
costs are. It would be nice to make a rational decision 
rather than just picking a figure out of the air. 
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DR. PRATT: I think that as the litigation progresses, 
we will have a better reference point as to what these costs 
are in competing institutions. 
in litigation right now. 
This is a very active point 
I would like to spend some time on what I think is 
perhaps economically the most important element of the mort-
gage and that is the due-on-sale clause, which we discuss 
beginning on page 18.* We take a look at the operation of this, 
the consequences of its elimination and some of the substi-
tutions that might occur. I have presented for your perusal 
at your pleasure the hypothetical effect of the due-on-sale 
clause, which is shown on page 19, which just compares a 
loan--two loans which were closed at the end of December, 
1974, at essentially then current interest rates. we take 
a look at the subsequent sale of this property at two later 
points in time, assuming under one situation that no due-on-
sale clause operates and under the other situation that the 
due-on-sale clause does operate. As you can see at the 
bottom of the page, the total payments received vary rather 
substantially. In fact, in this particular example the 
lender would have had to charge approximately 1% higher rate 
on the original loan to make up for the absence of the due-on-
sale clause. That is, where this loan was a 6% loan, in the 
absence of the due-on-sale clause to get the same total 
economic return over the life of the loan it would have had 
to be a 7% rateo 







In general, the due-on-sale clause, of course, operates 
to shorten the maturity of these loans. We have seen from 
previous figures that this is absolutely essential. Let 
us examine or ask the question what happens if this due-on-
sale clause were to be eliminated? The first point we might 
look at is how does this affect the borrower and is it always 
to his advantage? This is generally considered that it will 
be to the advantage of the borrower. However, the advantage 
may be slight or nonexistent under certain circumstances. 
First, there has been a tremendous inflation in housing 
prices which makes the existing mortgage, in many cases, rather 
inadequate. If you would glance at page 22 of the paper you 
would get an indication of how the average price of a new 
home sold in the western United States in 1967 has changed. 
That home at that time sold for $26,100. By 1973, it sold for 
$37,200. On the next page we get an indication of how the 
original loan may prove quite inadequate as a financing 
instrument for the person buying the home. Let me run through 
this example with you. The original cost of the house in 1967 
was $26,100. A 75% loan at that time would have provided 
financing of $19,575 and a monthly payment of $132.17 for 
principal and interest. By the end of 1973 the unpaid balance 
on that loan would be $17,281. Based on the price of his 
house in 1973, it would require $27,900 to bring that back 
up to a 75% loan, a level which the borrower might require at 
the time of purchase. A new loan on the $27,900 at 8~~ 
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which was the rate at that time, would be $244.66 per month. 
The assumption of the existing loan provides only 54%, 
I believe it is a 46% loan to value ratio. In other words, 
another $10,619 of financing must be found in addition to 
the existing loan to bring it up to a 75% loan. What is 
this financing likely to look like. It is a rather substantial 
amount, $10,600. It is unlikely that it is going to be a 
long-term fully amortizing loan. Much more likely it is going 
to be a 5-year, 7-year loan with a balloon payment. One of 
the great reasons for going to the fully amortizing mort-
gage was to get away from the problems of balloon payments 
and r~financing, assuming loans of this type brings us right 
back into the era of large balloon payments. 
I have made the kindest possible assumptions here 
I think concerning keeping the loan on the books, if the 
individual could get a 25-year second mortgage the highest 
rate he could pay to keep his total monthly payment the same 
as a new loan would be is only 9.46%. As you are well aware, 
second mortgages are not generally available at 9.46%, but in 
many cases may be at nearly twice that level. Well, what are 
the other options. We might have a purchase money mortgage or 
a contract. These are not very liquid investments. It is 
questionable whether we wish to encourage a proliferation of 
these and have a large portion of the public holding contracts 
or purchase money mortgages which, if they are to be sold on 






of rapid inflation such as we have had, it is very 
questionable how often the borrower's interest may be 
served by elimination of the due-on-sale clause. 
Let us take a look at some of the possibilities from 
the point of view of the lending institution. I have 
mentioned three possibilities that may occur. One, the 
association could absorb the losses. Two, switching to 
variable rate or short-term instruments. Three, continuing 
long-term lending but at a substantially higher contract 
rate. We have made the point before that associations are 
rather efficient and operate on rather small margins. This 
point is made again fairly effectively on page 25. Page 25 
shows the average yield on the portfolio for each year from 
1965 to 1973, the cost of funds, the amount available for 
operating expenses and income, the actual average operating 
expenses and the net margin on mortgages held. You can see 
that per $100 of mortgages held that margin was 40 cents 
one year, 7 cents one year, minus 1 cent another year, the 
average figure over the 1965 to 1973 average margin on 
mortgages held over cost of funds and operating expenses 
21 cents per $100 of mortgages held. You just cannot 
remove a clause like the due-on-sale clause that may make 
essentially 1% difference in the interest rate over a 30-year 
period when you have a margin that is 1/5 of 1% on your 
lending. The arithmetic does not work. The savings and 
loan association, the lender, cannot absorb that kind of 
loss. It must be passed on to other borrowers. Here is 
where the tax and subsidy comes in. We tax new borrowers 
who are trying to obtain homes at this time in the market 
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in order to provide a subsidy to someone who may have 
purchased his home under a contract, we provide a subsidy 
perhaps to someone who sold under a contract and is 
essentially creating a wrap-around mortgage in which he 
may have a rather high rate of return. It seems like a 
very questionable direction for public policy. 
The variable interest rate mortgage we have discussed 
previously. It would effectively solve this interest rate 
risk problem. It would take care of it. However, it does 
reduce the option of the borrower and the lender. I 
would maintain that one of the very valuable services that 
lenders have to sell is the assumption of this market 
interest rate risk and that they can assume this risk more 
cheaply than the average working man. Therefore, it is a 
good product for them. It is one product that they should 
have in their bag of tools, and to remove this from them 
does a disservice to the borrower. We should also note 
that the variable interest rate mortgage does exactly 
the same thing as the due-on-sale. The only reason anyone 
would object to the due-on-sale is that they now have to 
pay current market rates for their mortgage, under a variable 
interest rate mortgage they will also be paying current 
rates so it does not maintain that subsidy that the elimina-
tion of the due-on-sale does. It essentially provides the 
same aspect. The variable rate mortgage is a good tool. It 
is one we should have. It is not a reason for eliminating 






ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: The question I asked earlier 
was concerning the variable interest rate and the realistic 
adoption of a variable interest rate. certainly at a 
national level, my understanding the answer to my question 
was it would require changes in federal legislation in 
order to do it. It would not? 
DR. PRATT: You were talking about the changes of 
payment v. the change of maturity. It might be interesting 
to see that, Dr instance, on a 9%, 30-year loan of $10,000 
you would have a payment of $80.46 per month. In the first 
year about $69 goes to reduce the principal, or an average 
of about $5.72 per month so if interest rates went up only 
~ of 1% you would immediately go to a perpetuity if you 
were justrrying to adjust maturities with a change of 
only ~ of 1%, the variable interest rate mortgage would 
fail or else you would have negative amortization. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: I see something which looking at 
the effect on the industry of realistic politics, either 
at the national or the state level, the variable interest 
rate in the rising market would meet with, I would guess, 
widespread public disapproval. Are you offering then or 
is the industry in a position where attempting to put that 
straw man up in order to maintain its due-on-sale clause? 
DR. PRATT: I do not think it is a straw man. I think 
the figures we have presented show that operations just 
could not if we have another economic period such as we have 
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had. If we have that sort of rising interest rate, without 
the due-on-sale clause mortgage lending could not have taken 
the form it has taken. I do not know for sure what the 
actual experienced alternative will be but it just could 
not happen. Maybe it will be the other option. I will 
mention of just having a higher initial rate but I doubt 
that the public would be very pleased with a 12% or 13% 
new rate today in order to cover the market risk of a 30-year 
loan. I do not know what the alternatives are but facing 
25 and 30 year maturities with no chance of shortening them 
in conditions of economic uncertainty such as we have, is 
a very costly process. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: What about taking the opposite 
approach towards the other extreme of developing a viable 
source of long-term financing available to savings and loan 
institutions? 
DR. PRATT: I think this is clearly something that 
is important and is something that the industry has not 
sat on, average maturities and so on of liabilities have 
risen very rapidly. The Federal Horne Loan Bank System 
brought out a new credit policy in 1971, which allowed 
long-term advances. The introduction of the certificate 
and the proliferation of certificates has helped. A lot 
more needs to be done. We should remember that all long-








in the last two months have been out at about 10.5%, 
for 20 or 25 years and even with 1~~ operating costs and 
a margin for handling the funds we are looking at 11~~ 
mortgage rate when we have those new use sources. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: Do you anticipate with the federal 
government essentially being the largest single borrower in 
the market place today, we see a shortening of the length 
of term of federal debt ••• 
DR. PRATT: That has happened at the Treasury level, 
however, it has not happened at the savings and loans source 
of funds which is the consolidated obligations of the 12th 
Federal Horne Loan Banks. Their average two years ago, I 
believe was. around 18 months. At the present time and 
through this period of very tight money the roll-overs have 
maintained an average of 36 months. While the federal debt 
may have been shortening the federal Horne Loan Bank System 
has been doing a good job of maintaining a balanced term 
structure. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: Do you consider that kind of roll-
over, a balanced term structure for the industry? 
DR. PRATT: I think further development of long-term 
sources of funds should be pursued very strongly. However, 
I do not think we should kid ourselves that there is 30-year 
6% money around. That is all I am saying. Long-term money 
in a period of economic uncertainty is very expensive money. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: The question is better to direct 
it to the industry, do you feel that there is any viable 
pressure at the federal level in order to achieve a change 
in the techniques of financing mortgage money. 
DR. PRATT: There is a good deal of work being done 
at the present time in one area that is receiving a great 
deal of attention--the mortgage bank security which will 
allow the pooling of mortgages to be backed by securities, 
either private or having some government association with 
them. I think this is a very promising source of funds and 
one that is aggressively being pursued. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: What kind of total volume are you 
looking at? 
DR. PRATT: To make any dent in the mortgage market we 
would be talking perhaps $10 billion a year. It would be 
a very large market and there obviously are some real 
problems associated with bringing instruments of that size 
into the capital market. 
MR. McKENNA: We are giving a great deal of considera-
tion and working a great deal on a possible proposal to you 
people which is a development of the federal mortgage-backed 
bond proposal. It would be that we would be allowed to 
fund an agency which you would create, directors would have 
to be appointed, of course, by either the Governor or the 






our mortgages, it would issue tax-exempts on the basis of 
them and the proceeds ~uld be used through the savings and 
loans to get housing going again in the State. We are 
working intensely on that. We would in no sense use the 
credit of the state. It would explicitly say that the 
obligations are not a moral obligation of the State. We 
would put up the money, we would put up the assets. The 
agency, the California agency and under the direction of 
the State would get all of its financingftom us, whether or 
not we can construct this in a way that you would find 
appealing and within the interest of the State, we are 
still wrestling with it. on the question of whether or not 
we are throwing up an impossibility or a ghost here on 
variable interest rates, it could not be anymore different 
than that than it is because we are working with tremendous 
intensity on this. We see it as a necessary tool, an absolutely 
vital tool. We have been in extensive discussions in Washing-
ton with this, with the whole Federal Home Loan Bank Beard, 
in one session for three and a half hours with the chairman 
of the House Banking, with the Secretary of the Treasury 
personally and with the Secretary of HUD, trying to get 
the federal government to create a more attractive atmos-
phere for variable interest rate loans. There is no need 
for legislation either in the state level or the federal 
level. On the federal level we have a very limiting regula-
tion, the Bank Board says, it is essential to chapge the 
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regulation but we cannot do it without a blessing from 
Congress, even though there is no necessity for legal 
action by congress. This is a very difficult area. We 
need this tool to provide financing and there is resistance 
but it is resistance that I believe is emotional. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: You are saying, while we do not 
need legislation, you are not going to do it without some 
expression of approval from Congress. 
MR. McKENNA: We do not say that. We have this problem. 
That is the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: That is the problem of regulation, 
isn•t it, that you need the Home Loan Bank Board regulation 
to be changed? 
MR. McKENNA: our state chartered associations do not. 
The regulations inhibit only the federal associations but 
we are not permitted to compare notes and say that we are 
going to do a part of our lending on variable interest rates. 
We must compete with each other and as lawyers you would not 
let the industry cross that line of deciding it is going to 
do this in a certain percentage. we need something in the 
way of a mandate from some supervisor. It is a highly competi-
tive industry and we do not do these things, we cannot get 
together to do them and we cannot do them in the competitive 
arena unless the other fellow does too. That is the dilemma. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: You mean you cannot compete unless 
you are regulated? 
MR. McKENNA: They have to tell us that we have to do a 
certain percentage in this form. I t gets down pretty much 
to that. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has got to tell the 
industry, a percentage of your lending must be on this 
basis, or we will not do it because our first objective is 
intense competition, each with the other. That is the 
situation. 
CHA I RMAN McALISTER: Dr. Pratt indicated there is a 
serious problem with the variable interest rate if you apply 
it in a manner in which you extend the maturity date; what 
was it, how much of an interest rate increase did it require 
before you weren'to•• 
DR. PRATT: One-half of one percent is all that could 
be tolerated. I agree that the variable rate is a vital 
tool but it is not the answer to all questions. The fixed 
rate, fixed term mortgage is a very viable and vital tool 
that must be preserved . If you look at the equitable way of 
distributing this interest rate risk I think the present 
instrument has a good deal to commend itself. Under the 
due-on-sale, the individual purchasing a house is assured of a 
single set payment for principal and interest essentially as 
long as his tenure in the horne remains unchanged and S&Ls 
and others have found that they can live with that. At the 
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time a sale takes place, I do not see that we should have an 
implied warranty to either provide the old seller with a profit 
from his financing or to provide the new purchaser with a 
subsidized interest rate. We are at that time again at an 
arm's length transaction. The due-on-sale has done a good job 
of protecting the homeowner and his fixed payment while he 
is in the house and at the same time bringing in an arm's 
length transaction when his tenure in the home changes. His 
tenure in the home is never threatened by the change of 
payment, he can budget it, he is protected from a great deal 
of risk. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: The variable interest rate is at 
least a partial approach at something like indexation, isn't 
it? 
DR. PRATT: Yes, it is. The indexing problems, of 
course, are very substantial. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Of course, it is only a partial 
approach at it and at least in Brazil they apply it more or 
less across the whole economy. Let me clarify one thing. A 
one-half of a percent increase in the interest rate would 
eliminate any reduction in the principal? 
DR. PRATT: Approximately ~- Let me just run over those 
figures again. We had a $10,000 loan originated at 9% for 
30 yearso It gave us a payment of $80.46 per month. My 
quick calculation showed that the principal reduction during 
the year, I thin~, was about $69 or~.72 per month. 
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0 
That is the first year, or $69 per year, 69/100 of 1% on a 
0 
$10,000 loan. The first few years a loan amortizes, most of 
the amortization takes place near the end of the loan so this 
example, while on the first year would be quite characteristic 
0 
of the first several years. 
MR. McKENNA: It would be helpful if you gentlemen would 
give consideration to the possibility of our increasing the 
0 
term beyond 30 years in the event that is the alternative 
from the variable interest rate to upping the payment. I 
think that if we were given, not necessarily the power to make 
0 
an initial loan for a period of more than 30 years but rather 
when the interest rate goes up under a variable interest instru-
ment that instead of what we are talking about here that with an 
increase in the monthly payments that we be able to extend the 
terms beyond 30 years, perhaps 40 years. I think that would 
be something that might serve the interest of the borrowers. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: However, Dr. Pratt is saying it 
could end up that you would never pay off the loan. 
MR. McKENNA: In many cases that would be true but even 
that does not bother me so much if we have negative arnortiza-
tion, if, in fact, we have an inflationary market and the value 
of the house is going up. Is that so terrible? 
MR. McKENNA: I am talking like a way-out left person now 
but I am not that much horrified by the prospect of negative 
amortization. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Most of the people in the country are 
- -
in perpetual debt. There is no question of that. 
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MR. McKENNA: I think we have to, if we are going to have 
this basic problem of rampantinflation I think we have to re-orient 
our thinking and maybe get exacting concepts that we have not been 
willing to accept before. 
ASSEMBLYMAN RICHARD HAYDEN: It is my understanding that 
the variable interest rate is already in effect in california. 
If it is correct, how many savings and loan institutions are 
involved, and is it too early to indicate even preliminarily 
how successful they have been or are at this particular time, 
particularly in view of the economic situation? 
MR. MIKELL: In California the california State chartered 
associations has had this power for at least a decade that I 
know of. As has been pointed out, the federally chartered asso-
ciations cannot write variable rate notes at the present time. 
There is a restriction upon both associations that a loan 
cannot go longer than 30 years, so in practice, what has 
been done and there are variable rate notes and they have been 
written with varying degrees by different associations over the 
years. A loan will be written for 25 years and then the payment 
remains constant, in answer to Mr. Cline's question, throughout 
the loan. The principal amortization is reduced. This has 
had good customer-borrower acceptance because he knows that his 
payment may change but his payment remains constant and the due 
date may go on a little longer to 26 or 27. It is something 
he does not really worry about. At present, there is one shop 





loans for the last 12 years. There is another shop that I 
know even better that has written nothing but variable rate 
notes for the last four years. When the rate, the one that 
I know better is the one down south and when the rate for the 
past four years the rate has been raised twice and reduced 
once. When the rate is raised the borrower may pay off his 
loan with no charge. Out of 1,000 loans which were spot-
checked on the last rate increase, which happened about six 
or eight months ago, three responses were received. customer 
acceptance has been tremendous. The problem, of course, is 
customer acceptance going into the loan and here is where 
the problem comes. Most borrowers, just as most of us here, 
believe rates are going to go up so they say why should I 
lock myself into paying a rate which goes up as the rate goes 
up. I want that 30-year fixed rate term. That has been 
the biggest problem with acceptance of variable rate notes. 
one of the major associations, a billion dollar association, 
one of the top fifteen in the country in california has 
about $25,000,000 out in variable rate notes and it has been 
extremely difficult first to sell those and then to maintain 
them. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Are these variable rate notes the 
kind that would result in an increased monthly payment? 
MR. MIKELL: First of all there is a problem with the 
standard to which this fluctuating rate is tied. Secondly, 
the problem is that the increase is rated differently than 
the decrease. As I understand it now, the lender must make 
a reduction when that standard is tied to bank board borrowings 
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and variable things which are outside the scope of just 
california. When it drops one-tenth of 1% the lender must 
drop the rate, but he cannot raise the rate until it goes 
up 25/100 of 1%. I am not sure if there is a prohibition 
against increasing the actual payment but as we all know, the 
Wisconsin experience was utter disaster when they waited 
too long and then tried to raise the rate 2~/o and that was 
a situation that occurred within the last year. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: This is an area of the law that 
you think may need some checking into for possible legislation? 
MR. MIKELL: Yes. We are now dealing with your major 
lenders in the State, residential lenders. In direct response 
I think to Mr. Knox' question, more than 95% of the savings 
and loan assets are in residential mortgages--single family or 
multiple and you are taking half the market approximately, 
or 40% of the federal market which would be excluded from 
anything you did. What Mr. McKenna is saying is on a federal 
level we would love to have a variable rate note, make all 
of us do it, do not give the option to the borrower any more. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Do I understand though because of 
the 30-year limitation on your loans that on these current 
variable rate mortgages you are not increasing the maturity 
date or extending the maturity date, you are increasing the 
payment. 
MR. MIKELL: No. Generally when they write the variable 
rate notes the maturity will be for 25 or 26 years. 





MR. MIKELL: Yes. It would mean a higher initial payment 
because you are getting a 25-year loan amortized over 25 years 
vice over 30. 
MR. McKENNA: We do believe that the commissioner should 
re-interpret the statute to permit the term to recommence 
when the interest rates are adjusted and if it were so 
interpreted, which we think is a good interpretation, 
that problem would be ameliorated. I think it would also 
be better if you gentlemen would give consideration to 
permitting the term to be extended to 40 years. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAYDEN: This cannot be done administratively? 
ShouH it indeed need legislation which would make no doubt 
to a commissioner that he had this particular authority. 
MR. McKENNA: I think that this is almost an urgent 
matter because we do not know where the mortgage market is 
going to go in the next several months, the next few years 
and california should have the ability to be flexible in this 
area. It is almost an urgent legislative matter. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: I wonder with all the concern over 
debt and all the rising debt we ought to be increasing the 
maturity dates for the maturity, the length of term that a 
debt increment can last. That may be inconsistent toward 
variable rates too, but it does raise some difficult issues. 
DR. PRATT: Let me inject my thoughts here and they may 
be somewhat different than my colleagues. The variable rate 
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is an important tool which we need. Second, if we are talking 
about keeping the payment the same, it is one that provides 
for minor adjustments, you can go to 400 years and it will not 
help if you get substantial interest rate changes. You 
could not have started lending in 1965 and kept the maturity 
the same under any circumstances and made the adjustments as 
massive as we have had. In keeping the payment the same is 
a tool which provides a good solution to minor and modest 
changes. If you have major changes and you are going to use 
the variable rate it will have to be associated with the 
ability to change the payment. I think it is one of the 
tools and the consumer should still have the right to a fixed 
rate, fixed term mortgage at the appropriate price. 
MR. MIKELL: The Commissioner will be before you tom-
orrow. You might address the question as to whether he has 
the regulatory power to do that. we do notthink so, we think 
it needs legislation. 
CHAIRMAN McALIST~R: Our next witness is Mr. stanley 
Zimmerman of the Mortgage Refinance Company. 
MR. STANLEY ZIMMERMAN: In order to try to shorten 
what I would talk about which has primarily to do with the 
report of the National commission of consumer Finance, I have 
made some excerpts from it which I will not talk about but I 
will just hand out to you . * 
Read them at your leisure. The whole report is available 
but most of which it takes up is to do with the personal property 






brokers and industrial loan companies. I have tried to 
express that part which has more meaning in the area in which 
I am speaking. 
I ~ s ~an ley ~e~~~~-S:__F_E~.?ll ~-f?.t_a.te b:r;oke.r 
but I am primarily engaged in brokering necessitated borrower 
·--·-··- ·---------- ------ -- ·-···--· -·--
loans. These loans typically take the fo;nn_o.f_ s .econd 
mortgages, sometimes first mortgages and sometimes all inclusive 
and they are made at the lower of the market, or statutory 
maximum rate. When the market is in excess of the statutory 
maximum rate they just are not made at all and then in times 
like this necessitated borrowers do not get loans. 
Among our ghetto population and our poorer people 
credit is rationed. That means that everything that is 
available in credit is used. All that legally is available 
is used at some sort of a reasonable rate and after that they 
go to wherever they might be able to find, many times in 
the form of paying excess prices for the goods that they are 
receiving beca· se of rate of interest, that they pay is regulated. 
In the real estate loan field, those within the industry, 
those that are in the savings and loan associations think they 
are very competitive. We, that are not savings and loan 
associations, think they are not competitive at all. We 
think that there is a form of oligopsony which is in 
existence. Oligopsony is where there is a very limited number 
of buyers and that those buyers can inter-react with each other 
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and control prices. If you went shopping for a loan today or 
in any market you would find the variation in terms and price 
and most of the rates quoted by everybody are not the same. 
Partly this oligopsony comes from the fact that the state 
administrative agencies in approving new savings and loan 
charters use the convenience and advantage rule in approving 
new charters. I feel that this is not the thing that should 
be done and the National commission on consumer Finance assails 
the convenience and advantage rule in issuing charters. The 
answer to lower rates is competition. Competition means 
free access of suppliers into the market and that the way to 
do this is that anybody who has good character, reasonable 
ability to conduct a business should be able to enter that 
field. Traditionally, in the savings and loan and other 
financial institutions the reason for the convenience and 
advantage is given as the state of protective depositor. I 
feel that perhaps we should now start to organize nondeposit 
building and loan associations. savings and loans are an 
out-growth of the old neighborhood building and loans where 
everybody knew each other. When you have a situation where 
a savings and loan is really an instrument of a holding 
company and stock is exchanged on the New York Stock Exchange 
many of their activities are in relationship to what it 
will do to their stock and not what it is doing to their 
loans. savings and loan associations are an important part 






from nonpublic deposit building and loan associations, I think 
the rates would come down. These building and loan associations 
could be formed in local areas; they could be restricted as 
to what type of public deposits they could take and I advocate 
that they take no deposits unless they qualify under the rules 
o£ the Federal Horne Loan Bank and have savings and loan 
insurance. Perhaps they could qualify under something 
similar to the Reg. A that the securities Exchange corn-
mission has the power pursuant to Rule 3B, which if you 
(1) know the people that are involved, (2) if you had a full 
disclosure, (3) if you are not relying upon any representa-
tions other than the representations that you have made the 
personal inquiry into, (4) that you have the ability to 
make that inquiry, (5) you are not putting all of 
your assets into there, and (6) you know that this has some 
risk factor, you should be entitled to make a deposit. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: What you are really saying here is 
that you simply want a publicly-held corporation to be exempt 
from the usury limits of California because you can do that 
now. A corporation can be formed for the purpose of lending 
money and you are limited to 10%. or, if the commissioner 
says that the offering is fair and just and equitable you can 
sell stock to the public. 
MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yes, but unless you formed it under an 
11 S 11 type corporation which is very difficult to accumulate 
reserves, you would not be able to see to attract funds 
because you would have a double ~axation by the time you 
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pay dividends. If you are in the form of what I call "a 
building and loan," more the old te r m than the new one, the 
payments that you make out to your depositors are tax deduc-
tible before you determine income tax. If you formed it 
in the form of a small corporatio~ you are going to have a 
double taxation and I think we have to look realistically 
at this too. It is likely that certai n types of tax incentives 
to depositors are going to be passed by Congress or some 
sort of form like that. We have before congress now a proposal 
that the first $500 of an individual's deposits or dividend 
returns or interest should be tax exempt. That 
is going to create a disadvantage to a corporate structure 
and an advantage to a deposit structure. It is for that 
reason that I take theiDrm of saying let us be a deposit 
structure so that, one, any advantages of the large institu-
tions could accrue to the smaller ones and, secondly, that 
the payment for the use of the money be prior to the deter-
mination of income which is taxable. 
Gentlemen, that is generally what I want to say. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: This would be under the jurisdiction 
of the Savings and Loan Commissioner? 
MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Have you suggested it? 
MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Yes, a new form or a separate form 
of financial institution •••• a substantial operation ••• 
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MR. ZIMMERMAN: No, I do not really see it as closed 
end. I see it as open end. I see it even as a possibility 
of growing into a full savings and loan association, but I 
see more as a community effort, small to start with. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ERNEST MOBLEY: Just what is happening 
in the areas of the PCA and Federal Land Bank. Is this what 
you are talking about? 
MR. ZIMMERMAN: No, I am not. First of all, I am not 
familiar with a PCA. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOBLEY: Production credit Association, they 
are all over the state. 
MR. ZIMMERMAN: No, I see this as a way to start small 
building and loan associations so that a mass of community 
effort would create the competitive forces lower rate. At 
the same time to give the opportunity to those that are 
successful to grow. I think it is wrong to approve new 
charters and to look into the administration of existing 
financial institutions in order to protect their profitability. 
I think that what you should be doing is increasing competi-
tion so that innovation would come about so that it would 
cause better products and lower rates. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Mr. Mobley. Are not the PCA 1 S 
agricultural ? 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOBLEY: Yes, but they loan. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Thank you, Mr. Zimmerman. 
Mr. Charles P. Conner of the Escrow Institute. 
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MR. TOM KONOVALOFF: Mr. Chairman, I am Tom Konovaloff 
representing the Escrow Institute of california, and we 
appreciate the committee's time and inviting us here today and 
letting us talk about escrow. With me is Mr. charles conner, 
who is President of the Western Mutual Escrow Corporation, who 
is a spokesman for the Institute and plans to talk in those 
areas of escrow on home sales and loans. 
MR. CHARLES CONNER: Gentlemen. The Escrow Institute 
of California is a trade association of 72 licensed escrow 
corporations that consider themselves in the independent 
escrow business, not connected with any title company, 
savings and loan, broker, or other tie. The purpose of the 
Escrow Institute, by its bylaws, shall be to improve the 
escrow profession, foster better business relationships 
between the members and to promote mutual benefits to its 
members through mutual activities and legislative, 
corporate, and operational matters and business development 
and to counteract such influences that would not promote the 
general welfare of the independent escrow agent . There has 
been quite a bit of discussion on escrow matters, and I think 
the best mode to go into on this is to explain how escrows 
operate in the State and be in a position to respond to any 
inquiry that you might have. 
There are several definitions of what an escrow is. 





"Es crow" means any transaction wherein one person, 
for the purpose o f effect i ng the sale, t r ansfer, 
encumbering , or leasing of real or personal proper ty 
to another person , de l ivers any written instrument, 
mo n ey, evidenc e o f tit l e t o real or per sonal proper ty , 
or other thing of val ue to a third person to be held 
by such third person until the happening of a speci -
fied event or the performance of a prescr i bed condi-
tion, when it is then to be delivered by such thi rd 
person to a grant ee , grantor, promi see, promisor, 
obl igee , obligor , bailee , bailor , or a ny agent o r 
employee of any of the f ormer. 
That is a very restrictive term. Bas i cal ly , what we 
in the industry .cal l our_f?~~~-~=_0.~- -~:-~~--~~r._~d- - t.o .p~i:_ ._ ~:t . ..sll 
together , serve as a central clearing house to receive funds --------· _.._.. -~· __ .... - ......... -. -· - . -
from ~he buyer, the broker, the lender, to receive the docu-- - .... ----
ments from the seller that wiJ 1 convey title or from the 
parties to accomplish the desired results. 
our function also is to examine the preliminary 
title report, to determine that when all documents are 
recorded the escrow instructions are met. When all is 
ready, we complete the escrow and give the parties what they 
instructed us to give them. 
In the s_t_gte of California there are nine entities that -· ··- --~- --·-·-·- · - ·-·---- -- -· . ·- -- - ~-. --- --- ------ ·--- ____ ...... -- .- ·--- ... . 
can practice escrows. They are attorneys, so long as they 
-- ·-... ------- .. -- -·· .. 
are not in the actual business or make a business of escrows. 
Banks, state charter banks, federally chartered banks, savings 
and loan associations that are state chartered, federally 
chartered savings and l oan associations, title insurance 
companies , title companies, real estate brokers handling their 
own transactions and escrow companies licensed by the corpora-
tion Commissioner's office. current regulutions ·that are 
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imposed upon these entities, however, differ and they vary 
quite a bit. The corporation Commissioner's licensees are 
licensed under the laws set forth under Section 17000 
through 17654 of Division 6 of the Financial code and under 
the rules found in Title 10 of the Administrative Code, 
Chapter 9, and by special releases relative to interpre-
tations of the Department of corporations. These are good 
rules, good laws, good regulations and serve as a basis for 
the professional standards that are being sought by the 
majority of the practioners in escrow in the State of Californ~ 
r The banks, of course, operate escrow departments and they 
have indicated that in a letter dated October 9, 1970, 
that the superintendent of Banks has not promulgated any 
regulations relating to the escrow business of state banks 
and trust companies and the Department of Savings and 
Loan by letter dated October 14, 1970. These might have 
changed in the meantime. "In response to your letter of 
october 7, please be advised that we have no statutes, rules 
or regulations authorizing this department to control 
escrow transactions and escrow holders." The real estate 
brokers are governed by one section in their laws that 
pertain to escrow and that is Section 2950 and there is one 
page in their regulations relating to escrows although 
in their reference book, volume 9, there are many references 
to escrow but not as it pertains to the actual conduct of 
their licensees. The regulations that are imposed upon the 




quite complex. My binder is about a half inch of pages that 
a r e pertinent to the rules and regu lations imposed upon the 
Corporation commissioner's licensees. 
Qualifications--from the independent escrow operations 
standpoint a licensee of the Department has to have a five 
year experienced person at each location, stationed there 
permanently and have to show financial responsibility, be 
subjected to audits, both a CPA and their own internal audits , 
and the state audits. They have to be licensee by the 
corporation commissioner and bonded. 
The duties of the escrow holder are extremely compl ex . 
Most of you in this room know what the duties are but the 
problem with the industry is that quite often the duties are 
viewed upon as being very minor in nature but the professional 
escrow officer must know real estate law, how to deal wit h a 
usury situation, must know title insurance practices, lender's 
practices, not only conventional but also FHA, VA, Cal Vet, 
second trust deed lending, personal property laws, property 
taxes and insurance, heal ordinances relative to property 
inspections or local taxes, etc. 
Now, historically, the escrow holder is to remain an 
impartial third party to receive and follow all instructions, 
to remain silent on items that are not his concern and to 
retain the confidentiality of all parties of the transaction . 
He cannot practice law. He cannot give advice but must walk 
the fine line of knowing when to r emain silent and when to 
speak up. He must know what his duties are and what they are 
not. 
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The prohibitions on practice of law are spelled out in 
a State Bar Treaty that exists between the Escrow Institute 
of california and the State Bar, as does the california 
Banking Association and I believe several other entities. 
The problems that face the public these days are 
problems that we have recognized that exist within the industry 
and have existed within the industry for many years. First 
off, there is a lack of uniformity as to standards between 
the north and the southern california area. This is not 
unique at all because even within Southern california 
there is a lack of uniformity between cities and even within 
my own company there are many differences in how we process 
escrows in the various counties. 
The lack of standards of expertise is the biggest 
single problem that faces the industry. There are people 
who operate escrows, that handle escrows as an employee of a 
bank or a savings and loan title insurance company, or a 
real estate broker or licensed escrow company that have any-
where from five to twenty years• experience. Then, again, in 
other entities a person might be an escrow clerk with 
three months• experience and all of a sudden she is the escrow 
officer and then that person is responsible for all of the on-
going daily activities of handling the escrows. There are 
no experience requirements in other entities other than the 
ones licensed by the Department of corporations. I think 
that one of the major problems that faces the industry also 
is that there appears to be many conflicts of interest. Now, 





asked to go to a particular escrow company or a branch of a 
real estate broker. This is a trend that, be it good or 
bad, the buyers and sellers do not have a free choice of 
escrow on too many occasions. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: Are you prepared as an institute 
to ask the State Legislature to set the standards, qualifica-
tions, or licensing? 
MR. CONNER: I am sure the California Escrow Association 
will speak to that later on. As a matter of fact there was 
an attempt on this part in 1971, to come up with an escrow 
officer's licensing bill to try and establish some kind of 
uniform guidelines as to a level of expertise. But we, as 
an escrow institute, are not in a position to promulgate 
or even develop any legislative thinking along that line. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: You have no suggestions along that 
line to make for legislative consideration? 
MR. CONNER: I have some personal feelings about this. 
I am not sure how it could happen but I think that somewhere 
along the line an equalization of qualifications is an 
essential ingredient to the production of the public down the 
road. It should be done now. If it had been done now I think 
that the public could have a greater degree of confidence if 
they could go into any person holding themselves out to 
be an expert in the handling of escrows with the idea that 
they would be afforded the high degree of competence that 
they have a right to expect. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: What I was getting at is that I want 
to see less government regulation. Yet, I want to see a 
level of responsibility within your particular industry, self 
regulation rather than an imposed regulation. 
MR. CONNER: I think that is good too, and we have 
attempted to do that in the California Escrow Association, 
not the Escrow Institute. I do not want to take Mr. Hurst's 
speech away from him but they have a professional designa-
tions program that he will speak about later on and it is a 
real severe attempt to do just this. To increase the 
level of professionalism by various methods, by imposing 
testing on persons who are to receive the professional 
designations from the California Association. The only 
problem with that is at this point it is not mandatory. 
The State Bar has a method of controlling the expertise 
their members have, that is to admit them to the Bar and if 
they do not have the level of expertise they do not pass the 
test and, therefore, they do not get admitted to the Bar. we 
have not got thatcbut in the california Association to require 
that. A person just does not have to belong. The other way 
to do it is legislatively or by administrative remedies by each 
one of the commissioners. To say that this level of expertise 
will be maintained by all of the people practicing escrow work. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: Had there been sufficient violations 
beyond what you would normally expect in differences of ability 
that would warrant the_state ev~n ~onsi~ering it. 
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MR. CONNER: I have to get into some specific case studies. 
I am sure that there are cases on them. I heard just a couple 
of weeks ago from one source that there are many cases of 
inequities in the handling of escrows. Of course, there are 
many case law items that would pertain to that. I have got 
some of them here. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: How widespread is it, in your 
opinion? 
MR. CONNER: I could try to find that information out 
for you. I do not have that information at my finger tips. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CLINE: Thank you. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOBLEY: The title of your organization 
contains the word "institute." It connotes to me education 
in some form. Is that what you try to do, educate the public? 
MR. CONNER: The education is not only for our own members 
and the professionalism in our own Institute but also assisting 
the public in knowing more about escrows. We have had several 
publications, we have had several brochures that we have distri-
buted, indicating what escrow is all about. It is a common 
feeling that throughout the entire membership of the Escrow 
Institute that if we are able to serve the public in a better 
manner this will meet the objectives of the members of the 
organization. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOBLEY: Are members of your organization on 
the staffs of the various real estate schools in the State? 
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MR. CONNER: we have some teachers, some instructors, that 
either are or have been. They have been instructors or they are 
now members, active members of the Escrow Institute. I was an 
instructor myself. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOBLEY: Do they identify themselves as members 
of the Escrow Institute? 
MR. CONNER: Not necessarily. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: There are nine different categories 
that, by law, may act as an escrow agent. But your people, the 
escrow, professional escrow companies are the only ones that 
actually have standards that are set up in law, or regulation that 
they much comply with? 
MR. CONNER: Excessive standards, yet. I am not saying 
that the banks and savings and loans, and title companies do not 
administer their escrow departments effectively. I am saying 
that the State has no rules or regulations, as it pertains to 
the real estate brokers, as compared to the ones that are placed 
upon us. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Some of these other people, 
in fact, ,would have considerable expertise and in a title 
insurance company we should have a lot of expertise. 
MR. CONNER: Absolutely. No question about that. The 
anti-trust laws are dealing pretty effectively with 
some of the restraint of trade tactics that used to prevail in 
the industries where the savings and loan associai:ion would say 
you can have their loans, if you take their peripheral services, 











so on and so forth. So that the tool s for allowing the 
buyers and the sellers to have the right of free choice of 
escrow are there. In some cases the laws may not be administered 
100 percent the way that we think they should be but that is an 
on-going deal. We think that everything that can be done 
toward allowing the buyer to have the free choice of escrow 
would be an effective way for allowing free enterprise and 
the price levels to be met by the industry as required by the 
consumer. If there are any lock-ins of business this would tend 
to detract from that free choice of escrow and also therefore 
detract from the competitive spirit of the free enterprise 
system. I think that probably the other information I might 
have here has already been covered to a certain extent but I 
stand ready will and able to help in any way. The Escrow 
Institute wants to continue to assist wherever we can. We do 
not know how that might be, but we have many members who are very 
well qualified as to dealing with all facets of escrow and 
you can use the group or me as a consultant in any way, shape 
or form. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: our next witness will be Mr. Donald 
Hurst of the California Escrow Association. 
DR. PAT HEWITT: I am Pat Hewitt and I am an 
attorney and the legislative advocate for the california Escrow 
Association. I think if I could just clarify for a couple of 
members of the committee who were here this morning, the 
difference between this association and the association that 
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you heard from prior to lunch. This might help you to under-
stand the remarks that we make. The Escrow Institute is essen-
tially an association comprised of management of some 72 inde-
pendent escrow association. By independent I mean they func -
tion independently of any other institutional setting. On 
the other hand, the California Escrow Association, whom I repre-
sent and of which Mr. Hurst is President, is, as a matter of 
fact, a statewide association of various types of people who work 
in escrow, both employees and employers. We do cross, in terms 
of the setting in which we function. We function in all five 
settings that are regulated by State government. The independent 
escrow companies are regulated only by the language found in 
the Corporations Code. On the other hand, this association 
operates in savings and loan institutions, where they are 
regulated by that Commission: they operate in banks where they 
are regulated by the Superintendent of Banking; they operate in 
real estate offices where they come under the jurisdiction of 
the Department of Real Estate and when they function in title 
companies they are overseen by the Department of Insurance. 
so, with that introduction, I think Mr. Hurst has a brief 
statement and then we would like to receive questions from the 
committee. I did want to respond to a question of Mr. Cline's 
relating to licensing but I will wait until he reappears to do 
so. Mr. Don Hurst, President of the California Escrow Association. 
MR. DON HURST: The Escrow Inst i tute is a member of the 
california Escrow As.so_ciat:ion. W~ ar~ not different of OJ:?inion, 
we are not two different groups going in different directions. 





one of the things I think that we are concerned 
with, when we listen to testimony within this session, as 
escrow agents, we are criticized for any kind of cost or charges 
that are involved in the escrow. Regardless if they are 
lender's charges, title charges, or termite expenses, any kind 
of anticipated charges the consumer usually refers to in 
his escrow expenses we immediately have justification in trying 
or rationalize in trying to explain them. 
Let me give you a little background on the CEA. We 
are composed of 26 regional chapters throughout the state and 
the members of these regional associations are involved in either 
the processing of escrows or the supervision of the escrow 
personnel. We are involved with our employees, or the members 
of the association being involved under all five regulatory 
agencies. The primary goal of the association is for the 
education of its members and for the general improvement of 
escrow services to the public in general. we have just completed 
our 19th Annual Escrow Conference. For the last two years we 
have conducted seminars in various parts of the state in trying 
to build a better line of communication between the real estate 
salespeople and the escrow personnel. We have attempted very stenu-
ously not to get involved in regulation of any fees. We were 
concerned a number of years ago that there could be anti-trust 
violations or accusations raised be an effort to standardize fees 
within the industry. For this reason, we have completely 
ignored that or tried to avoid it. We feel that the variation of 
fees within the state actually benefits the general public because 
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usually the fees are determined by the competition within the 
area. We certainly believe that the citizens of this state 
have benefited by our system of escrow procedure, since it has 
become apparent that even the legal professions accepted the 
quality of the escrow expertise to the point that generally they 
have not felt it necessary to be represented in each transaction 
when their clients were involved, in either a buy or sell. We 
are not ,going to say the attorneys are not welcome. It has 
become an accepted standard in most parts of the nation. We 
trust that we have created enough line of communication with 
the legal profession that our method of escrow or processing is 
a substantial improvement over what has t aken place in other 
parts of the country. I would like to quote, if I could, 
from an article in a national realtor's newsletter in 1972. The 
article was entitled "A growing Number of Attorneys Refuse to 
Handle Closing on Single Family Houses." 
"A senior partner of a well-known real estate law 
firm indicated it is becoming harder and harder to 
find lawyers who are willing to handle closings on 
single family houses. The reason, he explained, is 
that most buyers and sellers are unwilling to pay 
an attorney for all the time he has to devote to 
a closing if it has to be done right. In our 
firm, as in most other law firms, we keep a record 
of the time spent by each member of our staff on 
each project because time is all we have to sell 
and we want to be sure we are using it to the best 
advantage. We recently completed a study of the 
time it takes to handle closing on a single family 
house and discovered it takes an average of 14 hours. 
Now, we have to charge each client according to the 
time any member of our staff spends on his case. 
our minimum fee of putting the most inexperienced law-
yer in our firm on an assignment is $50 an hour. 





closing the buyer or seller he represents will be 
expected to pay us approximately $700, whether the 
property is worth $50,000 or $10,000. Since the 
average buyer or seller feels that this is too much 
to pay we no longer accept this type of legal work." 
It is a very interesting quote and it is from 1972 
and it may be that the cost has gone up and we know that when 
we have looked at the practice of handling real estate in other 
parts of the nation that the cost is far greater than $700 
in connection with the closing. 
Chuck conner pretty well covered some of the other areas 
of involvement. Knowing the scope of the hearing, and knowing 
that the committee wants to try and provide as much dialogue 
as possible rather than get into any other areas, I think 
I would like to welcome any questions from the committee. If 
we are not prepared to answer them today we certainly can come 
back with some answers, either in writing or to other sessions 
of the committee hearing. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: I am just reading this chart. Who 
prepared that chart, the committee? 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: That is a source from the HUD/VA report . 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: You are under B, as I understand it. 
"Escrow B. Closing Fee Document Preparation and Other Closing 
Costs." I do not know what that is. Is that a fair statement 
of what you do? 
MR. HURST: Yes, it is a fair statement under "Escrow Fee 
and Fee Closing Fee. I can explain escrow fee or document 
preparation, if it were necessary. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: The escrow fee is for handling the 
money, making sure that the documents are exchanged and that 
the appropriate people get the check or checks, right? 
MR. HURST: The escrow fee is basically the fee that 
we charge for the processing from one end to the other. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Do you prepare any documents beyond 
a simple grant deed or a closing statement? 
MR. HURST: Yes, it is necessary at times to prepare 
deeds of trust notes, and there could be some other forms. We 
prefer to indicate that we are completing the form because the 
forms we are involved with are prepared documents that are 
necessary in order to insert the language of the parties 
involved; possibly the legal description or clarification 
of the terms. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: But you would prepare a deed which, for 
example, might be a deed from one person to fifty tenants in 
common. 
MR. HURST: Yes, sir. 
DR. HEWITT: If I could also comment. They would be 
responsible for seeing that the instructions, both buyer's and 
seller's instructions, clearly reflected the understanding of 
both parties. Then it falls upon them, the responsibility to 
see that each of those items on each instruction sheet are met 
before the check can be transferred and the property can be 





ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Are the fees for escrow broken down? 
For example, you have got the escrow fee for handling the money 
and handling the documents. Do you charge a specific fee for 
the preparation of dcx::u.ments? 
MR. HURST: In many cases, yes. A company has usually 
established their own basis of fees for preparation of documents. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: In other words, you charge so much for 
a simple grant deed. You might charge more for a more compli~ 
cated deed of trust or something of that nature? 
MR. HURST: usually a deed of trust there is a charge on it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Is this pursuant to a treaty with the 
State Bar1 
MR. HURST: Yes, sir. The treaty with the State Bar is 
involved with the Escrow Institute, as I said and is a member 
of the CEA. We have established a treaty as to documents that 
can be prepared. Also documents that cannot be prepared. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Your organization does not have a treaty 
with the State Bar? 
MR. HURST: No, sir. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Do you think you should? 
MR. HURST: We have just gone into negotiations with 
them, or conversation with them. Actually, whatever has been 
established with the Institute basically applies to members 
of the industry. There are many documents we do not prepare. 
There are agreements that we will not, whether it means 
refusing an escrow or refusing to prepare a document. This is 
done on a regular basis. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Do you prepare a contract of sale? 
MR. HURST: No, sir. There are times when contracts 
very possibly have been prepared but for the most part we do 
not; we will be involved in the consumation of the contract. 
There is controversy on this now because we know of a company 
that is deeply involved in the preparation of contracts. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: You base your fees so much per docu -
rnent? 
MR . HURST: We base our escrow fee on the consideration, 
p l us •••• 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: On the price ••• 
MR . HURST: a charge for additional documents that may be 
prepared. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: You base your fee, your basic fee 
upon the amount of money in the transaction? 
MR. HURST: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER. There an: additional charges for 
certain specific documents? 
MR. HURST: correct. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: It is not based upon amount of time 
involved as in the example you gave by an attorney? 
MR. HURST: No. It could be based on the amount of time, 







CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Yesterday we were given some figures 
about the cost of escrow fees from different parts of 
the country: indicating that L. A. county was not broken down 
terribly well. It was my understanding from our discussion 
yesterday that it was stated that escrow fees were higher in 
Los Angeles county than anywhere else. 
MR. HURST: I believe that he did indicate that the 
percentage went up from 1.58 in the state to 2.19 in Los Angeles. 
I believe that if the other figures were correct it would 
indicate that the escrow fee in Los Angeles is approximately 
$32 more than it is on a statewide basis, from the chart 
that was shown. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Yes, the HUD study apparently was 
part of my consultant's papers for this hearing. He has 
included a table indicating costs in Denver, which shows that 
Denver was much lower than california. It is interesting, it 
shows Denver as zero in escrow fees, seattle is $135, and L. A. 
county is $148. I wonder, are you familiar with how they could 
come up with zero for Denver? 
MR. HURST: I am not familiar with how, or what the 
procedure is in Denver. We could attempt to find out and get 
back to you with some information, but I am not really familiar 
with the Denver area. 
DR. HEWITT: I would like to reflect the procedure that I 
know of in the East coast: in Maryland and washington where 
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there are no separate escrow transaction. Two attorneys 
simply meet around a desk with the two parties to transact 
business. I think that is probably just absorbed any attor-
ney's fee. He writes the instruction and when his feeling is 
that the instructions have been met, the checks are 
exchanged. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: What was the source of the letter 
from the law firm, what community. 
MR. HURST: The National Realtors• Newsletter. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Where was the attorney located? 
MR. HURST: I am sorry, I cannot tell you. It was a 
sensitive situation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: What was the point of your 
presenting that as evidence? 
MR. HURST: Just to indicate the fact that the way things 
are going, the only procedure that is going to be handled with 
the cost of it is by an escrow company; the amount of hours 
that may be involved in the processing and the cost of some 
other areas in processing escrow. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: I take it you are unable, based on 
your own experience, to tell us how many hours it takes your 
company. 
MR. HURST: You cannot look at a number of files and 
take 5, 6, 10 escrows and come up with a standardization. We 
certainly cannot come to a conclusion if you keep doing a time 






ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: You find you are unable to measure 
your work product and price it out according to your payroll. 
You find difficulty in doing that? 
MR. HURST: We have not attempted to make that type 
of research on a state basis. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: To give you an example. 
Legislators work 40 hours, some work more hours or less in a 
week. We are paid about $10 an hour. I take it that a 14 
hour task would come out just about what you charge, $148 or 
$140. I believe, because I was involved in this area as a 
lawyer briefly, that if it is taking 14 hours for a transaction 
in your office you would be well advised to look around for a 
smart high school graduate or a new college graduate you 
would not have to pay $10 an hour. 
But I want to make that point and if you are thinking of 
using that letter again, I would give it a lot of thought. 
MR. HURST: I was not using it to make any point other 
than in a conversation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: The other thing you mention are 
the various escrow laws regulated by different units of 
government. Now, in your escrow office or a typical escrow 
office that belongs to your Association, are you subject to 
one or more of these laws? 
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MR. HURST: If you are asking· whether members of the 
Association are subject to them, yes, they are. Whether I am 
subject to it personally, we are talking about two different 
situations. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: No, I would l ike to take a growing 
escrow office that advertises its availability for escrow. 
Would that office be subject to regulation by a number of 
units of state government? 
MR. HURST: Only if they are involved as a licensed 
escrow operator under the Department of Corporations 
would they be subject to those rules and regulations. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Now that is one act. What if they 
are conducting other types of escrows? 
MR. HURST: What do you mean "other types of escrows?" 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: I understand that the escrow officers 
in banking transactions involving personal property are 
subject to some laws, real property is subject to others. 
MR. HURST: The personnel who are involved with a title 
company, for instance, are subject to whatever rules and regu-
lations established by the Department of Insurance. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: You mention title Company. Do you 
mean in escrow transactions? 
MR. HURST: Yes. If the escrow is being processed through 
a savi .1gs and loan, the involvement is through the Savings and 
Loan Commissioner. 
If it happened to be a realtor who was operating his own 






ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: If we come back into your office, and 
a realtor or various people want to use the services of 
your office, it is necessary for you to apply and gain a certi-
ficate of convenience from the Department of Banking, the 
Department of Corporations, the Department of Savings and 
Loan and so forth? 
MR. HURST: I personally operate my business under the 
Department of Corporations. I have an escrow license. The 
personnel in my office and in management must meet the quali-
fication that have been established by the Department of corporations. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Does that mean that it is possible 
you have to turn away business because the transaction is 
governed by an act administered by the Department of Banking 
or the Department of Insurance? 
MR. HURST: No, sir. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Is there reciprocity if you are 
certified by the Department of corporations, are you also 
declared eligible to conduct these other escrows? 
MR. HURST: The type of escrow has no bearing on the 
license that I hold, or the regulations that I am under. The 
point being a buyer and seller can come in off the street 
and whether I handle the escrow or whether it is handled 
through the savings and loan, it is only subject to the rules 
of our operation. The escrow is not subject to those rules . 
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DR. HEWITT: The institution in which the escrow officer 
is functioning is what causes it to fall under the jurisdiction 
of one of the five agencies, and the thing that is fascinating, 
is the fact that some of the agencies have much tougher regula-
tions on escrow in terms of supervision, training, audits 
bonds, financial statements and others, so they are quite 
different. There is no license, there is no escrow officer's 
license. There is a license for various settings and performance. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: That is the whole point of my ques -
tioning. As the president of a professional association would 
you prefer to have escrow licensing under a single unit of 
government rather than five or six units of government. 
MR. HURST: The rules and regulations that are established 
are quite different at the moment. We felt that there should be 
some standardization in the industry. We have attempted this on 
a nunber of occasions with the other regulatory agencies and 
have not been successful. It was for this reason that the 
California Escrow Association a couple of years ago attempted 
to have the bill on licensing only as a standardization of the 
personnel within the industry. We were not successful in doing 
it. I think we raised the issue of some of the inequities and 
the differences but we were not successful in having it passed. 
The personnel of the state, I think, really are interested 
in having a standardization. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: No, did you just say that your 
Association does not endorse the idea oflicensing being regula-





MR. HURST: No, I believe the Association wou l d. 
DR. HEWITT: We introduced a bill, or they introduced 
a bill prior to my representation of the Association two 
years ago, which was carried by clare Burgener. It happened to 
be put together in haste and be poorly drafted but it did set 
up a level of training and competency and certification for 
people doing escrow in any setting. It did not, however, address 
itself to the financial responsibility of the institution in 
which this person was to function. It was purely and simply a 
licensing act. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: As I understand it, unless you are 
part of a regular independent escrow company you do not have 
particular standards that you have to meet by law to do escrow 
work. Is that right? 
DR. HEWITT: That is right. Because of this, this 
Association has been very active in setting up a certification 
program as a voluntary association and their activity has 
been met with so much approval that many of the junior colleges 
now include this as an AA program and will offer the certificate 
or training toward the certificate. 
MR. HURST: I do believe that you will find that the other 
regulatory agencies do feel that they have rules. They are not 
all in the same level of performance but there are rules that 
are established in one man or another within those agencies. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Is anyone involved in escrow work in 
California eligible for membership in your Association? 
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MR. HURST: Yes, I would imagine so. The only thing, if 
they can qualify in a regional association they are eligible 
to join a state association. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: In your estimation, how many belong 
versus those who do not? 
MR. HURST: I do not know how many personnel within the 
State. We have approximately 2800 within the State Association. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Does that fall into the category 
that you would recognize as escrow agents? 
MR. HURST: Right. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: You have no idea how many are outside 
the Association? 
MR. HURST: There is no forced requirement in order to be 
a part of the industry that they belong to the Association, it 
is strictly a voluntary thing. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Is there any more than one type that 
belongs to the Association? 
MR. HURST: I am not sure what you mean by one type? 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: You laid out the different people 
who do escrow work. 
MR. HURST: The regulatory agency? 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOBLEY: Yes. 
MR. HURST: No, we have no basis really for that conclusion. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: In other words, it would be hard to 
say that you represented the majority of the people who do 






MR. HURST: Well, I do not know how many totals--since 
there is no license, and I do not know how many people are involved 
in escrow per se'. There is no other association it represents 
other than those within the California Escrow Association. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McALISTER: Do you have many real estate 
agents who belong to your Association? 
MR. HURST: We have some. I do not know how many. When 
the records come to the central or the state organization, we 
are not asking at the time for determination of who they may 
work for. Now the regionals would have to tell us that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: You do not really have to be regulated 
by anyone. Right? Unless you are incorporated. could I go out 
and perform escrows excluding the fact that I am a member of 
the Bar? 
MR. HURST: And hold yourself out as an escrow agent? 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Yes. 
MR. HURST: No. The Department of corporations would 
probably stop you. If you were involved with one or another of 
the regulatory agencies and met the rules, finb. If you just 
held yourself out in handling escrows to the public the 
Department of Corporations, I am sure, would stop you. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: You could handle any kind of an escrow 
business and things of that sort. If Mr. McAlister and I had 
a dispute as to an athletic contest between Mr. Ali and Mr. 
Foreman, to decide which was the better athlete in the opinion 
of the referee, could yo11 hold that escrow? 
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MR. HURST: I undoubtedly would not. 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: Could you under the law? 
MR. HURST: That would depend upon the terms of the 
contract. If it was a money bet of some nature, we would 
indicate no. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: The thing about these exotic escrows, 
there may be some rare opportunities ••• 
MR. HURST: We have had some exotic escrows and as I 
say, there have been reasons why we have turned escrows down 
from time to time. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: All your escrows are not for real 
property sales, I mean most of them are but ••• 
MR. HURST: That is true. Some of them even with 
attorneys. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Thank you. Mr. Richard Ratcliff 
of the California Bankers Association. 
MR. RICHARD RATCLIFF: * Mr. Chairman and members. My 
name is ~ichard E. R3tcliff. I represent the California 
Bankers Association, and I have a bit of a problem here today 
tbat I think you will recognize. Dr. Pratt, in our view, gave an 
excellent presentation of many of the outside parameters, but 
the one we have to deal with, is when he is involved in the 
real estate financing field. My presentation was drawn up 
* EDITOR'S NOTE: Mr. Ratcliff's written statement is 




on the basis that I would try and cover some of that material. 
I think, obviously, Dr. ~att did a better job than I can do 
and what I will try to do is to cover the material that I think 
we should cover and refer to his comments the best that I can. 
Unfortunately, it will probably result in a kind of holding 
presentation, but let me try and go through it anyway. 
Basically, the california Bankers Association, as some 
of you know, has been active in the past in dealing with some of 
the particular points that are involved in this hearing. For 
instance, AB 105 by Assemblyman Deddeh in 1973, got 
all the way to a conference committee between the two Houses. 
At that point, there was a proposed Conference Report 
where AB 105 was talking about a 10% limitation on late charges. 
The conference Report at that point was blessed with the appear-
ance on the scene of the Garrett case. You have heard some 
discussion as to what Garrett does today. We disagree with some 
of the discussion you have heard, but I think the point is the 
Garrett case has caused some new factors to be considered. 
The 10% at that point was unacceptable to the people involved. 
At that stage, various people were arguing for various things. 
Because of that discussion, AB 105 got hung up and died. 
AB 2114 (Hayden) set out to limit prepayment penalties 
to six months interest on the unpaid balance less 20%. This 
was to be effective for a period of 7 years after which prepay-
ment penalties could not be charged. This bill was killed in 
the Senate. It was killed in the process of amending the pro-
visions of SB 200 with which you are familiar into the bill 
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and it became unacceptable to those of us that supported AB 2114 
at that point in time. 
Another bill, AB 1514 (Deddeh) was passed as 
Chaptered 925 in the 1973 session, which I think answers the point 
that was made earlier in the hearing yesterday. That has to 
do with impound accounts. The bill says the lender cannot 
require impound accounts as a condition of making the loan. 
Those of you who were involved in the discussion of the committee 
when the bill was considered will recall a very careful 
discussion by everybody indicating that when there is a marginal 
loan application, if the lender can require an impound account, 
it puts him in a better position to grant the loan. If he cannot 
require an impound account, and the customer is not willing to 
voluntarily accept an impound account, at that point we said and we 
will repeat, at that point the lender should refuse to make the 
loan. 
AB 1514 sets up a structure where the consumer himself 
will make the choice. If he wants an impound account, fine. At 
that point, he accepts it with a notice that indicates to him 
that interest will not be paid on those funds. However, if he 
does not want the impound account, he does not have to have it. 
I think it indicates that the CBA has been involved in this thing 
on a constructive basis for some time. You may not regard the 
prepayment penalties provisions of AB 2114 as being particularly 








charge when AB 105 is what you have in mind. I think we should 
all understand that at the present time, there are no limitations 
upon these charges. The Garrett case has indicated that there 
is a limitation of actual cost. I disagree with the discussion 
of that case. I think what happened was the court was presented 
with a rather difficult provision to uphold in the light of the 
discussion before the court. The court decided that it was a 
penalty that was illegal under california law and the Legislature 
had not granted the power to lenders to impose the penalty. 
At that point they said that you have to fall back on liquida-
ted damages laws. These laws talk about a reasonable attempt 
to anticipate what kind of damages and costs you will come up 
against in the even of a breach. 
I think this is a different kind of a situation. Today, 
what I would like to do is to sketch generally the sources 
and flow of funds because we feel it is extremely important. 
I think it was indicated this morning in the s & L presentation. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Mr. Ratcliff, in your case you are 
going to have to determine what the actual damages are. You are 
not just going to be able to ••• 
MR. RATCLIFF: Under the Garrett case, they ruled that 
provision illegal. Having ruled that provision illegal, the 
only thing that the parties could do was to talk about liquidated 
damages. I think it is totally within the Legislature's power 
to look at this situation and set the limit which is reasonable, 
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workable, and would provide both parties with some equity. 
I think frankly this is what we would like to see done. 
There has been some discussion of the difficulty of 
finding costs for some of these activities, late charges, pre-
payment penalties, and other such things. Speaking for the 
banking industry, and I thinkmr some of the others, we do not 
have any kind of a unit cost accounting process in the banking 
industry, which would result in figures which actually reflect 
what the costs of any particular activity is. The problem we 
have is that you do that when it amounts to an extreme 
amount of money which would have no benefits or beneficial 
results to us other than perhaps some guidelines in helping 
the individual institutions to economize and increase their 
efficiency. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: Your recollections to me of the 
Garrett case are entirely different than I know. Yesterday 
in the information provided for us by the committee consultant ' s 
report, it said actual damages that set off actual damages 
suffered by the lessor. You are suggesting today that in 
that decision they said liquidated damages. I think it is 
clear enough. Is it actual damages or liquidated damages? 
MR. RATCLIFF: My comment was misleading. What I intended 
to convey was my recollection, I do not have that case and 





the attempt of the parties to set those charges was illegal 
because it constituted a penalty. Having been a penalty illegal, 
it was thus unenforceable. At that point, what do you do with 
regard to the rights of the parties involved? I think 
you start talking actual damages; I think that is all you can 
do. But with regard to a lender and a borrower, who enter 
into an agreement, they can set a late charge provision, as a 
liquidated damage. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: That is your suggestion? 
MR. RATCLIFF: No. I think that is what the court has said. 
ASS 1M BLYMAN CULLEN: our brief here in three paragraphs 
uses the term 11 for actual damage, .. and it has a lot to be resolved 
before the committee starts thinking in terms of. liquidated 
damages. I suppose most of the committee present here today are 
lawyers. Where it is difficult to ascertain actual damages, we 
all know the party may agree upon liquidated damages, but this 
court in this case may not have said that because they may not 
have been convinced that it is difficult for a lending insti-
tution to measure their work product and tell you what it actually 
costs them to process the late charges. That has never been 
demonstrated to this committee yet your client and the other 
lending institutions have found it difficult to ascertain the 
actual costs of processing late charges on a client's account. 
If it is impossible, if it is difficult,perhaps we should get 
into the area of liquidated damages. That is how I see it. 
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MR. RATCLIFF: There is a third alternative. I think 
the liquidated damges is one way to go. I think actual costs is 
one way to go in which you force the lenders into a situation 
where they have to come up with a cost figure, which we think is 
absurd, frankly. 
The Legislature should look at what a late charge is, what 
its function is, what its impact is, and come up with some kind 
of a decision rendering equity. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CULLEN: That is the thrust of your presenta-
tion. I merely want to call to your attention that we 
verified the Garrett decision set actual damages and did not 
allude to liquidated damages . You came before us today and said 
that you did not bel i eve that the court contemplated liquidated 
damages, and I think there is a difference of opinion in your 
presentation and that of others, and our committee's brief. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Page 38 of our brief states that the 
amount could be thoroughly measured by the period of time the 
money was wrongfully withheld, plus administrative costs that was 
reasonably related to collecting and accounting for a late 
payment. I do not think that means that the Legislature would not 
have any role in it. We could determine what we find to be a 
reasonable administrative cost. What about this business of 
measuring the period of time the money was wrongfully withheld: 
we could have some kind of a scale for that assuming we make some 







MR. RATCLIFF: one of the points that I was trying to 
make. I do not think that the Legislature is bound by the fac-
tors set forth by the court. I think that what the court was 
trying to say to all of us out in the world at large is 
that you are going to have a late charge provision, than being 
aware of it being declared a penalty. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: It would appear we would have to 
avoid impunity aspects. 
MR. RATCLIFF: I do not think so. I think the 
Legislature, if it saw fit, could provide a penalty. The 
Legislature ha~ permitted counties to charge a penalty for 
somebody who misses his property tax. The only difference is 
that if one of the private institutions is opposed to a public 
body, the function of that penalty could well be the same as 
the function of the late charge if the Legislature saw fit 
to define it in the same fashion. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: I guess the prohibition against 
the penalty is written into the constitution. 
I 
ASSEMBLYMAN KNOX: It is like sayirig if you don't feel 
like paying a traffic fine, you might land in jail. The banks 
could have a facility there to confine somebody for a while, a 
public institution can do it, why not a private institution? 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: We are talking in effect about a civil 
penalty. I guess it is not going to rise to the level of crime. 
MR. RATCLIFF: What I would like to do is to sketch the 
sources of the flow of funds because of the importance to them. 
I would also like to discuss the importance of the secondary 
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market. It is one of the forces that has to be considered 
by the committee. 
As part of that, I would like to discuss the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan 
corporation. Govexnment National Mortgage Act (GNMA) I will 
not discuss. I am trying to confine my discussion to conventional 
mortgages as opposed to various governmental programs. As I 
go through, however, I will mention FHA and VA. Further, I 
would like to indicate how banks would generally operate in 
these areas. Also, I would like to reserve some time during 
November 22 for us to present some specific suggestions for 
legislation to the committee. 
With regard to the sources and flow of funds, I think it 
is important to understand that banks have basically two in-bank 
sources of funds. These are commercial or checking deposits, 
and the savings deposits. By nature these are short-term because 
the depositor can retrieve them really on a very short notice 
period. The problem is conversion, as was indicated this morn-
ing, short-term investments into long~erm funds, which are 
necessary for real estate lending. 
The secondary market historically has been insurance 
companie~ eastern savings banks and others who have amounts of 
money, which they are willing and anxious to place in long-term 







and flows and has cycles as any money market does. The in-bank 
sources of funds, as indicated as short-term, have unfortunately 
been diminishing. The problems that you all have heard about, 
the out-flow of savings due to federal competition, etc. have 
hit the banking industry also. As these funds diminish, the 
ability and the resources that we need to make real estate loans 
also diminish. 
Basically, I think there are some rules of the game, 
and those that need funds are hard put to negotiate entirely 
favorable terms in the contract against those that have the 
funds especially in a comparative market. This is true whether 
you are talking about a California lender attempting to get 
funds or whether you are talking about a California borrower, 
who is attempting to get funds from a California lender. I 
think it is obvious that if the person has need and the other 
person has funds, the need very often will outweigh the 
ability of the person to negotiate something that is entirely 
favorable to him. The secondary market, in this case, your 
california lenders are the borrowers and we have that same 
problem. The market as I indicated is one that has cycles and 
twists to it that do not reflect the housing need that we have 
in California. Because of this there have been several devices 
developed to provide an easy entry into that market, an easy 
entry where you can get long-term funds out of what are basically 
short-term investments. 
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The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) is 
a public corporation, and was created to accomplish this 
purpose. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) 
basically was designed to do the same thing. It is a private 
corporation, set up basically by the savings and loan industry. 
The importance of these two devices to the committee are that 
both of them have standard provisions covering some fees and 
some provisions which are being discussed by this committee. 
The lender if utilizing these sources of funds need not 
use those standards unless he sells the mortgage obligation to 
either FNMA or FHLMC. At this point the terms of the agree-
ment with the borrower becomes those required by FNMA or FHLMC. 
In addition, FHLMC has standard forms which must be used if 
sale of the mortgage to FHLMC is planned. These forms are 
generally also acceptable to FNMA. The lender uses these by 
going to, for instance, FNMA paying a commitment fee of 1/2 of 
1%, or half a point. The commitment agreement makes the funds 
available for purchas·e of that mortgage by FNMA, when that is 
made by the lender. FHLMC works much in the same fashion. When 
banks pay FHLMC they pay a 1/2 point nonmember fee rather than 
a commitment fee as under FNMA. 
FHA and VA programs are programs which guarantee the 
mortgage. They are not a source of funds, so that when you are 
dealing with FHA and VA loans, the lender in these cases can 








llnder a FHA or VA program and subsequently sell that mortgage 
to these marketing agencies, and use the funds he realizes from 
the sale to make another loan. This basically is how the market 
is being carried on now. It is increasingly so in periods like 
we have now, of tight money, because we do not have the money 
to make the loans for our own portfolio and to hold the loans 
themselves. To be active in the market, you have to rely on 
these marketing devices as an approach into the market. 
Basicallywhat they do is they sell bonds in the bond market 
taking those investment funds and convert those into funds 
whkh they can then place on a long-term basis on the mortgages. 
Let us go briefly through how FNMA and FHLMC approach 
the various provisions that we are talking about here today. 
To give you an idea of how they treat late charges, prepayment 
provisions and such things: Late charges is one thing we have 
not talked about, that is the difficulty that the lender faces. 
The code of civil Procedure, Sec. 580 (b) sets forth the anti-
deficiency legislation in california, which was enacted back 
in the '30's. It says in effect that since the lender has two 
contractural relationships with the borrower, he has to 
choose between them. He can sue on the note or a late pay-
ment, but if he does so, he has to waive his right to sue on 
the security. or he can ignore his rights under the note 
and sue on the security. As a practical matter for the lender 
there really is not a choice. The security for the loan in 
all of these cases is the house itself. To sue for a payment 
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that is late and due, is one where it would be absurd to give 
up your right to subsequently sue on that security. 
This presents a problem. We have got a great big 
mallet to enforce our rights against the other party to the 
contract. That great big mallet is foreclosure. It 
is expensive: it is time-consuming, and it is rather frightening 
in all of its aspects to everybody involved. We do not like 
to use foreclosure: it is kind of a last resort. The problem 
we have is that there is no effective way that we can collect 
from the delinquent borrower on his delinquencies without 
going to a foreclosure proceeding which is ridiculous. In 
our view, late charge is something that should reach the 
threshold of pain, if you can use that term, which gets into 
the penalty concept of a late charge. It is something which 
the borrower should be aware that he has this obligation and 
he has to meet it. I think that Mr. McKenna this morning 
indicated another reason why late charges are important to 
the Jender and that is the problem of the mortgage being 
poisoned, if you will, when a person defaults on a payment 
when the lender tries to sell that mortgage in the secondary 
market and gets additional funds to lend here in California. 
Basically, FHA which as you know is a federal program, 
has a provision on late charges that 2% of the payment due, 
including impound accounts which are required under federal 
law, is the measure of the late charge. VA loans is 4%. 
FNMA, the provision is 4%, but there/it is only on the pay-





any impound accounts. FHLMC is the same as FNMA. In the con-
ventional secondary market, apart from FNMA and FHLMC--for 
instance, if the bank should attempt to sell mortgages to an 
insurance company. At that point, they are going to look 
at and see what the general market is. They review the 
bank's practices with regard to some of these provisions. 
If they are satisfactory, they will then enter into negotiations 
to buy the mortgage. If they are not satisfactory, then those 
funds do not become available. This is the problem that the 
lender generally has. We have to somehow have these provisions 
in such a form that they will be familiar and acceptable to 
that secondary mortgage. 
With regard to late charges, we have gone through this 
argument on late charges for some period of time. Four or 
five years ago, we used to oppose people who wanted to impose 
a limitation on late charges of 10%. Then we came in with a 
bill and suggested that 10% was equitable. There were others 
who opposed that. The bill has obviously never passed through 
or we would not be talking about it as we are today. 
With AB 105 in Joint Conference Committee, we agreed to 
a late charge limitation and I understand all these are limita-
tions maximums. We agreed to 6%, and we would like to say that 
we think that this makes sense. The county provision with 
regard to a missed payment of county property taxes is really 
very close in terms of what it is trying to accomplish. I can 
give you a personal example. I missed my property payment a few 
years ago; because I do not have an impound account, and in the 
process, the penalty that I had to pay was 6%. If you take that 
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penalty of 6%, if it is a December payment and you annualize 
it, it comes out about 11%. A December payment is something like 
24%. There is a new redemption situation in the law, which after 
those periods you go to a lien being imposed and you are talking 
about a 1% per month or 12% a year penalty on these funds. It 
seems to me that 6% makes some sense. 
The purpose of the prepayment was pretty well discussed 
this morning. Let me just go into the FHA, VA regulations, and 
say there shall be no prepayment provision. But in this siuta-
tion the seller is going to have to pay points, so that you have 
in effect almost an automatic assumption process. But the seller, 
when he goes to sell the property is going to have to pay points, 
which we will get into in a few moments, but basically reflect 
the difference between the market rate and the rate limitation 
imposed by the federal agency. 
FNMA equally says no prepayment provisions, but they 
also say that if the loan is on a FHLMC form acceptable to them, 
at that point the prepayment provision of FHLMC comes unenforce-
able as long as FNMA holds that mortgage. If they should turn 
around and sell that mortgage themselves, a secondary mortgage, 
to raise funds for them to use in the housing finance field, at 
that point it would become enforceable. This means that if 
FNMA feels that for their purpose, they do not need a 
prepayment provision. But they fully recognize that they have 
to go out and sell it on a secondary market. They are going to 









The FHLMC prepayment provision is one which I think is 
worthy of looking at. Basically, as you will recall in SB 200, 
Senator Gregorio's bill, the basic structure was, in all of these 
we deduct 20% on the balance, an automatic reduction of the 
penalty every year of 20% over a period set up in such a way that 
after 5 years there is no prepayment provision. FHLMC does it a 
little differently. They, too, have a 5 year period of opera-
tion. They say a prepayment occurs in the first 3 years, the 
borrower must pay an amount which shall not be less than the 
maximum amount allowed by the FHLBB regulations or such lesser 
percentage as is the maximum permissible under applicable law. 
There you g~t into the problem of the ruling with regard to 
the Federal Savings and Loans being able to charge six months 
interest on the excess of the 20% of the original balance 
of the loan. But if you are talking about a 10% loan, this six 
months' interest on the first three years talks about a 5% 
charge. If the prepayment occurs during the fourth and fifth 
years of obligation, the charge shall then be 3%. After the 
fifth year, there is no charge. This only applies if refinanced 
by the holder of the note. We feel that for purposes of trying 
to meet the general demand, to make sure that we do not disturb 
the flow of funds, the FHLMC pattern makes some sense. I think 
that this comes about because in the tight money market now, 
increasingly FNMA and FHLMC become the vehicles for what lending 
is going on. We feel that utilizing these things protects 
access to the secondary market that we feel is vital. Beyond that 
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you are finding increasingly, certainly among banks, that the 
lenders are making their loans on the FHLMC form preparing 
to sell those. That being the case, we think that the FHLMC 
provisions, perhaps with some adjustments, makes some sense in 
terms of the committee review of the things that we have been 
talking about. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: In essence as I understand that, 
on the FHLMC pattern there is no prepayment penalty except where 
the mortgage or deed of trust is sold to another lender. 
MR. RATCLIFF: It is effective, if it is refinanced 
by someone other than the holder of the note; if it is another 
entity doing the refinancing, then the prepayment charge 
becomes effective. I think that for present purposes, it may be 
a little narrow, that restriction. But I think that the FHLMC 
approach of 5 and 3 is something that incorporates the 5-year 
period of SB 200, and also the declining tendency, although 
states it rather than have a straight line decline. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER. This gets around the problem that the 
savings and loan people ·were talking about this morning, saying 
they need this ability to sell if they get out-of-state money, 
an equity kind of a problem? 
MR. RATCLIFF: I hesitate to answer that in the guise of 
what the savings and loan industry needs. on the banking industry's 
viewpoint, we think so, yes. There is some differences of opinion 





CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Your money is not all going out in 
terms of long-term loans like ••• 
MR. RATCLIFF: That is absolutely correct. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: If that solution addresses itself 
to that problem, it would be essentially a solution to 
either industry ••• 
MR. RATCLIFF: The purpose we have in suggesting that the 
committee look at this provision, is that in our minds by adopting 
something along the lines of the marketing device designed to 
get to the secondary market for lenders here that you are not 
jeopardizing the acceptance of these mortgages when the time 
comes to sell them in that secondary market. 
This one further point presen~a problem that this 
committee is going to have to wrestle with if they decide to 
do anything in this area. That is the mortgage loan brokers, 
for instance, have the provisions of AB 2114, which was the bill 
we were proposing for us, which the Legislature said, "No, 
we are n·ot going to give to you, " and they turned around and 
gave it to the mortgage loan brokers. 
We think that anybody in the business of real estate 
lending should be working under the same kind of overall limita-
tions. I think it should be true whether it is a mortgage loan 
broker, or any other type of lender. This would include 
individuals because we think that the attempt and things that 
the committee is looking at is to protect the consumer from some 
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of these provisions that some people feel are onerous. That 
being the case, I do not think it makes any difference who 
imposes the provision. 
The due-on-sale clauses was an excellent discussion in 
terms of what it is and how it works and why it is there from 
this morning's discussions. FHA and VA have no due-on-sale 
provision. FNMA has no due-on-sale provision, ~ut again 
FHLMC, 4 is usedJ It is suspended during the time that FNMA 
holds that mortgage. If they subsequently sell it, then it 
is reactivated. FHLMC has a uniform note, in which it contains 
the following provision, which we think makes a lot of sense. 
"If all, or any part of the property or any interest therein, 
is sold or transferred by the borrower without the lender's prior 
written consent excluding (a) the creation of a lien or encumbrance 
subordinate to this deed of trust, (b) the creation of the pur-
chase money secured interest for household appliances, (c) a 
transfer by devise, descent, or by operation of law upon the 
death of a joint tenant, or (d) the grant of any leasehold interest 
of three years or less, not containing an option to purchase, .. 
presents again a familiar provision to the secondary market. 
It presents a provision which is currently being used, and we 
think that the subdivision (c) talks about any transfer by devise 
or descent, that it takes care a lot of the problems that 
Senator Gregorio was talking about in terms of exercising a due-
on-sale clause against a poor widow etc. I think a lot of those 




Again, under the conventional secondary market, it 
depends on the market's review of the institution's policies. 
If they are acceptable, they will buy the mortgages; if they 
are not acceptable, they will put their money elsewhere. 
FHLMC has an interesting statement in their Services 
Guide. They believe that the right of acceleration upon transfer 
of ownership an invaluable tool of any mortgage investor and 
insuring that only credit worthy mortgages are responsible for 
making payments. The lender makes the loan, sells the loan 
to FHLMC or FNMA and then the key services the loan. In 
their manual to the service, they tell him to use his best efforts 
to determine the sale or transfer mortgage property; or any other 
event giving rise to the right / of acceleration. They go on 
to indicate that they treat assumpti ons a little bit differently 
than other people. 
Tucker v. Lassen is one that ends up possibly promoting 
the use of a contract of sale, as opposed to an outright convey-
ance of your interest, as the means to handle property transactions. 
we have not completed our analysis of this. We see a lot of 
problems with that device as applied to the consumer. I will 
just give you one . If a loan on a piece of property which 
subsequently is sold under a contract of sale, possession is 
transferred. The borrower under the loan no longer has possession. 
He is under the contract of sale to sell it to a subsequent 
buyer. If he defaults, the lender's only right is to foreclose. 
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We foreclose, and the relatively innocent subsequent purchaser 
loses his house. His only rights at that point are against the 
person he brought it from who may or may not be able to make him 
whole. I think this kind of thing presents many problems. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Why do you call this last person 
relatively innocent? You are assuming that the person who sold 
to him misrepresented the status. 
MR. RATCLIFF: No, I think he can be either innocent or 
less than innocent. I do not think it really makes any difference 
because the rights that he has are against the person that sold 
him the property whereas the person who sold him the property is 
in effect saying when your contract of sale is fulfilled, I will 
be able to convey the title of that property. But when that time 
comes, that title may not be any longer under his power. It may 
have been reclaimed by the lender in the foreclosure proceedings. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: But that only happens if default occurs. 
MR. RATCLIFF: That is right. If our lender, the seller 
under this situation, makes the payments everything is fine. If 
the institution and the subsequent purchaser agree on an 
assumption of some sort with the substitution of parties, then 
there are no problems. It is the ones in between that could 
cause the problems, which in our view could make the contract of 
sale work under some circumstances and cause terrible problems 
under others. We are just indicating there are some problems with 
it. 
Assumption clauses and fees are part of the hearing notice, 






fall into the assumption situation. FNMA is much the same. 
FHLMC, however, is different, and FHLMC basically permits the 
lender, the servicer, to use his judgment as to whether to 
approve an assumption or not. As you recall, they do have a 
due-on-sale provision, so it is up to the lender servicer. The 
lender servicer can approve an assumption under the following 
conditions: 
1 . If there is a cash equity of at least 5% of the 
new purchase price; 
2 . theproperty is to be owner-occupied; 
3. the monthly first, plus junior mortgage payment, if 
any, p l us escrow impound accounts do not exceed 25% of the base 
pay of the primary wage earner; 
4. the provision I just read to you, plus all other 
monthly payments on all installments debts having remaining terms 
of more than 7 months do not exceed 33 1/3% of the monthly 
base pay of the primary wage earner. 
The next one is not really appl icable, and the final one 
is that there are no other changes in the terms of the loan. 
The reason for mentioning this will appear when you look 
at SB 200 in the Tucker case. we should go back to the La Salla 
case, talking about the junior encumbrance situation. The court 
said because there was no substantial impairment of the lender's 
security, the lender could not accelerate when a junior encum-
brance appeared on the title. 
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The La Salla case talked about impairment to the security, 
and the next time I saw that concept was i n SB 200. Subsequently, 
again it was talked about in the californi a supreme court in the 
Tucker case. 
We take strong exception to the discussion of impairment 
of security in the lender's situation, as if the lender's only 
concern is with the condition of his security. The lender has 
extended financing to a particular borrower based on his promise 
to pay as agreed; and the evaluation of his ability and willing-
ness to pay the payments that he has agreed to do under the 
contract. If you will recall the conditions that FHLMC has 
for assumptions, you will recall that they are talking about 
basically creditworthiness and the ability of the lender--the 
borrower--to make the payments under the assumption. In addition, 
both FNMA and FHLMC talk about credit reports, and they talk 
about the obligation of the lender servicer to pass on any 
credit reports. The basic point is that both of these institutions 
understand what goes on in the making of a loan, and there are 
several factors obviously. But one of them that we feel is 
extremely important is the evaluation of the borrowers• ability 
and willingness to pay. We feel that the security is there, when 
you are talking about foreclosure. But in the meantime, of far 
more importance to the borrower, is his ability and willingness 
to make the payments, he is obligated to make under the note. 
We feel that the FHLMC approach is one that is far superior 
to the approach of SB 200. The FHLMC has a 1% assumption fee, and 




In my attempt to prepare for this meeting. there was a 
great deal of confusion in my mind as to what was intended and 
what was meant by points. As I understand it. there are two 
basic areas where points that come into the conversation when 
you talk about real estate financing. one is the discussion of 
points with regard to FHA and VA loans. This is where the 
subsequent person gets an FHA or VA loan. subsequently he goes 
to sell the property. At that point. as the seller. he has to 
pay the difference between the going market rate and the FHA 
rate in that particular loan. This is true on a brand new loan 
obligation also, say in the tract situation the seller in that 
case. is paying the difference between the interest rates on those 
funds. 
The problem arises because FHA and VA both are designed 
to get the buyer into the house, to help him through the maze 
and the difficulties of the market in his particular situation. 
Once he is in the house and goes to sell it. apparently the 
assumption is, that at that point he has some money and then 
he should pay the difference to the lender who has used market 
rate funds in advancing the house. He should compensate the 
difference between the limited amount of the loan and the 
market rate, which presently exists. 
Basically other than FHA and VA. the use of points is 
with reference to charges, which are computed on the basis of 
percentage of some amount. whether it is the unpaid balance, 
the original balance, or what have you. These also are regarded 
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as points. Banks generally do talk about points and the FHA 
and VA loans and do Charge the seller those points. However, 
when you get to the situation in terms of loan fees, for instance , 
which is loan origination fees, those points which are most often 
used in addition, the banks look at it as if the loan 
origination fee is the fee that covers the lender's cost of 
obtaining the block of funds from a secondary market, and its 
cost of processing the loan. Thus, in terms of your hearing 
notice, it would cover appraisal fees, photo fees, and many 
of those miscellaneous fees, in our view. 
Now FHA and VA loans fees, loan origination fees, are 
limit ed to 1% of the amount of the loan. The report I have on 
that is that depending on the lender, they think that cover 
their costs, or they think it is below a figure, which covers 
their costs. The FNMA, FHLMC, and the secondary market leave 
these fees to the lenders, and our feeling is the loan fee of 
2% would be a proper one, in other words, a charge of two points. 
If you take FNMA and FHLMC, if the lender is utilizing these, if 
you figure that the FHA/VA 10% loan fee covers our costs, then 
when the lender utilizes FNMA or FHLMC, the 1/2% commitment fee 
or nonmember fee is taking up an addition 1/2% leaving in some 
cases a 1/2%, which would go presumably into the lender's profit. 
When he sells to these people, he then becomes a servicer on 
the loan. He is no longer participating in the profit other 
than the charges that he is permitted to charge to FNMA or 
FHLMC for the servicing of that loan, which varies between 1/4 
and 3/8 of a point. 
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You have the 1% cost factor in terms of the commitment fee, 
plus the 1% of our costs. It is for these reasons we suggest 
that a very minimum really, a 2% loan fee, assuming you want to 
limit this fee, the idea being that this seems to be what we 
can live with. It seems to be what covers the costs 
undergoing the conventional secondary market, which is probabl y 
the most expensive process for the lender to do. 
This loan fee would include such things as appraisals, 
photo fees, and miscellaneous fees. Title fees, real estate 
broker fees, escrow charges, etc, are not normally fees charged 
by the bank. The extent that these costs incurred by the bank, we 
feel we should pass them on to the borrower on an out-of-pocket 
basis. When escrow services of a bank are utilized, we think 
that at that point the bank escrow operation should be regarded 
within the realm of the independent escrows; what they need to 
make a profit, what they need to carry out their business, are 
something that other people should be able to live with. 
Let me just very briefly indicate that under late charges 
banks are presently charging somewhere between 4 and 6%. 
Prepayment penalties again vary greatly, but probably a 6 month 
interest on the original balance, less 20% seems to be not unusual. 
Many banks at the present time are going to a shorter period of 
time. There are several banks for instance that have currently 
adopted either the FHLMC approach of the five, three, five-year 
period, or taking a 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 approach, but generally this 
seems to be the way to which things are going. 
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one item of intere~is that one statewide bank has no 
prepayment charge. They instituted a prepayment charge and 
subsequently they raised it to the FHLMC or something similar 
to the FHLMC provision. The reason they did that is because they 
found they were unable to compete in the secondary market for 
theobtaining of funds, and thus they had to impose a prepayment 
charge just in order to make those funds flow from other 
sources. This was mentioned to a degree this morning, and some-
thing that I have been trying to emphasize. 
Due-on-sale provisions, I think, are generally uniform 
and are almost always included in the notes. The unusual situa-
tion is where the note does not include such in the provision~ 
although there are notes which do not have due-on-sale provisions. 
Assumptions, the fees vary from a flat charge of--and I do not 
know what the minimum figure would be, but I would guess it to 
be somewhere in the neighborhood of $11, perhaps a little less, to 
1% of the unpa i d balance. We think that 1% of the unpaid balance 
is a figure that makes some sense. It is not in our view unrea-
sonable, and it seems to be something that FHLMC provides thus 
again protecting the secondary market and the flow of those 
funds. It is something the committee might want to consider. 
Loan fees also vary, but again 2% makes some sense. Finders• 
fees, incidentally, are not utilized by banks at all. 
The bank•s attempt to deal with the secondary market 






that we do have currently enable us to operate in that secondary 
market. The FNMA and FHLMC provisions are providing a trend 
within the industry to go to lesser charges and lesser fees, 
which is happening just because they found they do not have to 
charge these higher rates. The FNMA and FHLMC entry to the 
secondary markets especially at the present time is about the only 
source of funds that seem to be workable and flowing with any 
kind of degree of continuance. 
One item that this whole discussion should include is 
the attempt by us to take a normal money situation, which there 
may not be such a thing, but to try and give you an indication of 
one of the problems that we have in terms of raising funds for 
real estate lending if you assume that you can take $100,000. 
Take half of it from the two basic sources that banks have, com-
mercial or checking accounts, and savings accounts, the Federal 
Reserves requires that we establish reserves. For commercial 
accounts, 15%; for savings accounts, 20%; thus, right off the bat , 
$17,500 has to be deducted from that $100,000 in order to get 
down to the lendable fund, which at that point would be $82,500 
But assume for a minute forgetting that FNMA and FHLMC have 
limitations that have been raised to $550,000, in terms of the 
size of any one mortgage. Forgetting that aspect for a moment, 
assume a 10.5% annual rate of interest on this loan. Roughly, 
8% of that is going to go to pay interest in deposits, including 
FDIC insurance and other costs, servicing the loan, etc., which 
leaves the bank something in the neighborhood of 2~~, or if you 
take 2~~ of $82,500, it is something like $2,062.50 annual return 
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before taxes that the lender has to play with. Now, these figures 
represent nothing more really than an attempt to show you the 
general breakdown of what kind of economics we are talking 
about. A 2~~ return on the capital is one that would cause the 
normal investor to think about it a little bit, but this is 
the kind of structure that we are looking at in the real estate 
lending business. Again, this assumes the normal lending situa-
tion, and it also assumes the charges, fees, etc. It returns 
nothing more than the incidental revenue to the bank, and I woul d 
like to explain that our feeling is that the late charges, prepay-
ment provisions, assumption fees, and the rest of it should be 
regarded as covering the lender's cost, covering the 
lender's expense of doing business, etc. as allocated, but they 
should not be looked at as items of revenue. 
We feel that this kind of a structure causes all kinds 
of problems. Assume for a moment rather than a "normal 11 money 
situation, a tight money situation. The Federal Reserve--one 
of the things that they can do in fighting inflation is to increase 
reserve requirements for banks. Take the 15 of the 20% reserve 
requirement and boost them. Now, we have to spend money to buy 
government bonds in which those reserve funds are invested. 
Any expenditure comes out of that 2.5% return, but again when the 
federal policies of selling bonds in lots of a thousand dollars 
drains away potential savings, as has happened in the past, then 
funds do not go into the savings aspect of banks or savings 
and loans. At that stage the reserve requirements become even more 






The discussion was intended to illustrate a couple of 
points~ (1) the importance of the secondary market, both conven-
tional and that part of the market which has been captured by 
the market agencies, FNMA and FHLMC~ (2) any legislative action 
that the committee might anticipate really must not restrict the 
flow of these funds, because the whole housing economy is dependent 
upon that flow. We feel there are some ways to accomplish what 
I consider to be the ends of the commfttee in terms of revising 
some of the laws surrounding some of these provisions, to permit 
that flow of funds be retained: at the same time to accomplish 
something to prevent the application of unreasonable provisions 
and one of the things for instance in the Garrett case, and other 
cases that have come up involving some of these charges, are 
that the court marvel unfortunately from the consumer's view 
perhaps fortunately tends to take a fact situation which is 
difficult to justify, one that the results unduly argue large 
late charge provisions. Then in the process of attempting 
to justify it, the institution involved loses. In other words 
the court comes to the right result in the process, comes up with 
some reasoning, and some reasoning and rules of thought that we 
think are unduly and hinges on other provisions. 
The california Bankers Association would like to see some 
legislation based upon an analysis and an evaluation of some of 
the testimony that you heard today and some that you are going 
to hear tomorrow, and come up with legislation, which will put 
a lot of these things to rest based upon an intelligent, rea-
sonable approach to it, which above all protects the flow of 
funds to the secondary market. 
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At this point, I would like to offer to attempt to 
answer any questions that anybody has. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Regarding your 2 or 2~fo profit, would 
you calculate profits on net worth rather than on deposits? As 
you came up to 2 and 2~fo on the basis of these $100,000 deposits, 
you are making money on other people's money. 
MR. RATCLIFF: Yes, that is probably true. The point I 
was trying to make is that the costs that we have are such that 
when somebody charges you a lO~fo interest rate on a loan, I 
~agine your reaction would be to think that is high. What we are 
trying to show is that with the cost of money, and with the costs 
of the various other aspects of the business, that in our view 
the return to the lender is not that great, that there are other 
places where that money can be placed where the return would 
be greater. So we feel that we are part of the market, and 
there is a lot of discussion about the savings and loan, the 
banks and who is bigger and better, and who does it in the greatest 
fashion. I think both of us are part of the market and should 
remain a part of the market. The problem that we all face 
is increasing pressures, increasing concern by many people and 
an apparent inability over the past years to convince the 
Legislature that there are ways to accomplish some limitations 
which really should have the effect in our view of relieving some 
of the pressures anyway. 
-114-
CHAIRMAN- McALISTER: our next witness is Mr. Jack Hempel 
of the Department of Real Estate. 
* MR. JACK HEMPEL: Mr. chairman, my name is Jack Hempel. 
I am chief Deputy Director of the Department of Real Estate, and 
commissioner McCarthy has asked me to thank the committee for 
giving the Department the opportunity to be present and to respond 
to any questions that you may have concerning the jurisdiction 
or the expertise of this Department. 
The topics listed in the meeting notice are not regulated 
by the Department of Real Estate, except for some of the charges 
in connection with hard money loans under what is customarily 
referred to as the Necessitous Borrowers Act. These matters 
were most recently addressed by the Legislature in connection 
with SB 304 and SB 310 of the 1973 Session. 
Both bills were supported by the Department of Real Estate. 
These amendments tightened up the activities of some of the larger 
mortgage brokers via Article 7 of the Real Estate Law with 
respect to regulatory provisions applying to real estate licensees 
in certain mortgage loan transactions. 
We assume the above informat i on has been catalogued by 
the committee, and that your current interest lies primarily in 
the ~ea of settlement costs directl y related to the purchasing 
and selling of residential properties in today's real estate 
market. 
In that regard we understand several of the matters which 
the committee might feel are within our area of expertise, although 
* See exhibit D 
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not in our regulatory jurisdiction, have to do with the 
following: 
First, the effect of real estate brokerage commissions 
on real estate transactions and the question of these fees in 
relation to services rendered. 
Now, commissions are a matter of negotiation between 
agent and principal. Although there are rates, 6%, typical in the 
trade, many licensees deviate from this figure. In Sacramento, 
for example, I have seen TV commercials within the last three 
or four months from a pxnminent firm of real estate brokers 
advertising that their full service commissions on house sales 
are $800 plus 1% of the selling price. I do not know whether 
there have been any surveys as to how many licensees deviate 
from the norm, but it has long been customary for large 
transactions to typically result in a negotiated commission at 
somewhat less than that figure. Representatives from the 
industry could comment on this, I am sure, and I believe they 
will be testifying before your committee tomorrow. 
The state antitrust laws prohibit the fixing of commissions 
for services, and the california Association of Realtors many 
years ago entered into a consent decree, which resulted in the 
withdrawal fromcirculation of any recommended rates. It would 
be our observation that the fact that most licensees charge 6% 
on residential sales is more a standard of reasonableness than 
of design. It is true in most fields that activities below a 
certain rate are not economically feasible. This is probably 




the cost per visit from the three different repairmen who visited 
my own home during the last several years. It probably also 
explains why the markups for the sale of consumer goods based 
on inventory, turnover and the like are relatively stable. we 
understand big ticket appliances customarily sell at a 40 to 50% 
markup, whereas small appliances sell at the 25 to 30% level. 
Similarly, the discount new car auto sales are usually at $200 
to $300 over invoice. I know of none who deal for $50 to $100. 
The net-net under that sort of situation just would not be there 
for them to stay in business. 
In the typical real estate transaction, to get back on 
target, the commission is shared by four real estate licensees. 
The listing is secured by a salesman who is probably an employee 
in a real estate firm. The property is sold by another office 
with whom the listing office cooperates or through the multiple 
listing service. The same sort of division of the selling agent's 
share of the commission takes place in that office between the 
salesman and his broker. Without this network of communications, 
there would probably be fewer real estate transactions. Mulitple 
listing services have thrived because they help get the broadest 
possible exposure for properties which are available for sale, 
and it is true that concept where the multiple broker and 
salesmen involvement usually comes into play. If one considers 
the vast majority of every real estate licensee's time which is 
spent in work other than getting a signature on a dotted line, 
the actual remuneration to each licensee involved in the trans-
action would be best understood. 
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Now to get into some specifics on that, I would like to 
mention that a portion of all licensee's fees is set aside for 
education and research in real estate at the institutions of higher 
learning in California. We have found three of these research 
projects which contain segments relating to the income of 
licensees. A copy of each of these has been delivered to the 
committee for such analysis as might seem appropriate. Although 
each of these was directed originally to something only collateral 
to the pure question of income, the factors which were reviewed 
seem to point toward an average income for a full-time licensee 
in the real estate business at somewhere between the $10,000 
and $20,000 per annum level. Even a 1974 survey by the organized 
real estate industry, within whose ranks the most active licen-
sees are probably found and who, therefore, might be expected 
to have a substantially higher income level, 69% of those surveyed, 
and this was a 1974 survey, who were salesmen responded that their 
earnings were $20,000 or less, 23% of that group were under 
$10,000, 25% reported they earned from ten to $15,000, 21% 
from 15 to 20, and 31% checked over the $20,000 spot. 
We were told also that the question which might arise, 
from the committee, would deal with the question of whether or 
not a large number of licensees in the state is not a factor 
which runs counter to the possiblity for reductions in real estate 
commission rates. We hardly think so. If there is an over 
population of real estate licensees, every competitive economic 
test we haV§. _~v.~-~ §~_E:g1; .l?~PPOJ;"ts the Sl:lgg~st:J.on that _the great~_r __ 




To give you an idea of numbers, as of July 1, 1974, 
the department had 291,381 real estate licensees. Of these, 
146,435 were real estate salesmen. Of this group 90,000 were 
active and over 56,000 inactive. There were 73,000 real estate 
broker licensees on that date, 62,000 of whom were active and 
10,000 inactive. These numbers are large, but I think it is 
interesting that a percentage has varied only nominally for the 
past 35 years. A review of the department record shows that the 
ratio of licensee to population has run something from 90 to 125 
since the late 193o•s. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: You indicated 219,000 real estate 
agents. What was the figure on brokers? 
MR. HEMPEL: 72,000 brokers and 146,000 salesmen. 
219,000 was the total figure. 67 0 000 of those are inactive. 
we have an inactive status under the law that provides for a 
separate fee and they are identifiable. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: That means there are over 2/3 of 
219,000 that are active? 
MR. HEMPEL: Yes, sir. This inactive status has been 
statutorily provided just for the past 17 or 18 years out 
of our more than 50 years of license law enforcement history, 
and it shows as you have just observed that 2/3 of these numbers 
are participating on the economic scene. The other third are 
active. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: I had no idea that there were that 
many people in this industry. With the total, counting active 
and inactive, it would be just over one out of every 100 
people in the state. 
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MR. HEMPEL: I have been with the Department for 20 
years, but prior to 1940, I was in the real estate business 
for a number of years. When I first got my license in 1940 
there were six million people in the state, and they had 
60,000 licensees, so you see the ratio has not changed much. 
The one interesting observation is that in 1950 when 
the first requirement that separated salesmen from brokers 
was adopted by the Legislature, in order to get a broker's 
license you had to show two years• experience as a real estate 
salesman, as well as taking a more comprehensive examination. 
From that time to this, the ratio of brokers to salesmen has 
gradually changed. At that time there were more brokers than 
salesmen for the simple reason it was relatively the same 
type of hurdles to get over to get into the business. 
Today, if you notice from the figures that I just gave 
that there are two salesmen for every broker. Another reason 
for that is that we have educational requirements for real 
estate broker licenses, which have been growing. Beginning 
January 1, 1975, a real estate broker applicant will have had 
to complete six college level, 3-unit courses in or collateral 
to real estate. It is presently four courses and this is getting 
to be a meaningful educational requirement for a real estate 
brokerage which attempts to recognize the trend toward 
professionalization out in the industry and the needs of the 
consumer in the vastly more complicated real estate situation 




we heard the last gentleman refer to FNMA, GNMC and 
FHLMC and those terms did not even exist in the real estate 
field 30 years ago. We have delivered copies of the 
Department's long-range professionalization plan to the consul-
tant to the committee, so that can give you a picture of the 
road that has been travelled to date. In trying to upgrade 
the standards for real estate broker's license, and also to 
show where the legislature may continue to see an interest 
in raising these standards. 
we believe that a limitation is one which says that 
the entrance level jobs should be generally available to the 
person who can show a general level of competence: and that 
the real estate broker, who is under the law responsible for· 
his real estate salesmen, is responsible for the funds his 
firm handles, should be required to know a good deal about 
real estate. Those courses, by the way, include real estate 
law, real estate practice, real estate appraisal, real estate 
finance, either accounting, or real estate economics, which 
is course number 5 and any of the group of electives for course 
number 6. I mention that, too, because I heard some of the 
testimony earlier today about escrow handling. I might add 
a word or two in supplement as I complete this little sheet 
here. 
We believe that if there is to be a limitation on 
participation in the real estate field, getting back to the 
question of big numbers, and to what extent that has on the 
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relationship of commission charges. We believe that the only 
type of limitation that would be appropriate would be the type 
that exists today. There should be a competency requirement 
for entrance into the field, and there should be a substantial 
requirement for knowledge and experience before you are allowed 
to employ others in the field and be responsible for entre-
preneur. That exists today, and we would like to carry it 
even further in the years to come. 
We do not believe that entry into the real estate 
business or in any other field, should be artifically restricted. 
our citizens should have a right to a job and we are quite 
satisfied that we have the finest real estate examination in 
the united states. I have just returned from a real estate 
license law official's meeting where some nice things were 
said to us by the real estate administrators and commission 
members from other states. Half a dozen states utilize our 
examination for that matter and give them to their licensees, 
and it is developed into limited reciprocity for us with them. 
It is the commissioner's desire that I attempt to respond 
on his behalf to any questions that you might have formulated. 
If I do not have the answer at hand, we will try to get it 
back to you before you have the final meeting of this 
committee that it has scheduled at this time. 
In that regard, based on some comments about escrow 
handling, I heard earlier today there are a number of juris-
dictions invoived. I want you to know that the Department of 
Real Estate has surveyed all of its realtors in the process. 
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It began two years ago; we have four-year licenses. so 
all real estate broker licenses were renewed for the last two 
years, we have included a questionnaire to determine how many 
of them were handling escrows, and to this date we have had 
a return of 23,000 of these questionnaires. Of that group, 
250 of them handled 12 or more escrows per year. We assume 
that anything less than that is purely a casual operation, 
and I am sure a 12 escrow office could not survive on that 
basis. Somewhere between 1% and 2% of real estate licenses 
handle escrows as a regula~ function. 
They are allowed to do so under an exemption from the 
Financial code, which allows them to handle escrows 
coincidental with their own transations. Those are the only 
kind they do handle. we have separate regulations to deal 
with the handling of trust funds which go into considerable 
detail as to who can handle these. They can be handled only 
by a real estate broker, or salesman on his behalf, or if a 
nonlicensee is handling him on behalf of the broker, is required 
to secure a fidelity bond. Also, every broker, who handles 
these 12 or more is subject to an audit. We automatically 
schedule them for an audit and we have audited all 250 of 
those, and we have run into just two cases that resulted in a 
need for some discipline. One was a commingling case that is 
the type of thing that an audit would hope~ully guard against, 
and the other had to do with records that were just so poor 
that they did not meet the other requirements of the regulations. 
But, it seems that real estate brokers to what limited extent 
they are in the escrow field, appear to be functioning adequately. 
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CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Should the Department of Real 
Estate take a more active role or posture on various issues 
relating to the real estate industry, such as the due-on-
sale clause, late charges, and the other things we have been 
talking about here. 
MR. HEMPEL: That is almost a philosophical question. 
We are funded, and the Real Estate commissioner has the statu-
tory responsibility to do certain things. When we go beyond 
that, for instance, take surveys, we run surveys on situations 
and when a question arises on an appropriate item to be 
budgeted for whatever costs there might be to do something 
outside the jurisdiction. The experience that is available 
within the Department of Real Estate, as a result of observing 
the real estate scene rather closely, and having hundreds of 
people involved in one or the other phase of that suggests 
that the Department of Real Estate should be involved in 
commenting on various aspects that are directly related to 
real estate transactions. 
But that expertise has its limits, too, and unless we 
maintain careful records as they are related to these other 
aspects, such as late charges, due-on-sale clauses, and the like, 
at whatever expense is involved, the question arises how 
intelligently we could comment on their impact on the real 
estate scene. 
CHAI~ McALISTER: You mentioned the thrust towards 
greater professionalizat~Qn Q~ hig~ stand~rds th~t your Depart-
ment has been attempting to maintain. I believe in 1971 or 
1972 Assemblyman Ralph had a bill that challenged that concept. 
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MR. HEMPEL: It did when it was introduced, but 
subsequently with an amendment, the bill was an educational 
0 
advancement bill, part of this package. I think that was the 
one that made course numbers 3 and 4 mandatory. This has been 
0 
a gradual step. I refer to 6 now, it is now 4 and a few years 
before that, it was 2. By accepting an amendment which I 
think was wise that Mr. Ralph suggested that private schools 
that would give courses that measured up to the quality and 
level of the college courses that were given at that time 
should be included. He suggested that amendment, we accepted 
it, and he supported the bill, and it was signed by the 
' 
Governor. 
That concept has been continued into our course number 5 
and 6. This plan for professionalization does not suggest 
that just an endless array of courses should be added. we feel 
that if you review the plan, we feel that it constitutes the 
basic package of real estate subjects would be a major, if 
in fact, general education were plugged under. 
CHAIRMAN McALISTER: Thank you very much, Mr. Hempel. 
This completes our formal agenda for today. We will 
adjourn, and we will reconvene tomorrow in San Diego at 9:30 am 
at the San Diego Gas and Electric _company auditorium. 
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i.he Tesidential mortgage, in California as well. as the rest of the 
nation, has remained essentially·unchanged since the-major Tevisions.which 
. . . . . 
~l~wed the depression of the 1930's. The present completely amortising 
mortgage has served society well since then. Now, however, the.viability 
of the mortgage instrument is again coming intQ question, but the problems 
~f today seem to be centered in two new area~: 1) the difficulties 
. -..,._--..-.....___ .... _,_tf-·~·-- ' 
. associate~ with making long-tenn .fi_;~~ - r~:t~. Jo~ra~ . _in periods of extended 
. - .. -- .. -·---.. ------·:--·------...---:• ·-·. ' , ..... • ·---·· -. -····---·--·-· --·----.-· 
inflation and escalating interest ·rates, and, 2) the increas·e in legal 
~- ,... . .. - .... , .. _ .. - .. -
attacks and legislative ~jmitations on the mortgage instrument which reduce 
.,_. - - . 
its comp~t~tive .s~anding amQng -financial instruments. Although substantial 
attention has been given to the problems of financial intermediaries in 
-~neral (much of the President's Commission on Financial Structure and . . 
· R...~ulati on de a 1 t with short-term borrowing and ·1 ong-te~ 1 e.ndi rig.), th~se. 
. . 
new problems have for the most part been neglected. Yet thei~ consequen~es 
for the mortgage instrument as it has functioned for ne~rly four decades 
·could be far-reaching; and a balanced, thoughtful rethinking of issues 
associated with :the-·~gage ;nstr.Ument·-.will 'be .,-equired ~f state and 
mtional l~islators,.who 111Ust '1ieal-·with 'the ·:questions .'concerning tne.1110rtgage . . 
'4nstrument, courts ·-which must rule on -rights ·of various ··parties, and, ·finally, 
the· consumer who must ~ltimately obtain mortgage. credit. .A similar response, 
. . . .. 
f~ from past inertia, will be ·required.of the nation's mortgage lenders. 
!Jt ·,tt.is vital -process of--reevaluation, :several important -points should 
lie -.tept in mind: . -
. ,) Lenders, legislators :and --the ·.courts .should .clearly differentiate 
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. :between legal and economic issues. ·t-tany of the present .legal .attacks are 
0 ;based on financial issues .. masquerading as issues in ·-property law ... and 





·:-def ended various clauses~ased ~n legal and property ·rights, when·the real 
· ~mportance of such clauses is in _ mainta-ining t he competitive viability of 
t he mortgage instrument in attracting capital. Lenders ·need not be asham~d 
of provisions in mortgage contracts which are designed to provide economic 
~unerat1on"to the lender or lessen his financial risk. _Many of these 
"-provisions tend to assess the cost of special services to those requiring 
·such services and allow an -overall lower mortgage rate to the ~ulk of 
harrowers. The price of eliminating contract provisions of this type must 
-411tfmately be a ·higher price for ·-mortgage f.unds. · 
~) Legislators, ~ourts and consumer groups should understand that only 
a~dest portion of ~he ~ost of~ortgage credit is accounted for by the 
qoortgage lender's oper~ting costs~nd profits. Too often ~hose attacking 
tho mortgage instr~ent have look~d at the gross rate of interest on such a 
1n0rtgage and ha~e arrived at the m~staken idea that this amount represents net 
~venue to the mortgage lender. ·On the contrary~ mortgage lenders operate on 
exceptionally thin profit mrgins. -During the period from 1963 to 1972, 
~ngs and loan associati1)ns had nnly :one ·year in :wh'ic~ "th~ir after-tax 
- ~~fits amounted to as much as one -percent of~heir mortgages outstanding. 
1rhe 4verage net profit after taxes ·during ~his period amounted ·to seven-
unths of one percent of mortgages ,1)utstanding~ or $0.701 -per year fo_r -each 
· .tmndred dollars of 1210rtgage -balances. 'Moreover., -savings ~nd .,loan associations 
.,lMortg·a·ge 1 oans a'tyea:r end :divided by net income-after ·taxes for · a 1.1 
~ngs and loan ~ssociations. Savinas and Loan Fact Book l974,p.95,104. 
-lJnited States .League of . ..Savings Associations, 1974 _ . 
. .J..2 9.--
. . · .
• 
~.Jaaye .also been successful in amtroll ing 'their operating costs, ,an :additional 
...JICODiponent .1)f the cost of ..mortgage credit. Total -annual operating cost.s of 
-~ciations have varied from 1~ :to 1-31; of mortgage loans ·held 4Juring the 
.. ::past decade.. In comparison the ·amsumer ..price index ·rose from 94.5 .to .148.3 
4)Ver an essentially similar ~eriod. Association~ record of cost control over 
-·• -.decade of inflation indicates the increased efficiency with wh~ch mortgage 
funds have been supplied. In total, the mortgage lender requires less than 
21 for his services of assembling -funds, servicing mortgages and assuming 
1the risks of financial loss. 
3) .~estrictions imposed on the mortgage instrument ~Y any state will 
~~duce the ability of local lenders to obtain mortgage credit through the 
~le of .loans iri the national secondary market. The secondary mortgage 
snarket funnels capital iTom areas of surplus to ·areas requiring mo~tgage 
·funds. The private secondary market is composed of private loan originators 
-selling whole loans or participations to private investors, often in geo-
·graphical areas remote from the origination of the loan. The federal second-
~y market is composed ·of the Federal National Mortgage Association and the 
-Federal ~orne Loan Mortgage Corporation. ~hese agencies purchase mortgages 
\ .-ith funds obtained -from 'the sale 'Of :federal :agenc;y obligations ~nd from 
iDther sources. 
lhe--state··of ·california, and -the Western United ·states in general, . 
~pe~d heavily on secor:ada~y markets ... to 13rovide mortgage funds to . home buy~rs. -
Of--the -.estimated 3.8 mill ion -single f.amily -homeowner .mortgages existing in 
'the ·. West, 1.4-million, 1)r"J6% of .. the ·.:total, were held by lenders · .. outside 
"ttte -region. 1 With over .·1)ne-third ··of ::the single family .mortgage .credit 
~pplied_ io _ the West COJDing from outside ·that area ~ it is tmpo~ant that ~o 
2•Mortgage Bankern, Mortgage Bankers Association of America, Nov.~ 
1974~p.52. . . . 






- ·restrictions be placed on ~he~rtgage instrument which would. impair its 
7salabil ity. • ... 
~he secondary loan purchaser, whether public or private, has certain - . 
Amderstandings concerning the investment which he is p·urchasing.~-:..._Loans . 
. ·-----
~re normally purchased .based on an assumed life of 12 years. If maturities ------ -----.-·-·--··--... ~·---------·-·--··-, 
of California loans are lengthened as a result of a legally imposed chang~ 
in the due on sale clause, the California loan will become an inferior product 
~f questionable salability on national markets. The loan purchaser expects 
~mely payment of principal and inter~st. A weakening of late charge 
~quirements may jeopardize such timeliness and impair the market acceptance . . . 
~of-the mortgage. A private sale of loans may be made on a basis which 
-41lticipates the sharing nf prepayment charges, but a loan n~t providing for 
prepayment charges may be unattractive in the secondary market. Any 
·1DOdification of -the mortgage which c9mpr~mises its salability in national 
~rkets reduce$ the availability of mortgage credit to the citizens of 
California. 
4) Legal prohibitions of various clauses found in the mortgage contract 
. . 
-~ce the borrower•s~ as -well ~s the lender•s, options in mortgage credit 
~otiations. · Historically,. 'the ~-borrower has been free ~o negotiate al_l the 
~rms of the mortgage--interest~rates, origination fees, prepayment charges, 
4!te~ eliminating any of~hese elements removes a possible option which the 
-~Jbortower might have preferred. Because savings association mortgage lending· 
--~erates 1r1ith thin :profit margins .and a high le_vel of operat~ng efficiency, 
--ldbanges ·in ine mortgage instrument which appear to reduce the cost of borrowing 
-·-·. ·st .be made up in .an -offsetting ·cost increase in some other aspect of the 
· ... %J~Dr tgage. - If -non-interest Tate items are e 1 imi nated, -a hi-gher-contra-ct rate 
· ~ .... . 
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~n :the mortgage .will result.. A large number of borrowers -might prefer a 
_.;lower i nterest rate with provision for .a ·due _on sale clause, ·or a 'Prepayment 
·4:barge or a late charge to an .alternative contract, qmitting one or -more 
·,~f these but bearing a higher ·.contract -:interest rate. 
~E PROBLEM OF ~ORROWING SHORT Arm LENDING LONG 
California savings and loan associations (the state's largest mortgage 
-~enders) ~btain ~heir funds from short-term sources and invest them in 
~long-tenn real -estate loans. Their funds are· .acquired from three primary 
sources. The first is passbook savings, which as· of March 31, 1974, repre-
~ed 31~3 of the liabilities of state ~hartered California associations. 
lnhese passbook balances are subject to immediate withdrawal and are, therefore, 
~ry :sensitive to t:hanging interest rates. The second source of funds for 
..associations is savings t:ertificates -earning interest higher than the nonnal 
1JiSSbook rate. These -certificates provided 49~4 of total liabilities as of 
··-'March 31, 1974· • . Although savings certificates are of a fixed maturity, 
;this period is _relatively short in relationship to the ~aturity of mortgage 
-·loans. Nearly all certificate accounts range in maturity from three months 
. . 
~·four years, ·with -the -la11Jest iClJDOUrlt-of""two years 111aturity or less. ~ 
-=tiJird ~-f-i-cant --seur.ce~ ~!. ·1Jutsi de ~!~1_f9r -~~o~i_~}~~- j_~ -~~r::r9wing 
·-~-·---··-·.. . 
~:the Federal Home Loan Bank system, a cre~it system -established by 1:he 
·~era] GQvernment to provide back-up fi_~ancing for -savings an~ loan 
· :-.as·sociations. For state -chartered California Associations., advances were · 
-=:'8..91 -of 1 iabilities as of March '31.., ·19742 .Some· Federal Home Loari .Bank 
-
~ces are available in .11Jaturities ·-of-fi.ve years or "Ql"'eater., .. but .approximately 







4Jalf of the·advances ..to .California ...associations .were less than one year 
. . 
~411aturity as of March 31., 1974. lhe.-short-tery~ nature of savings .and loan 
··4lSSOciations• liabilities ;s -not ·inadvertent: historically, short-tenn 
•.. -
·~nterest rates have been lower than · l~ng-term rates, making the process of 
-.:;.borrowing short and lending long profitable • 
• 
Although associations are funded by liabilities with very short 
~turities, thei~ assets .have greater maturities than those of any other 
-financial ··institution. As -of 'June, 1974, the national average contract 
.· .. ...111aturity on mortgages fo.r newly .built homes was 27.7 years, while average 
•aaturity for ·existing homes was 25 years. Contract maturities have 
~nsistently been above 25 years in recent years.6 In a period when interest 
. . 
"Tates remain unchanged, ·borrowing short and lending long provides a sub-· 
-~ntial service to·the ~ublic 4nd is also ·profitable to associations, since 
.·'Sftort-tenn rates have =usually been :.below long-term rates. But the upward 
~vement ~f in~erest rates over 'time ·causes s·evere earning problems for 
-
savings and loan associations and other financial institutions which borrow 
~hart and lend long. And in fact, interest rates associated with savings and· 
loan associations have generally been increasing in the postwar period. 
-~le 1 traces the ·mortgage -portfolio hel~ in 1965 through '1973. 
-·As 'the ·:table ·shows, -the interest income :per $100 of mortgages in 1965. was 
~ ~7. Inasmuch as the interest-Tate is fixed for the mortgage loan, the 
. .. . 
~6.~7 per year figure continues throughout the life of the loan. During 
~is same period ·Of~ime~ · however~ '~he .association must pay the current 
.. . 
~d flexible) market--rate for:f.unds..and~st -:meet its operating expenses.· 
. -
'7Jhe.-second line of the.-table .shows -the average cost of funds plus. expenses 
- - - - . -
~ral +lome loan .. ·Bank Board .Journal., October, 1974~ p. 37. 
'.• .. . 





....-- ·:nBLE 1 , 
···.:EFFECT Or~ INCOt~E 'FROM BORRO~llNG SHORT AND LENDING LONG 
. (Based on loan ~ortfo1io held 1965) 
/ 
·1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
:lnterest Incomea 
Per .$100 of 
-Mortgages . .$6.37 .$6.37 .$6.37 $6.37 $6.37 $6.37 $6.37 $6.37 $6.37 
-Avera~e Cost of b 
-Funds plus 
·-operating 
Expenses of 1.2~ 5.93 6.~3 6.39 6.30 6.43 6.82 6.80 -6.76 -6.93 
. 'Wet Income per 
··$100 of 
· ~ttortgag~s ~44 -14 ·-.1)2 .fJJ. -.06 -.45 -.43 -.;'39 -.-56 
.. . 
~ Interest income represents interest earned on mortgages _held in ~he 
.. portfo 1 i o during 1965 as a percent of those mortgages, based ·on figures for 
.associations in the 11th Federal Home loan Bank Board District. Source~Federal 
Home loan Bank Board Journal, December, 1973, p. 34, ~nd September, l97~,p. 36. 
b Operating expenses as a percent of mortgages· nationally for all associations 
·~ve varied between 1-22~ ·and 1-3~ _ in the period 1969-1973. See 1974 Savinqs 
~~nd loan Fact Book, p.104 and p.95. The lower figure of 1.2% is consistent with 
:~ Brigham and Petit results for the los Angeles area, corrected for non-
~-mortgage assets. See: Study of the Savinqs and loan Industry, Irwin Friend, p.l018. 
-Average cost of funds is based on figures for the llth Federal Home .loan Bank 
.,JSoard District. See FHLBB Jo~mal, .Dec, 1973, p.-33. 
-· 
. -·· 
.. , . . .. . . . 
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.. ·:- : . ~: . . . , 
- ~ :1 .. ~. The :net of :.these~ -figures ·is the.net income per $100 of mortgage 
-=--ade in 1965. Thus :in ·the ·first _year ·the po~folio generated $0.44 of net 
--;zincome per $100 of mortgage. lhe original =income level is eroded because 
.%he .cost of funds- increases-while.-the.r.ate of ·return on the mortgage remains 
'->f.ixed. Indeed, by the year 1973~ the .mortgage was imposing a net drain on 
~he association of $0.56 per $100 of mortgage. Over longer periods of time, 
• • 0 • 
trf ~ours·e, this pro~lem of lending long and .borrowing short could be 
increased.· 
ibis -borrow short-lend long-problem has ·forced mortgage lenders to 
'incorporate provisions in -their contracts \'thich 1 imit their risk exposure. 
-ISSUES lN THE .. MORTGAGE lOAN 
7lle ~mortgage agreement between the .lender and the borrower consists 
,~f :-several major provisions .which :detennine :the :financial responsibility 
·:the .:borrower .undertakes in return for 1:he loan. These are: 1) payment of. 
··:the stated interest rate on the mortgage loan, 2) payment of closing costs 
~d origination fees~ 3) timely.payment of principal and interest on the 
_ .-:.mortgage until maturity, or .until -an ..act occurs -which, by mutual agreement, 
::~lerates the loan, 4) payment :of late :charges i·n the event of late 
-- ~.)'IIJents, '5) the .l)ayment-of· :prepayment .charges in 1:ne event of early 
"'ftt)ayment of the loan, .6) the -.paY111ent ilf a ~pro rata share of the property 
%ax .and property insura~ce on a-monthly basis. These elemeQts w~rk together 
-- ~.=constitute a viable instr4JIIlent .allowing the 'Ordinary cftizen to borrow 
~urns 't)f~ money ·for c·ver:y -1-ong ·:time·,enods.. .A :brief .synopsis of each of the 
·-·important aspects .of the -'IJJOr~age ~~n -is -gi-ven in .T-able· 2. 
"~l:though the provisions of .a::mor.tgage -loan -:are """ell established in 
·-. ·-- -. . ~ " -
• ': 
--:PROVISION IN MORTGAGE 
"INSTRU~1ENT 
Due on Sale Clause 
· :fJrepayment Charge 
. ...lnterest ·-Rate 
:~rigination F~es 
tate Payment Charge 
· · :-Impound of Tax ·and 
.;Insurance ·Funds 
. · 
· ~ABLE 2 
::IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF .THE 




Provides a means of adjusting loan 
rates upon a borrower•s transf~r of 
~roperty, thereby enabling new 
:borrowers to obtain loans without 
~•holly subsidizing nolders of old 
-loans. Allows long term fixed rate 
· :mortgages. 
·Provides sharing of the costs 
-~ssociated with falling interest 
-~tes between borrower and lender. 
· .. · ;.Provides basic return to lender . 
-~epresents a return for lending risk. 
~eflects local and national economic .· 
x:onditions. 
"C-overs out-of-.pocket costs of mortgage 
lender for appraisal, etc. 
Assesses cost of delinquent accounts 
to those generating costs. Provides 
-an incentive to the borrower to . 
- ~1ntain his loan in current status. 
'. ::·~uiring of impounds for ·most·111ortgage 






. ..:tr-adition cand pr.actice, ·.:they ~ve .recently O>me under "close scrutiny by 
.-consumer ·-groups~ .courts and ·state legislators. Probably al-l the elements 
.-'Of """the :mortgage loan have, -at-.one time -or -another, been at issue in various 
• .:.am.sumer -.suits-against mortgage lending .institutions. Each aspect of the 
o .4DOrtgage loan will be examined in some detail in the following pages, with 
an attempt to show how they operate, what their-economic impact is on the 
. .bor rower :and lender, and some ·.of the implications of modifying each aspect 
"'Of -the mortgage contract. 
'THE I NTEREST RATE 
The stated interest ·rate is normally ·not a legal issue i~ mortgage 
~-ending, although it may .occasionally be a matter of litigation in in_stances 
·- * here the .borrower alleges that -the lender has charged an interest rate in · 
-violation of the -state's usury laws • . But -on a broader scale, the nominal 
·=.!Interest rate on mortgages Temains .a .matter of continuing concern. There 
. .ar e "'tlumerous state usury 1 aws 1 imiti ng mortgage rates . Th~se 1 aws reflect 
"the belief that a restricti_ve usury law will result in the availability of 
.. low-cost mortgage funds. Unduly -restrictive usury laws actually tend to 
~'1illeny:mortgage ~di:t 1:o·:the -state's citizens.. When market rates rise a~ove 
~vels .set ·by local :usury laws~ · "local ,availability of funds tends to dry up 
· -.-as :institutions -find it·'1110re :profitable to invest outside the area; ~hile 
lAot a ·~or item of consumer litigation .at ~his time, public interest can be 
.. 
ibest served by removing usury laws .and relying on market competition and 
·....-lgid ·disclosure Tegulations-.to~ure -:both .nortgage ·availability and the 
-~ possible .credit costs .• 
~able ·3 ·shows ·how ;nterest -rates n d -maturities combine to detennine 
~:1110nthly -payment .required -per. $1,'000 ~f ·mortg~ge balance. Two aspects of 








:mfE UFECT OF 1NTEREST. RATE AND . . 
· · ~-t!ATURID ON ~10NTHLY PAYMENT 
~Assumes a $1~000 Loan) 
,-... . ... . 
, :INTEREST -; ;MTURID 
RATE 
5 YEARS 10 YEARS 15 YEARS 20 YEARS 25 YEARS "30 YEARS 
:61· .$1.9.33 .$11..10 $8.44 $7.16 $6.44 $6.00 
. 
71 19.80 11.61 8.99 7.75 7.07 ~.65 
Bl :2.0.29 12.13 9 .. 56 8.36 7.72 7.34 
1JI ":20.76 ,..2.67 10.14 9.00 8.39 8.05 
101 --21.25 13.22· 10.75 9.;65 ·g.o9 8.79 
111 - "21.74 13.79 '11.37 10.32 9.80 9.52 
.'l21 22..24 14.35 '12 .. 00 11 .. 01 10.53 . 10.29 
"131 22.75. 14 . .-93 12..65 11 .. 72 11 .. 28 11 .. 06 
141 '2.3."21 . 15.53 13.32 12.-44 12.04 11.85 
151 .23.79 i6.13 14.00 13.17 12.81 . 12.64 
·. 
/ , . 
~ - . ·-






_::tilis: re.lationship ··should be .given ,careful consideration -~fo~ ·4 greater 
~rtion ·of the ·total .cost of the 1110rtgage loan ·is lumped into the ·contract ... . 
:tnterest rates. -first, -as ·mortgage interest -rates are -pushed higher_, -each 
;equal increment ·:;n the interest -rate -causes 4 :.more -:than .equal increase in 
~he .monthly payment re~uired. For example~ an incr~ase in rates f r om _6% to 
·7s on a 30 year loan increases the monthly payment $0.65~ An · increase from 
.9% to 10% increases the .payment .$0.69. .Second, at higher interest rates an 
-;aextension ·. _of. loan ·litaturity lowers the .monthly payment less than a similar 
·lllaturity change at lower rates. A 7'1, loan tlf 30 years maturity has a monthly 
;:payment .$0.42 lower than a .25 year loan. At an i nterest rate of lO'J, "the 
-~ifference is reduced to $0.30. 
_£lOSING tOSTS AND.ORIGINATION fEES 
· .l'he 1J10rtgage borrower is -normally t:barged certain ·fees at ·the time tlf 
.:tile origination of "the loan. These fees .normally range from 1% to 1.5% .and - - ·--·-.. - ·- - ··----------... --· - . -· ··- -- · 
-~y be either deducted from the ·face amount of tbe -loan-~r.added . as a c~sh 
~eost. A $20,000 loan with orjgination .and closing costs of 1.5 ~oints would 
~. - ·--·------------·- ~_.._,. __,.,_, .... .. _ ...... -.. ·- -··- --- ... .. 
~ul~ ~~ a djsb~rsement of funds in the .amount of $19~700 to the borrower . 
... - - - ...... . - .. --- --~- ~------ ---. _ _ _, _____ .... -····,.,..__..=co-__.._.-- .... 4"1T" ....,__,.._ 
;:.During :the :year 1973, .loan -4rigination fee ·income for ·state 1:hartered 
· .~1 1fomia savings· .. and loan .:associatipns ·.amounted 1:o 3 .- 6% of "'the ·tota 1 
~venue. 7 The amunt of loan ·nrigination fee :income is largely -depende~t 
·«JPPn loan volume during the period in -question. 
-;£onceptually, closing costs and :orl·gination fees can be 4ivided into 
-~,;two~eparate categories: l) :dla'"9es for:!Otrl:-.of-l)ocket .expenses incurred by 
~ lending ·institution in the actual1>rigination nf :the mrtgage~ .and 
.2) :Payments to the lender for "the lJUrpose ·of increasing the mortgage yield 
' 
-·~tement of -tonditi~ .:talifomia .:DePartment ,of 'Savings .:and .loans. 
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~:The portion of -origination fees which are associated with hard costs of 
0 - "the mortgage origination are charged for s_uch items as title insurance, · 
~llppraisals and other functions which help consumate the transaction. These 
··:charges essentially represent user-imposed costs on the association and so 
.~hould be properly charged to the buyer for the services performed. 
- Table 4 shows the effect of origination fee, maturity, interest rate 
.. ;and prepayment on the effective yi e 1 d of a mortgage 1 oan. Several factors 
~re ~viderit from~he table: 1) origination fees have a greater effect on 
~lized interest ·rates at nigher contract interest rates? 2) the effect of 
~rigination fees is higher on loans of shorter maturity, 3) the effect of 
-~rigination fees is higher on a loan that is prepaid relatively early. 
_ ·ne present ·re_g!IJ~tlons of ~the-Fedmrltte~ve-soard h:eg_u 1 a~ ion Z) 
~quire that the actual percentage rate on a loan be shown, thus the effect 
--of ~rigination fees is not hidden .. fr.om the consumer in· the .loan origination 
4Process. Given the existence of rigid disclosure regulations, there is no -
~eason to prohibit or limit such fees on mortgage lo~ns. As long as the 
-consumer is unambiguously informed of t~e true rate of interest on his loan, 
·;end the ·true cost ·of .credi~ 1110rtgage lenders should. be allowe~ to offer 
:~e-various mixes ·of ;nter.est Tates and origination ·fees. which seem to best 
- ~·their market. -
_,.REP A ntENT CHARGES 
. . . 
, -14ost Tes-idential 1DOrtgage loans include a .charge for early prepayment 
.. ~~he -loan .balance. The :most .common pattern for prepayment charges 
·Gationally is ·that provided by the regulations of the Federal Home Loan Bank 
-:~Soard: .a Federally_ char.tered .association may _i mpose -'-a ·prepayment charge 
::.equal 'to ·6 months interest on 'the amount of pri.ncipal prepaid less 20% of 
. . ~ · . ~ . . . ' 
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:tfFECT OF ORIGINATION - . -: . : ~ . . .. . . 
~ AND LOAN PREPAYMENT < '·· .. .. . 
.af EFFECTlVE HORTGAGE-LOAN 
···INTEREST RATE* 
;.>-- -~~Origination Fee of 1~} 
.Loan of 25 Years fgtiJritl loan of 30 Years Maturitl 
Prepaid jn Prepaid in 
.'-Contract 
-Rate On 5 10 15 No Pre- 5 10 15 No Pre-
Loan Years Years Years Payment Years Years Years Payment 
6."25~ 6.5M 6.40% 6.38% 6.-36% 6.50% 6.40% 6.37% 6.35% 
6.50 6.75 6.65 6.63 6.61 ·6.65 6.75 6.62 6.60 
6.75 7 .. .00 6.91 6.88 6.86 7.00 6.90 6.87 6.85 
"7.00 7.25 7.16 7.13 7 .. 12 7.25 7 .. 15 7.12 7.10 
7 .. 25 7.50 7.41 7.38 7.37 7 .. 50 . 7.40 7.37 .7 .36 
7.50 7.75 7.66 7.fi3 7 ... 62 7 .. 75 7.65 . 7.63 7.61 
7 .. 75 8.01 7.91 7.88 7 .. 87 8.00 7.91 . 7.88 7.86 
13 .. 00 8.26 8.16 8.13 8.12 .8.25 8.16 8.13 8.11 
. 8.25 8.51 8.41 8.'39 8.37 9.51 8.41 8.38 8.36 
-8.50 8 .. 76 8.66 8.64 8.62 8 .. 76 . 8.66 8.63 8.61 
.-8.75 9.01 8.92 ·8.89 s.aa 9.01 8.91 8.88 8.87 
~ .. 00 9.26 . 9.17 '9 .. 14. 9.13 9.26 9.16 9.13 9.12 
'9."25 9.51 9.42 9."'39 9.38 9.51 . 9.41 9.39 9.37 
. ·'9 .:so 9.76 9.67 9.64 9 .. 63 9.76 9.67 9.64 9.62 
·:9 .. 75 10.D2 9.92 9.89 9.88 . 10.01 9.9~ 9.89 9.87 
lO.t>O 10.27 10.17 10.15 10.13 10.26 10.17 10.14· 10.12 
10.25 10.52 . 10.42 10.40 10.39 10.52 10.42 10.39 10.38 
10.50 10.77 10.68 10.65 10.64 10.77 10.67" 10.64 10.63 
10.75 11.02 10.93 10.90 10.89 11.02 . 10.92 10.90 10.88 
11.:00 11.27 . 11.18 11.15 11.14 11.27 11.17 11.15 11.13 
11.25 11-52 11.43 11.40 11.39 11.52 11.43 11.40 11.38 . 
11.50 .11 .. 77 11.68 11.66 11.64 11.77 11.68 11.65 11.64 
11..75 12...03 11.93 11 ... 91 11.90 12.02 11.93 . 11.90 11.89 
12.00' 12.28 12.18 l2.16 12.15 12.27. 12.18 12.15 12.14 
.:12.25 :12...53 "12.44 ·12.~1 12.40 12 .. 53 12.43 12.41 12.39 
-~As a general rule of thumb, origination fees have the following impact on 
~~rtgage loan interest rates. Assuming a loan of 25 to 30 years maturity. 
· ,_ .Each 1CX: of ·origination-fees ·increases the -effective interest cost 
--;appt'Oximately 25 basis points ~ssuming ::total prepayment at the end of 5 years. 
2. Each 1% of origination fee increases the effective interest cost 
-~proximately 15 ~sis .points assuming total prepayment at the end of _10 years. 
. . . 
3. £ach 1% of oriqination fee increases the effective interest cost 





~1the original balance of the~rtgag~ While no such regulation exists for 
. . 
-~te chartered California .associatinns~ ·the Federal pattern has_ gained 
:·iSUbstantial local .acceptance. 
. -
~he .economic~ationale for imposing prepa~ent charges is to protect 
-the mortgage lender from refinancing in periods of declining interest rates. 
-During periods of rising interest rates, the mortgage lender can neither 
i ncrease the interest ra.te nor call the mortgage loan and reinvest at more 
. -· . 
~vorable·rates; but during periods of declining interest rates, the 
·borrower is free to prepay ·the-mortgage loan and refi.nance at a lower rate 
,.except as constrained by the prepayment· charge. Thus prepayment charges help 
. . 
~ -equalize interest rate Tisk. The ~ctual impact of the prepayment charge 
is shown in Table 5. 'The ·table ·provides information on the prepayment of a 
25 ~ear loan {)f ·9S .interest -and original balance of $10,000. For exar_nple, 
-if :the loan is .prepaid -after five years, the amount prepaid is $9,327 .00, 
:~ne~repayment charge. is $330, the effective cost 6f the loan to the borrower 
..over the five year period is 9.53%., and the borrower would. find it profitable 
~o Tefinance if he ·can ~btain mortgage credit at 8.~6% or·below. A 
- -~repayment penalty -provides ·only -minimal protection to the mortgage lender 
··.in :the -early years ·of -the ln~n, ·.or ·'COnversely, the benefit to be gained by 
·1the .borrower fromTefinancing is ~ot severely compromised by the existence 
~f .the prepayment penalty. At_thefive year date, interest rates need drop 
~DnlY 34 basis points to make it profita~le for the borrow~r to repay the 
l oan, pay the prepayment :penalty, -and Dbtain new financing. If the loan is 
··-'1Jn!paid at a later. -point., -the~llar prepayment charge is smaller and the 
-,'effective cost ·of credit ':to ··the borrower is lower; however, the· incentive to 
~inance is also lower. 
. . 
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·.:~tABLE 5 
~PREPAYMENT CHARGE* 
25 Year Loan ... 
-~~ Interest Rate on $10,000 Loan 
,/-
REFINANCING 
RATE AT \miCH 
,• COST OF BORROWER HAS AN 
YEAR OF PREPAYf~ENT LOAN OVER ADVANTAGE FROM 
PREPAYMENT At10UNT PREPAID CHARGE PERIOD HELD PREPAYMENT 
:s $ 9327.00 $330.00 9.532: 8.66% 
10 .$ .8274.-QO ··$282.00 9.19% 8.43% 
15 $ .6625.00 . '$208.00 . 9.08% 8.28% 
20 $ .ll043.00 $ .92.00 9.022: ~.04% 
"* Assumes maximum prepayment charge a11owed by Federally chartered 
··sav;ngs and loan associations. Prepayment charge is 6 months interest 
-~n·the amount prepaid less 20% of the original loan balance. 
· .. . . ' 
.. -.. .. 





·;.'Mortgage lenders impose a charge for 1110nthly . :installment payments 
. -~hich are overdue. Qften ~he ·institution allows a grace period, in some 
:.<ases up .to 1.5 .days., .before .a .Jate cllarge ;s "imposed. There are 
~everal reasons for the imposition· of a ~harge on delinquent payments. 
First, the handling of delinquent payments imposes a cost on ·the lending 
-institution. Oelinquent .accounts take the specialized attention of staff 
-~d~enerate increased costs of servicing. Second, it encourages the 
4lorrower to remain .llUnctual in .his loan payments. la.xness on the part of 
· :the lending institution --encourages delinquency on the part of the borrower 
. 
--.and ·may ultimately result in "the borrower losing his property through 
f oreclosure. ri·nally, 1ate chaTges are -important in -maintaining the cash 
''flow of ·the lending institution_.and 'this provides additional -mort9age funds. 
·r-rhe largest single ·source ~f lendable funds for California savings and loan 
-:.:associations comes from the repayment of existing loans. 
· ~appropriate late charge should be sufficient to fully recover the 
-ildditional cost imposed by the late account. In addition, the late charge 
should be sufficient to -motivate 'the .borrower to maintain his loan in a 
· '1:111 rent :status. 
· --rHE 'tMPOUNDING .. OF iAX ·-AND lNSURANCE FUNDS 
.;ttationally, most mortgage ·lenders ·requJre the payme~t of a pro ·rata 
~rtion of the borrower•s yearly~roperty tax and property insurance. Except 
· ~ ~ertain classes 1>f·'1110rtgage loans., ~such .a -requirement is .not allowed in 
~ -state of -California. The ·impounding m tax .and insurance funds assures 
. ~t -the lender's interest in -the property is protected from tax liens and 
.. ... 
p " • ' : ... . -
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. . 
-.-:¢be ·.destruction through fire . .and .other causes. Inasmuch as impounding of 
-~x-and insurance accounts is ~ot permntted in California, this issue is 
• 
l i kely to disappear as a matter of concern to lenders, borrowers and 
.:.J~gi.slators. lnterestingly5 however, ...California experience indicates that 
.::borrowers generally prefer to include tax and insurance payments \'lith 
- ~eir l"egular installments even where not required. 
'THE .DUE ON SALE .CLAUSE 
-~e aspect ~f the~rtgage loan neserves special attention--the due 
.·.on sale clause. It is highly important to th~ viabil 1ty of the long-term 
'fixed rate mortgage, arid~ it- has been .an .attractive target for judicial or 
. legislative attack. The following sections examine the nature of this clause · 
1and the impact of its removal. 7he ~ration of the due On . sale clause 
-~quires that .a mortgage be·~paid~pon .the sale of the property. The effect 
~~f~he due~n sale .clause nas ·been to ~ffectively shorten the actual realized· 
Jmaturity of mortgage portfolios. A l~nder normally uses t~e due on sale 
t:lause ·· to adjust the interest rate to a level nearer that currently pre'lail ing . . 
in local mortgage markets. This has ~he ·effect of maintaining the financial 
..-lability of the mortgage -portfoli.o., ·<Which 10ay have been eroded by increasing 
- ~:2nterest ·rates. ,.able :.6 ;provides-a ;comparison of two· hypothetical mortgage_s. 
·-.me -subject to a .:due· on sale clause, ·'the ·llther not having the due on sale 
~lause. Both are assumed to ~e~losed December 31, 1964,8 and the property 
~bsequently sold December 31, "1968, and· ~gain December 31, 1971. Loans 
~losed December 31, l964, ..are ~ssumed -to .~e at an interest rate of. 6%, 
. . 
-~entially the national mortgage r.ate ~xisting at that point in time. Upon 
· .
. 8rhe cost of ·funds for association~ lending in the 11th district as of 
··-1965 .was 4.73% at the time the property was sold. By ·1968 the cost of lendable 
~~ds had increased to 5.10:, by 1971 ~o 5.6%. The exercise of the due on sale 
~lause al1mo,~s the lender to ·keep ·pace with the rising cost of funds. See 
.:.Federal Home .loan Bank Boar.cLJoumal., January, 1974, p.49. 





. · ~OTIIETICAL EFF..ECT-:.OF .DU£ ON ~ALE .CLAUS£ . - . 
~OAN WITH DUE ON SALE. t:LAUS£ 
.:Loan Closed December .31, 1964 
~Amount of loan $10,000 
.l nterest Rate 6% Mat. 25-years 
l nit1al Monthly Payment $64.43 
] 964-1968 
-~·-Monthly Payments @ $64.43 
~perty Sold December 31, 1968 
JDue -~n Sale Invoked 
~~ew loan Amt. $9,219~34 Rate-7% 
-1969-1971 
:36 ·Monthly Payments of $69.93 
· :f»mperty So 1 d December .31, 1971 
_,:a,e-.on Sale Invoked 
-1iew .loan ,Amt. $8,474' Rate 7.75% 
"!1972-1989 
··'216 Monthly Payments of $73.74 
~AL Payments Received $21,538 
l.OAN -ltllTHOUT DUE ON SAL£ CLAUS£ 
... :Loan Closed December 31 , 1964 
-~unt of loan.$10,000 
Jnterest Rate 6% Mat. 25 years 
. Initial Monthly Payment $64.43 
1964-1968 
-,48 -Monthly Payments @ $64.43 
Property So 1 d December 31 , 1968 
_lfo .Due-·{)n Sale Clause 
·01 d loan Remains 
1969-1971 
36 ~nthly Payments of $64.43 
lT.operty Sold December 31, 1971 
·:;f.llo.IDue •on Sa 1 e .Clause 
-:Dld J.oan Remains 
. -197.2-1989 
. . 
~16 Monthly Payments of $64.43 
-
· ·:rorAL .:Payments Recei ved ..$19~329 
-_ :toss from rermval of due tm 'Sale- ..$2,209 . 
; .. 
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"!$ale of -the property, . .December .. 3l, ."1968,.::the loan...hav.ing :the ..due :On sale 
::c:lause is called, and the interest rate ·raised to the .current rate. of 7'1, 
- ~isting in 1968. This results in a~ew ·monthly payment of $69.93. When 
-~ property is sold December 31., 1:9n., :the :.due on .sale . .clause is .again 
~nvoked, and the interest rate . raised to 7.75%., again .the current lending 
Tate. By invoking the due on sale clause, the total payments received frem 
. . . . 
~his loan over the 25 year period amount _to $21,538, whereas the total 
~yments received from ·the loan not having the due on sale clause amount 
~ $19,329. The loss from removal of~he ~ue on sale. clause amounts _to 
~2,109, approximately 22% of ·the original amount ~f the~rtgage loan • 
. In the absence of -the due -on -sale cla~se, the 1110rtgage lender -would 
~ave had to ·charge a ·rate to the original borrower of approximately 7%, · 
:instead 1lf the actual .£% rate .charged. The due on sale clause., .while allowing 
,.the association .to mai_ntain its mortgage .portfolio ·nearer current mortgage 
_-yields, ~lso allows ~t ;to .maintain lower li!l"!ding Tates at -each -point in 
·tfme. · 
Jn :~he absence of this clause, ·the lender would have to be-prepared 
~ llCcept a .maturity as long .as :tilir.ty _years on a -majority ·of its loans. 
. . 
-~he-due on .sale clause -plus ~nther -prepayments -of -mortgage loans nave··resulted 
4n-i!n ·average life of 1DOTtgage cloans ·-of 8 to 12 years~ Secondary ·mortgage 
-warket operations generally assume .,cln .average mortgage life of 12 years. 
miE .CONSEQUENCES OF EUMINATlNG "THE DUE ON SALE CLAUSE 
• ·':A$ ""tile --previous section -demonstrated, :the ·:.due~n sale .:clause provides 
. 11ft~ective mechanism for ~hor.tening -of '"tbe -~ver~ge ·maturity o~ l110rtgage 
~oans and sh~ring the ~rket .-orintere~ rate risk between the association 
.end· its . .customers. abe due ~on -sale ·clause, by shortening. -maturities and . . 
· -14?- . ... 
D 
.. . 41a'fnt aining portfo1Jo yields • . helps :to ·-maintain .the :supply of mortgage 
~dit at a reasonable interest ~ate. lJimination of the clause ~Y not .aid 
~.:.potential purchaser and .. will i nCTease .. the :cost of all ·mortgage _credit. 
-:£f fect on the Borrower 
1n fmfnat ion of the due·on sale clause would appear ~o favor the 
. . 
-~otential home purchaser. But increasing home prices nullify the benefits of 
4tssuming an e~isting ·mortgage. Table 7 shows the price behavior of a 
Mest ern home originally purchased in 1967. -As the table .shows, the price 
bas increased from $26,000 to $37~200 over the peri~d 1967 to 1973. The 
.. .annual rate of price ·increase over this .period has been 6~08% per year~ with 
·.dr.amatic increases in 1972 and 1973. A 75% loan originally negotiated in 
:l 967 ~would provide only a 46% 1oan-to-price ratio by 1973. :Thus the potential 
:purchaser ~ould have to eome up with ~sh covering 54% of the purchase price. 
l n t he absence of such a cash down payment, the purchaser must buy on contract, 
~obtain a purchase money mortgage from the se1ler, ·or ~btain.a second mortgage 
-from an outside party. Table 8 illustrates the -problem faced by the h~me buyer · 
. ...wishing to assume an existing mortgage. A buyer 1'Urchasing (in Dec.- 1973) 
.:.a 'typical house constructed~ -sold, .and fl11anced in 1967 could afford to .:pay no 
-lii!Ore t han 9.46% interest--on -a 'Second111or.tgage 1tf "25 years -term if he ~ishes to 
~leep his total monthly payment at or · be1ow~he pa~e~t on ·a new loan (Dec., 
1973).9 But a 9.5~ rate· is well ·be1ow~he -rate normally charged by a second 
.~gage lender--second mortgage rates are often ·in the range of 15% to 18%. 
1rhe .unwary buyer ·may mistakenly think it .advantageous to assume the current 
~ ' gage and negotiate a second ·mor.tqage-4!t. a ·rate :substantially higher than 
-:9It -"is unli ke1y -that the borroWer w111 be able to obtain a .-maturjty of 
·25 years with a junior instrument. t1uch of the secondary financing will 
- ~corporate substantial balloon payments which were partially responsible for 










- ~"7ABLE 7 
AVERAGE SALE PRICE OF 





























1 lypical house is defined as the average house sold in 1967. Western 
-4Jnited States includes Mountain States and Pacific Coast area. 
- ~ource: Construction Reports -'•Price. Index of _New One-family Houses · 










.mEFINANCING VERSUS A SECOND ·-MORTGAGE 
··Original Cost 
.,.Original Loan 1 
,--
cMonthly Payment2 at 6.5% and 
25 years maturity 
.Loan Balance-end of-1973 
-·-loan cRequired -end -of 1973 ·for 
75% -loan · 
"Payment required of ::$27 ;900 1 oan 
~f 25 years at 8.5%3 . 
. . · .3967 
l967 
1973 
-+.Additional Financing required for 
7.5S loan if purchase money mortgage 
-.1lr -second .mortgage is .used 
~~hest rate payabl~ ~n second 
~rtgage 25 year tenm4 







1 -75% loan-to-~rice ratio -based on national average loan-to-price 
---ntios of 73.6~. FHLBB -Journal, March~ 19!0., Pg. 29. 
-·-:z .;.;Based on ·national :average -~ffective -:rates of 6 .. 46% .. 
"'3 -'National average 'effective -rate "'n ·new loans made at savings and loan 
-4ssociations December, 1973. FHLEB -Journal, Oct. 1974. 
~ This is the highest interest ~ate ~ayable by the borrow~r on a ~econd 




.""·· . ... _ 
Jlis break-even -rate. Elimination ~of ·:the :due .nn ··sale clause could result in 
• 
~ proliferation of second mortgage instrumen~s providing credi~ at a 
. . 
-·~elatively high rate, with little or .no -net .benefit 'to the potential home· 
.-
~purc~aser. It may also result in a large ·number of purchase money mortgages 
~r real estate contracts which tend to tie up the liquidity of the home 
seller. These real estate contracts or purch~se money mortgages are 
·Telatively high risk, low liquidity investments. The proliferation of such 
jnstrumenis ~oes not seem to serve the public interest. 
·:Effect :on Mortgage lending and The Mortgage Instrument 
ln~valuating the possible ~ffects on the lender of-the elimination 
-~f 'the -due on sale clause~ at li!ast three possibilities should be examined; 
1 1) savings and loan associations will -absorb the reduction in net in~ome 
. arithout effects .on other -parties, 2) mortgage. lenders will switch to variable 
~dnterest rate mortgages· as a substitute for ·the due on sale clause, and 
. . 
3)lmortgage lenders will continue to offer.fixed rate ~ortgages, but at 
substantially higher. interest rates. 
\:ilhsorption uf ..losses .By .Sav.il'lgs and ·.Loan ·Associations 
·. 
:savings -and ·loan 'associations -:are ·:extremely ~fficient in the handling 
-~f'the public's funds --and receive a 'Sma11 -margin ·per dollar of funds handled. 
:Table 9 shows the relationship between -the --major income and expense items 
. . 
-for savings and loan associations in the, 11th Federal Home Loan Bank Qistrict, 
.. ;comprised of .California, .Arlzona .and -Nev.ada. Out .of -each $100 of .mortgages 
.. field, :the association receives :-only ..about .·$1.46 to cover all operating 
-~enses and provide adequate ·net-;ncome to the association.. The entire cost 
. . 
















. ~OST OF FUNDS Arm INTEREST RETURN 
:.Ott MORTGAGES FOR SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS 
.. ... ;.--. . 
·JNTEREST PER AVERAGE COST AVAILABLE FOR OPERATING 
$100 OF PER $100 OF OPERATING EXPENSES 
1-tORTGAG ES~ FUNDSb EXPENSES PER $100 OF 
AND INCOr~E · r~ORTGAGESc 
$6.37 . .$4.73 $1.64 $1.24 
.$6.34 :$5.03 .$1 ... 31 $1.24 
$6 .. 39 $5.19 .$1 .. ""20 $1.21 
•$6.52 .$5 .. 10 :$1.42 $1 .. 22 
$6.71 ·.$5.23 .$1..48 :$1.."26 
$6."92 •$5.·62 $1-30 $1 .. 31 
$7 .. 13 . .$5.1>0 $1 .. 33 $1.25 
$7.21 15.56 . $1..-1)5 $1.22 
$7 .. 34 '$5.73 $1..61. $1.32 











.aBased on fi.gures for the ·11th Federa 1 -flome loan Bank District, FHLBB 
~ournal~ October~ 1974,. p.33,34 • 
. ~lbid. 
-~Based :on figures for all savings and loan associations. All ·operating 
~sts are implicitly assigned to -mortgage lending by this technique. 
].974 Savings and Loan Fact Book, p.95 and 104. 
~Net Margin will difrer from ~et income mainly because the association 
-~as equity funds ~hich are cost free in .an accounting sense. 
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-=$100 of mortgages held. ln the ·l)eriod -shown .by 'the .table~ the average 
~rgin available for the-association's net income ,amounted to only $0.21 
~r $100 of mortgages held • 
.. 
. ]n ~e hypothetical exampl~s presented .in the previous section, . the 
l oss of the due on sale clause would have cost nearly one dollar per year 
per $100 of .association mortgage loans outstanding. This is nearly five 
~mes the $0.21 net margin available for net income. While the hypothetical 
~ple pres~nts only one set of circumstances~ it is indicative of the 
··impact of the due on sa 1 e c 1 a use. It is -un 1 i-ke 1 y tha :t the due on sa 1 e c 1 a use 
flas an overall impact as low .as one half of 1~. However, even this figure 
·1represents nearly twice the spread between the yield on mortgages and the 
400St of funds plus operating ~xpenses. It is clear that savings and loan 
~ciations could not easily absorb the losses generated by the elimination 
.1Df·the due on sale ·clause. If it ~ere to be eliminated, either the method 
·~f granting mortgage credit must change, or mortgage interest rates must rise. 
~he ·Substitution of Variable In~erest Rate Mortgages For the Due on Sale Clause 
~-~s been shown, the due on sale clause operates to effectively 
. . 
.··:show ten the maturity 1>f .an association's mortgage loan portfolio; alterna-
·~ve1y, ·it -~uld be .described as a ·~echanism to keep ·mortgage portfol~o yields .. 
. -.:as close as possible to current mortgage .market Tates. In the absence of the 
·.1due ·on sale clause, i~ is possible that associations would turn to the 
·v.triable interest rate mortgage. 
1rhe variable interest rate mortgage is ~·mortgage whose interest rate 
-is .adjusted from time to time based ..on so~~ .predetennined market index or 




:" · .. 
· '1be -only financially rational :reason -f'or borrowers -objecting ·to 1:he 
~ue on sale clause is that it eliminates :the -subsidy of a ·low-;nterest Tate 
... 
-~ich can be shared between the or iginal borro~er and the subsequent purchaser 
M -the -property. Under the -variable interest -rate mortgage, the purchaser 
. . 
.of a property, having an existing -mortgage loan, would be required to pay 
current mortgage rates. This is .exactly the same condition th_at is _imposed 
~~nder the due on sale contract. 
~igher Rates for .Fixed Rate Mortgages .. 
~hould the .due on sale clause be eliminated, the ·fixed ra~e mortgage 
$.YS'tem will be maintained at least for a .portion of mortgage lending; however, . 
~rrent mortgage rates required at each .point in time-will be higher. The 
· ~limination of -the due on -sale ·clause, .by extending the effective -maturity of 
· . .ar'tgage loans, would -greatly increase· the market -risk facing the mortgage 
:)ender. ihis higher level of market -risk wuld'·require lenders -to raise the 
:·-interest rate ~n ·mortgages. The Testricted entry into -banking activities, 
· including mortgage lending, creates ~onopoly .powers sinrtlar to those e~joyed 
-"'by ~ilities. 'This, -combined .with the ·existence of a substantial body of 
- ·~..,rtgage loans below -cun-ent··111arket -Tates, in -effect ·:creates a tax and 
"3Ubsidy. ln 'Order for ·past'iloTTOWers··to ·-continue -to ·1mjoy the low interest 
--:.-ontes, .current .borrowers must :be .:charged rates sufficient to meet "the cost 
~ funds for their own mortgage plus an amount necessary to overcome the 
. . 
-ldeficiency cr~ated by the below-market ·rate mortgages. A tax on ·new borrm'lers 
··;:is ·:created in nrder -:to -f.und the :.Subsidy :to existing borrowers. ihere seems to 
-~·-no social purpose served by -such .an income --transfer., and the ~unfavorab 1 e 
--effects 'lDaY be substantial. ·An -; -ncrea.se in"1110rtgage ·interest rates would act 
- . -.s ·.a -depressant on the ilousing .industry ·by decrea~ing ·effective--demand -for 
·wew housing. 
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~..due .on sale · provision~ -then, -serve~ :several purposes: 
1) ·Precludes the generation of a subsidy from current borrowers to 
. 
.. "'"lJast borrowers by reducing the ~number of below-market interest rate 
,__._,rtgages. 
:2) ·Increases the availability of~ortgage funds~ Keeping mortgage 
~ortfolios at current competitive yields allows the attraction of additional 
-~r.tgage funds in the market. 
3) 1leduces the llrol iferation -of second mortgages and purchase money 
·iiDOrtgages. These 1110rtgages .are high -risk assets to the lender;, .and ~xpensive 
u the borro\'ler. In sonie -cases the borrower -may ultimately be worse off 
-~th -~ £Ombination assumption ·and second mortgage than if he had _obtained a 
-~ first mortgage at current interest -rates. 
~) :J\llows the ~continued . lending of mortgage funds on a long-term 
·fixed interest rate basis, thus shi_elding the borro~er :from the risk of 
4nterest ·rate changes. 
3) ·nimination of the ilue .:an sal~ clause may -requjre mortgage lenders 
..:to .use variable interest rate mortgages or short term mortgages with a large 
~lloon ~aymen~. 
;-..:Mortgage law and Tegulation should assure that mortgage lending 
c~sti tutions do not have to live with mortgage ~ortfolios whose maturities 
~ve been unreasonably extended. 
·:Statute -and ·regulation -should ·recognize 'the right of lnOrtgage lenders 
~ call or terminate :the mortgage .upon -:the.:.Sale -of the property. No implied 
'4:0Diiii~nt to future purchasers- :should be .incorporated in ·the ·execution of 
, ,.... ... IOrlgage. 
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~HIBIT B 
!!:CRL.;SED CO!·:PE.TI'Jl8~l IS ADV:)CA'l'ED TO INCf'.EASE AVAILABILITY OF 
CCJ':-'SU!·~.n !..CIP.!\S rOR ?J:.DUCLD l!~':'ER:CST RATES. by Stanley Zimmerman 
EXCi'RPTS FROM: CONSUhi:R CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 
At P. 109 
At P. 110 
At P .. 112 
At P. 113 
At: P. !14 
Report of The National Commission on Consumer Finunce 
December 1972. 
11 Availability and market rate are so . related tnat 
legally determined rates may adversely affect avail-
ability and that of course would constrict the use of 
re:.te ceilings as ea poliC}' tool benefiting all consumers." 
"A highly competitive market exists when the number 
of sellers is so large and entry is so easy that no 
seller has power over price (in this study, annual 
percentage rate). Price is determined by the inter-
a-:ting forces of supply and demand." 
11 B. t•:hen a few firms possess market power in a particular 
market, they may charge higher than . competitive market 
prices if it is more profitable for them to do so. 11 
"Competitive conditions are a major determinant of rates 
and availability in the many state markets in which lega l 
ceilings are sufficiently high to leave the market rate 
unaffected ... 
11 Empirical evidence indicates that rate ceilings that 
impinge on market rates are also associated with sub-
stantial reductions in credit supply." 
"In general, any kind of market imperfection-any re-
striction which tends to inhibit the free interactions 
of potential borrowers and suppliers of credit-can have a 
potential effect on credit availability. Such market. 
imperfections include legal constraints, regardless of 
intent, as well as noncompetitive behavior of suppliers. 
L~gal factors of most potential significance are rate 
ceilings, restrictions on other credit terms such as lo~n 
size and maturity, limitations on creditors' remedies, 
and legal constraints on the entry of new firms. 
"The restrictive effect on availability can occur in two 
basic forms: a price effect and a nonprice rationing 
e=fect. 11 
.. Barriers to entry. Because the principles of free co:-:-.-
petition are based in part on ease of entry for new 
suppliers, any barriers to entry can lessen competition. 
:Oarrier'=> are not limited to th·~ commercial bank, credit 
union and =inance company seccors studied by the Corn-
:n!. S S: i011. u 
"AJlother E' ignifican t leqal barrier in consumer credit 
markets is that of convenience and advantage (C&A) 
licensing for finance c ompanies under many state laws. 
By limiting licenses under strict construction of the 
law to offices that serve the .. convenience" and "advantaq, 
of the comnunity, states inhibit comfetition from new firl 
, cc 
At P. 136 
At P. 137 
At P. 138 
At P.l47 
"Althou~h the intent of C&A licensinq is purportedly 
to encouraqe the qrowth of the size of loan offices to 
attain cconor.ics of scale, misdirected application of 
the rule can lead to substantial lack of competition. 
!·1oreover, Cor..mission studies reveal no significant 
econorr.ies of scale." 
"Legal rate ceilings may reduce the price of personal 
loan credit to some borrowers, but when ceilings are 
sufficiently low to affect the observed market rate in 
a significant way, there is a substantial reduction in 
the number of borrowers included in the legal market." 
" •••• the only truly effective way of gaining ample 
supplies of personal loan credit for consumers and 
reasonable rates too, is to increase competition while 
simultaneousiy relaxing inordinately restrictive rate 
ceilings." 
"With respect to new commercial bank entry, there has 
been in the past an excessive concern on the part of 
chartering and regulatory authorities for the protection 
of the profitability of existing bank in~titutions and 
the presumed "needs and convenience" of the public. Too 
little emphasis has been given to the vigor of bank com-
petition and relying on such competition to provide 
optima~ performance in terms of price and availability. 
The economics of entry have been summarized by Donald 
Jacobs. 
"If the rate of return is low in an area, no new bank will 
seek to enter. Restrictions on entry in these cases are 
redundant. In areas where the rate of return on capital 
is high, entry restrictions may impede the free flow of 
new capital. At best, the economic effects of entry 
restrictions are redundant; at worst, they are harmful. 
"The presence of deposit insurance wil•l continue to 
protect depositors' funds and current supervisory stand-
ards will continue to preserve the safety and soundness 
of commercial banks in an environment where there is 
liberalized entry chartering and more vigorous competition ... 
"i~i th respect to regulations restricting entry of finance 
companies in the market, the Commission finds no value in 
"Convenience and !>.dvantage 11 limitations on entry. There· 
is ample evidence indicating that these and similar re-
strictions are disadvantageous to the publie and should be 
abolished. The Commission recommends that the only 
criterion for entry (license) in the finance company seg-
ment of the consumer credit market be good character, and 
that the right to market entry not be based on any 
minimum capital requirements or convenience and advantage 
regulations." 
.,Rate cei~lings . in many states restrict the supply __ of _ 
credit and eliminate creditworthy borrowers from consur..er 
credit markets. Some seek out less desirable alternatives, 
such as low quality credit sellers and illegal lenders. 
Furthermore, many borrm'lers who are not rejected pay rates 
of charge higher than they would be charged in workably 
competitive ffiarkets." ,1:'..., 
At P. 162 
At. P. 163 
At P. 165 
"T~·.e Cc:-.:--:!0.:-.:.on· recor.:·!t.:.:-JC=:s t!"'.<::t n~licies C::E=:i~r.e:=: to 
promote co~netition · should be qiven the first priority, 
with adjust~ent of rate ceilings used as a complement 
to expand the availability of credit. As the develop-
ment of workably competitive markets decreases the need 
for rate ceilings to combat market power ·in concentrated 
markets, . such ceilings may be rai~ed or removed ... 
"Rate ceilings below those indicated in Commission studies 
may tend to inhibit the functioning of a competitive market 
and restrict the availability of consumer credit. Such 
states should also monitor the effect on high risk bor-
rowers since lower rate ceilings tend to eliminate such 
borrowers from the legal consumer credit markets." 
"Encouragement of competition is imporant to consumers 
because it provides the most efficient means of making 
credit available to them at reasonable prices. Pu1: anothex 
way, competition can eliminate any monopolistic profits 
of credit grantors and drive from the market the least 
efficient creditors. If competition can be made to work, • • 
" ••• financial responsibility, experience, character, ·and 
general fitness." 
"If th~ commissioner shall find ••• that allowing such 
applicant to engage in business will promote the con-
venience and advantage of the community ••• " 
" ••• firms with licenses try to prevent the issue of 
additional licenses to potential competitors, ••• " 
"Restrictions on bank entry have generally been justified 
in the name of deposit safety. But it is difficult to see 
what public policy objectives are fostered by a "con-
venience and advantage" test for financ~ companies other 
than perhaps preserving a higher than average level of 
profits for banks and finance companies ••• 
"One can perhaps understand the opposition of bankers and 
some finance companies to a repeal of convenience and 
advantage restrictions on entry. Such an action might 
well jeopardize their monopolistic profits ... 
''One of the ~ost effective ways competition serves con-
sumer interests is in the development of new products 
and services." 
" .•. to provide for Federal chartering or l'icensing in an 
attempt to override legal impediments to effective com-
petition in the highrisk market. Federally chartered 
fina!1ce companies may be able legally to ignore restrict-
ive state laws that inhibit competition in consumer credit. 
". ~ ~efJ9.;-1:§__ ~_!1q~ld._p~---~-n~d~_;-~a!ceD _ _to _ p§!r~-~~~e _the states 
to remove from existing laws and regulations anticornpeti 1:i •, 
(and, by extension, anticonsumer) restrictions on entry 
and innovation. -158-
EXHIBIT C 
The following presentation was made before the Assembly Finance 
and Insurance Committee on November 12, 1974, in Los Angeles. 
Mr. Chairman and Members, my name is Richard E. 
Ratcliff. I represent the California Bankers Association. We 
are here today to discuss with you the subject matter of your 
hearing which covers the costs associated with the financing of 
real property transactions. 
In the past, the California Bankers Association has 
sponsored more than several bills, dating back some four years, 
covering part of the subject matter of your hearing. The most recent 
of these are: (1) A.B. 105 by Assemblyman Deddeh, which would 
limit the late charges to 10% of the payment due. This bill was 
not passed by the Legislature, rather, it was hung up in joint 
conference committee. Part of the problem was the appearance on 
the scene of the Garrett case. 
(2) The second bill was A.B. 2114 by Assemblyman 
Hayden, which would have limited prepayment penalties to six 
months interest on the unpaid balance less 20%. This was to be 
effective for a period of 7 years from the date of execution of 
the deed of trust. The bill was amended on the floor of the Senate 
to be the same as the provision which is cuxrently within S.B. 200, 
which is also before you in this interim study. Because of the 
amendment, it was not acceptable to the proponents, and thus, the 
bill died in the Senate. 
passed and signed by the Governor and is Chapter 925 of the 
Statutes of 1973. This bill prohibits the lender from making an 
-159-
impound account a condition of making the loan. 
We feel that this indicates that the C.B.A. believes 
that reasonable, workable legislation in some areas should be 
adopted. We have tried, but for various reasons these measures 
have not been adopted. 
In our testimony today, we would like to do the 
following: First, sketch generally the present sources and flow 
of funds. Second, discuss with you the importance of the second-
ary market as one of the forces which must be considered. Third, 
discuss the Federal National Mortgage Ac~or Fannie Mae, and the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Freddie Mac, their treatment 
of charges and some other provisions which are contained in standard 
notes and security agreements of these organizations. Fourth, 
we would like to indicate how banks generally function in these 
areas. Fifth, we would like to reserve some time during the 
November 22 hearing in San Jose to present some specific suggestions 
for legislation to be considered by this Committee. 
Throughout my testimony, I -will be talkip~ about 
-------·~·-~ 
conventional real estate loans except where we indicate that the 
r-··-··--------·-·-·-··-·····-·--·--· .. ·-·-·-·····-··----·· ....... -·--··--··---· .. -· .. _________ .. • ·-------------·-- ---
information available is with regard to F.H.A. and V.A. loans. 
Also, we are talking about residential lending, as it is our under-
standing that the intention of the Committee is to cover the areas 
of conventional, F.H.A. and V.A. lending as it applies to residential 
lending for consumers who are in the market for, or who are involved 
with, residential real estate loans and financial transactions. 
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I. SOURCES AND FLOW OF FUNDS 
The sources and flow of funds in residential lending 
and residential transactions are obviously the most important parts 
of the entire picture. From the lender's viewpoint, if the funds 
are not available or are available in a restricted fashion, then 
his difficulties of making real estate loans are obvious. 
For the first source of funds, the lender has the 
basic funds w~thin the institution involved. For instance, banks 
have two 'rin-bank" sources: commercial/checking deposits and .... __ . 
savings deposits. By nature these are short-term funds, i.e., the 
depositor can retrieve them either on demand or within a relatively 
short period of time. Real estate lending obviously involves the 
placing of funds on a long term basis ••••• twenty to thirty years 
normally. 
The secondary market is the other source of funds. 
The hist~rical or ~~~~~~t~onal secondary market consists of insurance 
compani~ easte.~~~~y!ngs panks, large savings and loans, banks, 
... - -- .. - ...... - . . ' . . . 
or other institutions and even individuals which have the ability 
-----~-w _ ___ .., 
and the desire to commit their funds on a long-term basis to a 
lender in order that the lender can then place those funds in the 
real estate market and sell the mortgage obligation to that investor. 
It is this part of the market that we feel is extremely important. 
II. THE SECONDARY MARKET 
Historically, California has had housing needs far 
beyond our ability to generate sufficient long-term funds to meet 
that need. Because of thi~, a~~ ~ende~~ ~n Calitornia that have 
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had any impact in this market have relied on the secondary market 
as a supplementary if not a primary source of needed funds. There 
are certain "rules of the game": those that need the funds are hard 
put to negotiate entirely favorable terms against those that have 
the funds, especially in a competitive market. This is true 
whether you are the California lender attempting to get eastern 
funds or whether you 1.are a California borrower attempting to get 
funds from a California lender. 
The point of this comment is that the funds are nego-
tiated and the terms tend to be dictated by the one who has control 
of those funds. The person who invests the funds has to recov~r 
his costs, has to make a profit and has to, in some fashion, 
control the return of these funds under some kind of contrac-
tual agreement. Again, this is true whether it is a California 
lender (who is in the borrower's position when he goes to the 
secondary market) or whether it is a California borrower. 
Generally, the large investors, wi~ available lon.g-
- -· -.,_·- ...... --- - ·- --- .. ~-- -----
term funds which constitute the secondary market, have been ~-~-·~·- -·· 
- -- --- -·- ... -· 
position to set the terms bY. .. wbi....c.h __ thQ.~~ - funds.~ are placed when a 
-:------------·----·------ ·---·-- -- . . - - ··· 
bank ventures forth to locate a block of funds that can be used __ _ .. ___..... ... .... ... .. ... . 
- ·· .. __ .. ---~-- ·-- -~- --- ....... -. ------ --
by the bank in real estate lending. The in~:~_:t.~-;- _:reviews _ !:h~. 
lender's policy on .. .suoh . things_ .as_...t.he __ f.Qpn of the note used, the 
• • - r" • - ·- . ... .. _ _ .... - ... --- ••• - • ----
form qf the mortgage or d~gg ~f trust including late charge provi-
.. ... . - • ~ • ·0 - I - •• - • - -
s~on~, ~repayment charges, due on sale . provisions, assumption -- . --- - . ·-· ---·- -- ----
policies and other provisions. Their interest is to ensure loans 
to creditworthy borrowers on t~rm~ that iqs~re _timely payment and a 
generally productive investment of their funds. If their funds 
-162-
0 
can be placed elsewhere under more productive terms, it is 
obviously more difficult t~ get those funds into the California 
housing market. Also, if one type of lender has more freedom 
to meet these demands, that particular lender has an advantage 
over other lenders who are not permitted to meet these demands on 
the same free basis. It is for this reason that we feel that 
lenders in California, regardless of type, whether they are bank, 
savings and loan, mortgage banker, or mortgage loan broker, so 
long as they are active in the area of supplying funds and supply-
ing lending to those who want to purchase residential real property, all 
should be under the general over-all rules of the game as established 
by the Legislature. Credit unions and others that periodically 
get involved in this market, including individual sellers, we 
feel should be in no better position to extract a more onerous 
agreement than any other lender. 
III. FNMA & FHLMC 
Recent developments in the area have resulted in 
reaction to some of the difficulties in the market. There are 
cycles in the flow of funds that have had little to do with housing 
needs. Rather they are cycles that are determined by the general 
economic situation within the United States and, at times, the 
world. Federal legislation and federal activity has resulted in an 
easier entry into this market. 
One example would be the Federal National Mortgage Act 
or- Fannie Mae, a - public -corporation -which was created to obtain funds __ - - -- -·--------· --- . ---... ~ - .__.., ____ . __ , ... ..- -·--·· .. ------------ -·--
either from the normal second~~y market or from investment in the 
''-...,,-... ...... -........ _, ____ _ _,,. -·· 
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bond market. The activity in the bond market converts short 
term investments of others into money which can then be used on 
a long-term basis. 
Another example is the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
• Corporation, or Freddie Mac, which is a private corporation formed by 
------- --
the Federal Home Loan Bank system. The program is designed to 
. ---- .. ~ . . -. - . . - -
accomplish the same ends as Fannie Mae. There is a third progr~, -- ·- ~--- ~- - ----· · --··· .. .. --·- -- . . - .. ·- .. . . . . . ·-· ·--. ·- .. 
the Government National Mortgage Act, or Ginnie Mae, which is a 
. -- - -- . -. _ .. -
division of H.U.D. It is another device of the same nature and 
i's in the process of development with regard to conventional loans. 
They have various subsidized programs but are just beginning their 
conventional loan program. Because of being in a developing state, 
GNMA will not receive much further comment in this presentation. 
Under present tight money conditions, FNMA and FHLMC have 
---------~-----~ -~..:~- ~-- ·~ ------. -- . ------------- ----
become the primary sources of funds for residential real estate . - . __ ____ _..., ... _, __ 
--·-·l•...- ......... ·~~--... pCDL----1'~-------.,.,-
lending activity by both savings and_~oans and banks. The problem is 
tha t:~e&_o_n~.,ll~ic:>;;~:-_~;~i~;i~Y -~rke~o~s ~~t h~v~ at ~:_1 _ :_~es 
sufficient funds available at a sufficiently reasonable cost to be ...._ _________ . 
able to convert those into a saleable home loan at a price that the 
normal borrower is able to pay. It was because of this that FNMA 
and FHLMC were formed and they present to us all an entry point into 
the market. Primarily, their source of funds under present conditions 
have come from the bond market, as indicated, rather than from the 
secondary market because there they run into the same problems that 
lenders from California have if they go direct. The importance·of -------- -- --
FNMA and FHLMC· to th-is ~-~'?~i~t_e~ _lies . in that tl!~~ h~ve stand.a~g 
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provisions covering some fees and some provisions which are being 
-·----~ ·-.. - -----.. - - --··-- ·-·-·- -------
discussed before the committee during this series of hearings. 
-·-· ----- - -
The lender, if utilizing these sources of funds, need 
not use those standards unless he sells the mortgage obligation 
either to FNMA or FHLMC. At this point, the terms of the agreement 
with the borrower become those required by FNMA or FHLMC. In addition, 
FHLMC has standard forms which must be used if sale to FHLMC is 
contemplated. These forms generally ~re acceptable to FNMA. However, 
they have some differences in policies and approach. 
The manner in which the lender uses these devices 
(FNMA and FHLMC) should also be discussed. With re ard to FNMA, 
gene_!ally the __ l_e~~er_ p~ys a C<?~ent f~~- ofe lL~~ of.__!~.-9.! __ 1/2 
"point" based upon the funds needed. The commitment agreement which 
..,--. ·--.,.··-· . . .... - -- . 
results from this process includes provisions whereby FNMA will buy 
the mortgage placed by the lender from him at a certain value. ---- ... . - - ..... -- ---~--------- - . . 
FHLMC works in the same manner when banks deal with FHLMC: banks 
pay a 1/2 point "nonmember fee" rather than the eg\l_a_l _¥~MA_ ~ype 
of commitment fee. However, the result is really the same. 
F.H.A. and V.A. programs are programs which guarantee 
the payment of the loan and provide that if a qualified housing 
unit and a qualified borrower can be funded through FNMA or FHLMC, 
then these market entry devices can also be used to produce funds 
for real estate lending which can then be regulated under F.H.A. 
or V.A. programs which, of course, are subject to the federally 
regulated provisions of F.H.A. or V.A. These provisions regulate 
the mortgage and note form and become the conditions of the loan 
- . - -
to the borrower. Included are late payment charges, prepayment 
charges and the like. 
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FNMA and FHLMC have become the most active and 
available fund sources for several reasons: (1) their access to 
bond market funds, (2) the savings outflow and federal competition 
for funds problems that banks and savings and loans have shared in 
recent months, (3) these devices convert short-term funds to 
long-term funds which are then available for the real estate 
market, and (4) the necessity that lending institutions in California 
have to go beyond their own in-house sources of funds. 
At this point, I would like to discuss the approach 
that FNMA and FHLMC have to the various provisions which are 
included in the hearing notice preceding this meeting. 
A. LATE CHARGES 
Generally, a late charge is a charge to encourage 
the borrower to meet his legal obligations in a timely manner. It 
also serves to compensate the lender for his losses due to nonpayment 
by the borrower. This is a technical default entitling the lender 
to foreclose. However, C.C.P. Section 580b, the anti-deficiency 
legislation enacted in the 1930's, forces the lender to bring 
foreclosure and to sue on the security for the loan rather than 
for the payment due under the note, since if they do the latter, 
the lender would waive his rights under a deed of trust. Therefore, 
the lender obviously attempts to get payment without going to 
foreclosure because of the expense and because of the emotional 
impact of a foreclosure proceeding, if nothing else. Failing this, 
however, the lender is left only with foreclosure as the enforcement 
device. 







upon a payment including impound account amounts which are required 
under federal law. 
V.A. loans provide for a 4% charge figured on the 
same basis. 
FNMA has a 4% on the payment due charge, but in this 
case the payment due is computed by only including the principal 
and interest and not the impound accounts. 
FHLMC has generally the same approach as FNMA. 
The conventional secondary market is the remaining 
source of funds. These provisions vary. Generally, what has 
happened historically is that the sources of funds have reviewed 
individual lenders policies. If they find they are agreeable to 
the source of funds, then they make the funds available to the 
lender relying on the lender's expertise in evaluating the loan, 
placing the loan and enforcing and servicing the loan, including 
late charge provisions. If the late charge provision of the 
individual lender is not acceptable to the conventional secondary 
source of funds, then those funds are not made available to that 
lender. 
I would like to make some comments on late charges. 
The F.H.A., V.A. programs indicateoneapproach to late charges. 
FNMA and FHLMC present another. If the lender is lending for his 
own portfolio there may be different problems. 
The Garrett case held that a particular late charge 
provision was invalid as a penalty which the Legislature had not 
au~hor~zed. At tha~ -p~int, the Court decided that as that p~nalt~ 
was invalid the case had to be discussed in terms of actual damages 
to the lender because of the failure of the borrower to pay as he 
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was obligated under contract. The case also discussesliquidated 
damages as the present provisions of the code which should regulate 
the lender's position. Liquidated damages provisions must be 
reasonably related to damages to the lender in the event of non-
payment. 
The California Bankers Association feels that a proper 
approach by the Legislature would be to enact legislation setting 
a maximum charge. We have advocated 10% in the past. This has 
apparently not been acceptable in view of the Legislature's refusal 
to pass such a provision. We would suggest 6% at this time in view 
of the fact that 6% is the penalty charged by the State on late tax 
payments and by counties on late property tax payments. As a matter 
of fact, the county charge is a flat 6%. Assuming a missed 
December payment, annualize that payment, it comes to some 12%. The 
same approach taken with the April payment, if that should be missed, 
annualizes to a set rate of 24%. After the late charge portion of 
the county tax charges there is available a redemption procedure 
which provides, in essence, for 1% per month interest cost on the 
funds that are due. We feel that 6% reaches the "threshold of pain" 
level necessary to encourage timely payment, which is vital to all 
lenders, especially in view of the fact the lender cannot sue to 
force a late payment, he can only foreclose. Failure to adopt this 
approach will result in a continuing 10% late charge policy by some 
lenders. 
At this point, I would like to refer you to the dis-
cussion earlier this morning -by the - savings- and loan indu~try. 







FHLMC or a FNMA loan results in a disallowance or disqualification 
of that loan for trade in the FNMA or FHLMC market. That being the 
case, the lender is precluded from turning those funds over and 
receiving more funds. This is just one of the indications of the 
importance, from our viewpoint, of the late charge provision. 
The late charge provision is especially important to us in view 
of the fact that, practically speaking, the lender cannot sue 
for payment. He can only foreclose. 
B. PREPAYMENT PROVISIONS 
This provision permits the lender to impose a charge 
on the borrower. The borrower agreed on a long term contract. Now 
he wants out. This provision is designed to compensate the lender 
for the unilateral change in the contract by the borrower. I think 
it is obvious that the lender in the same situation cannot go 
to the borrower and say, "Well, we don't like the contract anymore, and 
we would like to have all our money back." Thus, the prepayment 
provision is an attempt to cope with the lack of balance in this 
case between the borrower and the lender. 
F.H.A. and V.A. regulations provide that no prepayment 
provision will be charged, but I think it is important to note the 
seller must pay points upon selling that property to someone else. 
The impact of the requirement that he pay points provides much the 
same kind of readjustment that the normal prepayment charge provides. 
FNMA requires no prepayment provision. However, if 
the loan is made on a FHLMC form, which is then acceptabie to FNMA, 
the prepayment provision of FHLMC is unenforced during the time the 
loan or mortgage obligation is held by FNMA. However, if they 
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subsequently sell it to another on the secondary market, that pre-
payment penalty becomes enforceable. I think it is interesting 
to note that FNMA uses FHLMC's provision on prepayments on condominiums 
and planned unit developments. There was an article in the Wall 
Street Journal just a short time ago that indicated that condominiums 
made up some 14.5% of the 1973 new starts. ~ think that this indi-
cates that FNMA, while requiring no prepayment provision while they 
hold the loan, does understand and accept the necessity of such a 
payment when it comes time to sell that mortgage to a buyer in the 
conventional secondary market. 
FHLMC presents a different approach than FNMA. They 
have on their standard forms a required prepayment provision. In 
general, what that provision provides is that, if the prepayment 
occurs during the first 3 years of the mortgage, the borrower must 
pay an amount which "shall not be less than the maximum amount 
allowed by Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations or such lesser 
percentage as is the maximumpecrnissible under applicable law." 
The maximum amount is found in Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
Regulations in Section 555.15, Ruling No. 74-121, February 19, 1974. 
In general, this provides that with regard to federal savings and 
loans, they cannot charge a prepayment penalty that exceeds 6 months 
interest on the excess of 20% of the original balance of the loan. 
I think it is interesting to note that this provision permits the 
provision to be enforceable for the duration of the loan. Assuming 
6 months interest, and a 10% loan, there is a 5% prepayment charge 
after deducting 20% from the loan amount. _ 
The second part of the FHLMCnote provision sets forth that 
if prepayment should occur during the fourth or fifth years of the obli-
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gation the charge shall then be 3% of the original balance. Thus, in 
effect what happens is a two-stage, five-year prepayment provision. 
The first three years shall be up to six months interest, the 
next two will be a 3% charge, both based on the original balance 
of the loan. After the fifth year there is no charge. .Further, 
this prepayment penalty applies only if refinanced by other than 
the holder of the note. 
The conventional secondary market varies. But 
generally, it is handled in the same manner as discussed under 
late charges. The lenders have been free to do what they wish, 
but in order to get funds, must conform to the demands and the 
needs of the conventional secondary market. 
The California Bankers Association has advocated six months 
interest after the deduction of 20% is applied to the unpaid balance 
of the loan. This would prevail for 7 years. This was included in 
A.B. 2114 by Assemblyman Hayden in 1973, which I earlier indicated 
died in the Senate. It is interesting to note, however, that this 
particular provision was inserted over the objection of the mortgage 
loan brokers in S.B. 304 of 1973 and currently is in the law. This 
can be contrasted with the provision of S.B. 200 by Senator Gregorio, 
where there would be a five year provision which would diminish by 
20% each year so that after 5 years there would be no more charge. 
The C.B.A. feels that the FHLMC provision would be 
proper and workable and still provide a provision familiar to the 
secondary market. The provision of S.B. 200is a provision which is 
unfamiliar to ±hat market and again, we feel that the secondary 
market is what we have to aim at in order to ensure the flow of funds. 
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FNMA and FHLMC have both recognized that necessity should they 
have to sell mortgages in that market. Further, it provides the 
benefits, generally speaking, of S.B. 200 by recognizing the 
5-year period of existence and the declining tendency of the 
payments over the period of that 5 years. One further point, 
I earlier indicated that we feel that all lenders should be under 
I 
the same limitation. The federal S & L's have their regulation 
which presents a problem in this regard. The same is true of 
the mortgage loan brokers where the provisions of our A.B. 2114 were 
incorporated in S.B. 304. We feel that this Committee should 
reconsider S.B. 304 as applied to mortgage loan brokers and should 
somehow attempt to deal with the federal savings and loan provision. 
Since the federal provision is an over-all limit as to what they 
can do which would be higher than the FHLMC provision which we are 
suggesting, competition would ope·rate to bring federal savings and 
loans down to provisions of FHLMC, should it be adopted, so that 
they would then under the market restrictions be competitive with 
other lenders. 
C. DUE ON SALE CLAUSES. 
This provision gives the lender the right to accelerate 
the debt in the event the borrower sells all or part of the property. 
The reason for this provision is that the agreement is for a 
long period of time. Anticipating changes is very difficult if 
not impossible. If one party, the borrower, chooses to change one 
important provision of the contract, the term, to convey to someone 
else the security for the lo~n, _then the lender shou~d be able to 
call a halt and on theevent of the change of ownership, enter into 




upon default because both are the right of acceleration for the 
benefit of the lender. 
F.H.A. and V.A. loans permit no due on sale provisions. 
FNMA has no due on sale provision but again, if they 
are utilizing FHLMC forms in making the loan, they don't enforce it. 
However, a subsequent purchaser of the mortgage may enforce that 
provision. 
I think it is important to note at this point that if 
there is no due on sale provision, there is no ability of the lender 
to accelerate the loan obligation and that obligation continues. 
One situation which can result is assumption. If· there is no 
assumption, however, that borrower remains liable in addition to 
a new borrower who agrees to pick up the obligation for those payments. 
From the lender's viewpoint, this presents a difficult problem. The 
protection of c.c.P. S~c. 580b still exists, but to collect from 
the original borrower would force a waiver of the security in addition 
to the fact that he has sold that security to another. 
At the present time, lenders view the making of a 
twenty or thirty year mortgage as one which probably will be prepaid 
within a twelve year period, thus they regard the twelve year period 
as one they should consider in setting interest rates and the rest. 
If, however, the loan is one which is subject to some kind of 
automatic assumption and the rate of that loan is, compared to 
the present market, relatively low, obviously prepayment and refin-
ancing will not occur. In those circumstances, the lender has a 
loan ~h~_!: -~s __ g.Q~~g __ 1;Q _g.Q_ __ ~b~. fJ,tll __ tem, ___ _wn_~_t._her __ it _is _twenty,. t!wenty-
five or thirty years. This presents a difficult problem for the 
lender if he has anticipated the twelve year period which is 
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presently being used by most lenders. 
FHLMC presents a different approach ~g~in to the 
-- 11 
due on sale. FHLMC has a uniform note which must be used if the 
mortgage is to be resold to FHLMC. It provides, and I would like to 
quote this at the present time, 
"If all or any part of the property or an interest therein 
is sold or transferred by the borrower without· the lender's 
prior written consent, excluding (a) the creation of a 
lien or encumbrance subordinate to this deed of trust; 
(b) the creation of a purchased money security interest 
for household appliances; (c) a transfer by devise, 
descent or operation of law upon the death of a joint 
tenant; or (d) the grant of any leasehold interest of 
3 years or less, not containing an option to purchase, 
the lender may at the lender's option declare all sums 
secured by this deed of trust to be · immediately due and 
payable." 
The conventional secondary market is a structure within 
which the lenders are left to compete in trying to meet the demands · 
of the secondary sources of funds. As a result, they have developed 
due on sale clauses in much the same manner as late charges and 
prepayment provisions. 
We would like to note at this time that subdivision (c) 
of the FHLMC uniform note where it excludes from the due on sale 
clause a transfer by devise, descent or operation of law on joint 
tenancy is a provision we feel takes care of many of the problems 
that have been indicated in testimony supporting S.B. 200. Such 
situations as the enforcement of due on sale clauses in the event 
of death of the borrower and the transfer of the property by either 
devise or descent to the widow. Under the FHLMC approach, there 
would be no enforceable due on sale clause in this case. In 
- -
commenting on due on sale provisions, we feel that- this provision 
is extremely important in view of the length of the term of the 
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contract and also the difficulty inherent in anticipating important 
changes in the underlying circumstances. 
These changes may have profound affects on the 
borrower, his creditworthiness, and the security •••.• the security 
being the only source of funds available to the lender under the 
anti-deficiency legislation (C.C.P. §580b). Further, its importance 
is recognized by the FHLMC's Services Guide, page 516: 
"FHLMC believes that the right of acceleration upon transfer 
of ownership is an invaluable tool of any mortgage investor 
in ensuring that only creditworthy mortgagors are responsible 
for making payments where the right of acceleration upon 
transfer of ownership exists. Servicer shall use its best 
effort to determine the sale or transfer of mortgaged 
property or any other event giving rise to the right of 
acceleration." 
The case of Tucker v. Lassen, a recent decision by 
the California Supreme Court, considered due on sale clauses in ' 
the context of the legislative provision against unreasonable 
restraints against alienation of property. The Court held that \ 
such a clause could not be enforced where the sale was in the fo~ 
of an installment contract of sale of real property. It very 
carefully did not consider a true sale situation. 
The California Bankers Association feels that the 
FHLMC provision offers a reasonable suggestion for California 
legislation, especially in view of subdivision (c) which covers 
all transfers by devise or descent, and excludes them from the 
due on sale provision. 
D. ASSUMPTION CLAUSES AND FEES 
This clause arises where the borrower sells the 
property and attempts to have his new buyer assume his benefits 
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and obligations under the note and deed of trust. Most instruments 
merge these with the due on sale and permit the lender to exercise 
the veto. 
F.H.A. and V.A. permit assumption provision due to 
the fact that they don't have due on sale clauses. 
FNMA likewise has no provision. 
FHLMC again presents a little different structure. 
You will recall the FHLMC statement on the importance of the due 
on sale provision. They permit the lender servicer to approve 
an assumption if (a) cash equity of at least 5% of the new purchase 
price; (b) property is to be owner-occupied; (c) monthly first plus 
second of any mortgage payments plus escrow impound accounts do not 
exceed 25% of the base pay of the primary wage earner; (d) ic) above 
plus all other monthly payments on all installment debts having 
remaining terms of more than 7 months do not exceed 33-1/3% of the 
monthly base pay of the primary wage earner; (e) is not really 
applicable to our discussion here today; (f) that there be no 
other changes in the terms of the loan. If these conditions are 
not met, FHLMC will consider an assumption on a case by case basis. 
Note: Under this system, if the loan rate changes, the servicer-
lender cannot permit an assumption. In those cases, the lender 
must repurchase the mortgage from FHLMC at par and make a new loan 
with regard to the new party. 
Conventional secondary market in this area is much 
the same as above. Assumptions normally are only at the option 
of the lender. There are instruments, however, which do permit 
assumptions but these are normally for the lender's own portfolio 
and, again, it is the secondary market which dictates the nature 
of the provision. -176-
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In commenting on the whole area of assumptions, 
le~~~p~~~~~~ith extreme caution. Each lender has 
an experience factor which reflects the turnover rate of their loans. 
This factor is considered in the light of inflation, risk, and the 
cost of money in setting the interest rate of the loans. Incidentally, 
under the FNMA and FHLMC programs, the turnover rate is generally 
regarded as 12 years. Thus, the loan is analyzed as if it is going 
to last only for twelve years. If the lender did not have the 
veto right, then each loan would ·have to be regarded on the term 
of the note, in other words, twenty or thirty years. Inflation 
i 
alone would dictate higher interest rates than presently exist. 
S.B. 200 and Tucker discuss the lender-borrower 
relationship as if the only concern of the lender is with the 
condition of the security. We take strong exception to this point. 
The lender has agreed to financing that particular borrower based 
upon his promise to pay as agreed and on an evaluation of his 
ability and willingness to pay. 
Let me for a minute go back and reread some of the FHLMC·~ 
conditions · for assumptions: (a) cash equity of at least 5% of the 
new purchase price; (b) property is to be owner-occupied; 
(c) monthly first plus second mortgage payments plus escrow-impound 
accounts do not exceed 25% of the base pay of the primary wage 
earner; (d) (c) above plus all other monthly payments on all 
other installment debts having remaining terms of more than 7 months 
do not exceed 33-1/3% of the monthly base pay of the primary wage 
earner. These provisions, plus the fact that both FNMA and FHLMC 
anticipate credit reports clearly indicate that they consider 
more than merely the security. 
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A further point is the "unreasonable impairment of 
security" 1est of S. B. 200, which apparently was borrowed from the 
court's discussion in the LaSala case which also appeared in the 
Tucker case. This is a situation where the lender, under their 
theory, is solely concerned with the condition of his security. 
We feel, from the lender's viewp~int, that this concept is plainly 
unworkable. By the terms of S.B. 200, the only application of this 
test would arise in a foreclosure action. If a standard is to be 
enacted by the Legislature, it must be an objective one, not a sub-
jective test. The latter would lead to constant expensive and 
time-consuming litigation and be against the best interests of 
everyone involved. The problem arises since the unreasonable 
impairment of security test is a test which is dependent upon a 
subjective view of the particular situation. What is necessary is 
a standard which is objective and can be determined by the parties 
involved with a minimum of possible disagreements leading to 
litigation. 
The California Bankers Association feels that the 
FHLMC approach is one that is far superior to the approach of 
S.B. 200. FHLMC, incidentally, permits a 1% fee upon assumption, 
and we feel that this is an agreeable provision. 
E. "POINTS II 
The next concept I would like to discuss is that of 
"points". This discussion differs from other areas because points, 
as we understand them, arise only with regard to F.H.A. and V.A. 
loans. F.H.A. and V.A. are not sources of funds - they are 
guarantee programs. They are designed to r~duce the risk factor 
for the lender and to get funds to borrowers who are otherwise 
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unable to get mortgage funds in the prevailing market. Thus, 
they have an interest rate limitation. For instance, F.H.A. is 
now 9-1/2%. Having gotten the loan at the artificially low rate, 
when the borrower sells his property, the new buyer assumes, in the 
normal situation, and he then gets that same benefit. The lender, 
having gotten the funds from the normal market,then is permitted 
to charge the seller points. This is the difference between the 
F.H.A. or V.A. rate and the prevailing market rate expressed in a 
percentage of points. 
F. LOAN FEES OR LOAN ORIGINATION FEES 
Loan fees are very often expressed as points also, 
which creates some confusion with the F.H.A.-V.A. situation. In 
our minds, the loan fee is that which covers the lender's cost of 
obtaining a block of funds from the secondary market and his cost 
of processing the loan. Thus, it would cover appraisal fees, 
photo fees and all normal closing costs which would cover work 
done by the lender on the loan application. Credit reports are 
among the included costs. 
F.H.A. and V.A. limit loan fees to 1% of the amount 
of the loan. 
FNMA, FHLMC and the secondary market leave these fees 
to the lender. We feel that loan fees properly charged and used 
properly cover processing costs and commitment costs necessary to 
bring a loan to fruition. We feel that a loan fee of 2% of the loan 
is proper, that is, a chrage of two points. F.H.A. and V.A. is 
limited- to 1% which barely covers administrative anq proq~s~~ng _9ost~. 
When using FNMA and FHLMC the breakdown is as follows: 1% for our 
costs plus 1/2% commitment fees or nonmember fees, resulting in a 
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small profit of 1/2 point which is not unreasonable since loan 
. 
payments then go to others. The lender becomes only the servicer 
for a small fee. The servicing fee ranges betwen 1/4% and 3/B% of 
the interest collected on the payment as it is made through the 
life of the loan. The conventional secondary market breakdown 
is as follows: there is the 1% cost factor, plus the 1% commitment 
fees normally charged by sources of funds in the conventional 
secondary market. Under a 2% loan fee l~itation, this would 
result in a wash for the lender. 
Since each of these sources of funds should be pro-
tected, the 2% fee should be the minimum level at which any statutory 
max~um can be set. 
Title insurance fees, real estate broker fees, 
escrow charges are not normally fees charged by the bank. To the 
extent that these costs may be incurred by the bank, we should be 
able to pass them on to the borrower at cost. When bank services are 
utilized other than as part of a loan application (e.g. escrow services) 
any limitation which is set should consider the private escrow 
services, permitting them to recover their costs plus a reasonable 
profit. If such a limitation is needed, then this approach should 
be followed in our view. 
IV. NORMAL BANK PROCEDURES 
These should be reviewed in order to give the Committee 
an idea of what is presently going on with regard to bank policies 
in real estate len9ing. To so~~ d~~ree th~s has already been 
covered, but I think it should be discussed directly. For banks 




trust problems. However, it is no secret within the industry 
what various banks do. There are differences between banks that 
reflect varying degrees of involvement in the real estatellending 
field. Other differences reflect different policies as to qualified 
borrowers, geographical locations, and whether they primarily lend 
for their own portfolio or need outside funds in order to operate. 
Late charges are normally from 4% to 6%. Prepayment 
charges .. ~~ry greatly, but six months interest on the original balance 
plus 20% seems to be not unusual. One statewide bank recently 
raised their charge to better compete with other lenders for outside 
funds. They raised their charge to something similar to the FHLMC 
provisions. It should be noted that within this area there are 
some banks that have a 5 year limitation on their prepayment charge, 
others do not. Due on sale provisions are generally uniform and are 
included in the note. The unusual situation is the note which does 
not include such a provision. Assumption fees vary from a flat charge 
of $100 to slightly higher than 1% of the unpaid balance. 
Acceleration and assumption fees are judged on individual cases. 
The factors considered are loan rates, creditworthiness and loan 
officer judgment factors. Loan fees also vary but they range 
from 2% to something slightly higher. Finders fees are not used 
by banks. Again, many of these provisions have been formulated 
to compete effectively on the conventional secondary market. 
At this point, perhaps it would be worthwhile to 
discuss a major problem a real estate lender has which affects 
all Qf_ tne thi.rrg~ we _hay_~ .l>~e~ _ _Q_!_~q~~-~~r.!g. This is the p:z:~blem 
of profit and the problem of obtaining funds. 
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Assume that a bank wants to use in-bank sources to 
make a real estate loan. Assume further that you take $100,000, 
one-half from each of the two basic sources. In other words, 
$50,000 from commercial/checking account source and $50,000 
from the savings account source. Under the Federal Reserve require-
ments, reserves must be established covering the deposit sources of 
the funds. With rega"g __ t.o..J;;he __ commercial aspect, it would be 15%, 
- - - - ... 4 - -·--- - _., - --- · - -- . . ... ·- • -· -- -
which results in $7,500 that must be set aside and fQl:" _j;h_~ _  savings -------.... 
asp~t.__thent_ _ _i_l! -~- -2Q%_. reserve. .. :r;equiremgp~ or a reserve of $10,000. 
--- . -- ~- -
Thus, you have $17,500 which must be taken from the $100,000 and 
----·-- -·· -- -- ..... -----·- ------ - --------···- . ... -· ----· 
placed -~~---~overnmen-t: __ ~~-~t.Q provide reserves for the deposits 
from whence these funds came. 
This reduces the lendable funds from $100,000 to $82,500. 
Assume that there is a 10.5% annual rate of interest that is charged 
on the loan. This results in an interest payment for the year of 
$8,662.50. Of the 10.5% rate of interest, some 8% goes to pay 
interest to the depositors of the $100,000, including the depositor's 
interest payment, F.D.I.C. insurance and other costs to the bank 
including servicing of the loan under discussion. This figure 
comes to roughly $6,600 during the year. This leaves 2.5% out 
of the 10.5% or $2,062.50 as an annual return to the lender before 
taxes. 
The foregoing assumes a "normal" lending situation. 
It also assumes that charges, fees, etc. return nothing more than 
incidental revenue to the bank. 
This then p_r~s~nts a gene~al p!cture wh~ch _ is ~ot 
intended to reflect any particular bank or any particular trans-
action, but rather to reflect a problem common to bank lenders. 
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To place capital in the real estate lending market is 
very expensive to the lender because his return is not as high as 
people would assume. It is obvious that you can get better than 
a 2. 5% return on many other types of investment. This is one of 
the real problems involved in real estate financing. 
If the loan was prepared on FHLMC forms, .etc., and if 
we f~rget the .~imitation . of FHLMC .and ~~~. ~~--~55,~0~ . lo~~~ in the 
individua~ .~i~~~~~- -~~~ -!~~~5~0 ~ortgage c~~~~- ~e sold on the 
FHLMC or FNMA market. The funds realized can then be utilized to 
o;-------- ·----- · - .... -----·-- · 
make another loan. This is how to get loan funds into the California 
-. -
market • .....__ 
If there is a tight money situation, then the Federal 
Reserve may increase the reserve requirement. This causes govern-
ment bond prices to incr~ase, plus the fact that out of that 2.5% 
return, we must go out and purchase further government bonds as the 
only means we have of meeting the increased reserve requirements. 
Further, federal policies of selling bonds in lots of, $1,000 drains 
away potential savings or commercial deposits because of limited 
rates banks can pay on savings. This further operates to raise 
the cost levels of the market -- another complicating factor. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This presentation is intended to illustrate two 
points: (1) the importance of the secondary market, both conven-
tional and FNMA and FHLMC; (2) that any legislative action must 
not restrict the flow of funds upon which the entire California ............. 
housing economy is dependent. The provisions and practices 
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discussed can have i~portant effects on that flow of funds. 
This generally concludes the California Bankers 
Association presentation and I will be available and willing to 
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My name is Jack Hempel. I am Chief Deputy Director of the 
Department of Real Estate. Real Estate Co1nmissioner Robert W. 
Karpe has asked me to thank the committee for giving the 
Department of Real Estate the opportunity to be present and 
to respond to questions which may arise involving either the 
jurisdiction or the expertise of the Department. 
The meeting notice states the activities of the committee will 
encompass costs associated with the consummation and financing 
of real property transactions. 
The topics listed in the meeting notice are not regulated by 
the Department of Real Estate, except for some of the charges 
in connection with hard money loans under what is customarily 
referred to as the Necessitous Borrowers Act. These matters 
were most recently addressed by the Legislature in connection 
with S.B. 304 and S.B. 310 of the 1973 Session -- both bills 
were supported by the Department of Real Estate. These amend-
ments tightened up~n ' the activities of some of the larger 
mortgage brokers via Article 7 of the Real Estate La'\'T (with 
respc:ct to regulatc.r:y· provisions applying t;u l:t::ct:i.. t:S'-.di..~ 
licensees in certain mortgage loan transactions). 
We assume the above information has been catalogued by the 
committee, and that your current interest lies primarily in the 
area of settlement costs directly related rini.· the purchasing and 
selling of residential properties in today • s ··'real estate market. 
In that regard, we understand several of the matters which the 
committee might feel are within our area of expertise, although 
not in our regulatory jurisdiction, have to do with the follow-
ing: 
1. The effect of real estate brokerage commissions on real 
estate transactions and the question of these fees in 
relation to services rendered. 
Commissions are a matter of negotiation between agent and 
principal. Although there are rates (6 percent) typical 
in the trade, many licensees deviate from this figure. 
In Sacramento, for example, I have seen TV commercials 
within the last three or four months from a 
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prominent firm of Realtors advertising that their "full 
service" commissions on house sales are $800 plus 
1 percent of the selling price. I do not know whether 
there have been any surveys as to how many licensees 
deviate from the norm, but, of course, it has long been 
customary for large transactions to typically result in a 
negotiated commission at somewhat less than that figure 
representatives from the industry could comment on this, 
I am sure. 
State anti-trust laws prohibit the fixing.of commissions 
for services, and I believe the California Association of 
Realtors -- many years ago -- entered into a consent decree 
which resulted in the withdrawal from circulation of any 
recommended rates. It would be our observation that the 
fact that most licensees charge 6 percent on residential 
sales is more a standard of reasonableness than of design. 
It is true in most fields that activities below a certain 
rate are not economically feasible. This is probably why 
my TV repa~r experience has been relatively similar as to 
the cost per visit from the three different repairmen who 
have visitec my own home during the last several years. 
This also probably explains why the markups for the sale 
of consumer goods, based on inventory, turnover and the 
like, are relatively stable. We understand 11big ticket" 
appliances customarily sell at a 40 to 50 percent markup, 
whereas small appliances sell at the 25 to 30 percent 
level. Similarlv. discount new car auto saleR are m:;unllv ~t 
$200 to $300 over invoice. I know of none . who deal for, -
say, $50 to $100. The net-net just would not be there! 
In the typical rea 1 estate tr·ansaction, the commission is 
shared by four real estate licensees. The listing is 
secured by a salesman who is probably an employee in a 
real estate firm. The property is sold by another office 
with wpom the listing office cooperates or through the 
multiple listing service. The same sort of division of 
the selling agent's share of the c~mmission takes place in 
that office between the salesman and his broker. Without 
this network of communications, there would probably be 
fewer real estate transactions: multiple listing services 
have thrived because they help get the broadest possible 
exposure for properties which are available for sale. If 
one considers the vast majority of every license~s time 
which is spent in work other than getting a signature on a 
dotted line, the actual remuneration to each licensee 
involved in the transaction would be best understood. 
A portion of all licensee's fees is set aside for education 
and research in real estate in the l.nstitutions of higher 
learning in California. 
We haye fQund three of thes~ r.ese~rch_ projects which contain 
segments relating to the income of licensees. A copy of 
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each of these has been delivered to the committee for 
such analysis as might seem appropriate. Although each 
of these was directed to something collateral to the 
0 pure question of income, the factors which were reviewed 
seem to point toward an average income for a full-time 
licensee in the real estate business at somewhere between 
the $10,000 and $20,000 per annum level. Even a 1974 sur-
vey by the organized real estate industry (within whose 
ranks the most active licensees are probably found and who, 
0 therefore, might be expected to have a subst~ntially higher 
income levels) 69 percent of those surveyed in 1974 who 
were salesmen responded that their earnings were $20,000 
or less• 23% under $10,000; 25% from $10,000 to $15,000: 
21% from $15,000 to $20,000; 31% over $20,000. 
2. We were told that the question might arise as to whether 
the large number of licensees in the state is not a factor 
which runs counter to possibility for reductions in real 
estate commission rates. We hardly think so. If there is 
an over-population of real estate licensees, every com-
petitive economic test we have ever seen supports the 
suggestion that the greater the competition the more price 
cutting might be expected. 
As of July 1, 1974, the Department had 219,381 real estate 
licensees. Of these, 146,435 1(90,026 active and 56,409 
inactive) were salesmen and 72,946 (62,464 active and 
10,4'32 inacti_ve) '\-ler'3 brokers. These ntmlber:c:: are large, 
but the percentage has varied only nominally in the past 35 
years. A review of Department records shows that the ratio 
of licensee to population has run something from 1 to 90 to 
1 to 125 since the late 1930 • s. · 
Further, the inactive status, which has only been 
statutorily provided for the past 17 or 18 years, shows 
us that only about two-thirds of the overall numbers are 
participating on the economic scene as real estate 
licensees. The one change which has been apparent during 
the last two decades has been a gradual reduction in the 
overall number of licensees who enjoy real estate broker 
license status as compared to the percentage of the total 
licentiate who are real estate salesmen. This, we believe , 
is a direct by-product of the two-year salesman experience 
requirement which was placed into the law in 1950, 
supplemented by the educational requirements for real 
estate brokers which have been added during the last ten 
years -- most rece~tly bringing the college level course 
requirements for real estate b:rokers to six real estate 
and real estate related courses (of three units each) to 
be effective January 1, 1975. We have delivered copies of 
the Long-Range Professionalization Plan, of which all of 
this is a part, to the committee. 
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We believe this sort of 11 limitation 11 on participation in 
the real estate field is that which is most economically 
sound and most particularly in the public interest. That 
is, that real estate licensees, especially those employing 
other real estate licensees, should be competent and 
knowledgeable in dealing with what is often the life 
savings of the average California citizen -- his participa-
tion in the ownership of his home. 
We believe, too, that entry into the real estate business --
or any other field -- should not be artificially restricted. 
Our citizens should have a right to a job, and as long as 
we have a tough real estate examination for determining the 
competency of real estate salesman licensees, we do not 
believe arbitrary restrictions should be added to them. On 
the other hand, the broker is responsible for the activities 
of his salesman and as such should be expected to have a 
higher level of competence and knowledge in order to 
protect best the interests of the consumer. 
Since most of the questions which might be developed by the 
committee as a result of testimony before it might deal with 
matters not apparent to us in preparing such a statement in 
advance -- it is the Commissioner's desire that I respond on 
his behalf to any questions you might have formulated; if I 
do not have the answer at hand, we pledge prompt research 
through appropriate members of our staff and a response prior 
to the co;:-,cl"..A.3ion of your deliberations. 
Thank you for the opportunity to be heard. 
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